Category Archives: nashi

EDITORIAL: Sacrilege at Seliger

EDITORIAL

Sacrilege at Seliger

Vladmir Putin is no stranger to hypocrisy. For example, though calling the USA a “parasite” whose economy is not based on productivity and which therefore is unreliable and harmful, under Putin Russian investment in the US economy has increased by a stunning one thousand six hundred percent.

Putin deals with hypocrisy of this kind they way Soviet rulers like him always have: He lies to his people, seeking to cultivate a nation of thoughtless automatons who can do nothing but worship at his feet.  It all begin with the youngest, at summer camp, the way it always did in the USSR.

In the photo above, two participants in the Kremlin’s Hitler-Jugend variant, Camp Seliger (one with a bra with eyes drawn on the outside of her t-shirt) walk past a billboard showing the faces of Dmitri Medvedev and Vladimir Putin weirdly fused into a single person, with the explanation “they are interchangeable.”

Elsewhere at the installation, campers walk by a row of photographs of Garry Kasparov, Mikhail Kasyanov, Boris Nemtsov, Eduard Limonov and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, under the banner:  “Losers of the Year.”

Continue reading

EDITORIAL: The Rat Bastard Named Vladislav Surkov

EDITORIAL

The Rat Bastard Named Vladislav Surkov

That’s Vladislav Surkov you see standing at the lectern in the photograph at the left, the bright red lectern emblazoned with the word “NASHI.”  Nashi, meaning “us Slavic Russians,” is the Putin youth cult founded by Surkov several years ago to emulate the Hiterjugend created in Nazi Germany. He fondly refers to his creation as  the “combat detachment of our political system.”

From the lectern Surkov told the Nashi cultists to “train their muscles” in preparation for the upcoming presidential elections in Russia which in his words “must be won by [Dmitri] Medvedev, [Vladimir] Putin and United Russia.”

Continue reading

EDITORIAL: Yashin 1, Nashi 0

EDITORIAL

Yashin 1, Nashi 0

It’s a mark of how odious and vile the Putin personality cult known as “Nashi” really is that not even Russian courts can stomach it.

Last week, a Moscow court ruled that Nashi’s outrageous lawsuit against opposition leader Ilya Yashin was frivolous, and tossed Nashi out of court on its ear.

The Moscow Times reports:

Continue reading

EDITORIAL: There’s Sick, and then there’s Russian Sick

EDITORIAL

There’s Sick, and then there’s Russian Sick

Russia’s ability to surpass itself, week after appalling week, with ever lower levels of vile, nauseating, subhuman conduct is truly breathtaking.

Last week, Echo of Moscow Radio broke the story of how the annual Nashi orgy of xenophobia and aggressive nationalism known as Camp Selinger, a government-funded festival of barbaric outrage, plumbed inconceivable new depths by putting the virtual heads of opposition political leaders on pikes and decorating them as Nazis.

The Kremlin’s youthful thugs did not hesitate to include octogenarian Lyudmila Alexeeva among those so assaulted.

You read that right:  They put an eighty year old woman’s head on a pike and stuck a Nazi hat on her head. She’s a human rights activist. She’s utterly defenseless and frail. And she’s a Nazi.

Continue reading

EDITORIAL: In Putin’s Russia, Welcome back to the USSR

EDITORIAL

In Putin’s Russia, Welcome back to the USSR

We can’t help but wonder how the world in general and Russia in particular would have reacted if, during his presidency, George Bush had circulated a list of 25,000 young people who the White House identified as America’s “most talented youth,” young people who would receive overt favoritism in education and employment from the very highest levels of the U.S. government — and every one of the names was drawn from extreme right-wing political organizations like the John Birch Society and the KKK.

Well, that’s exactly the kind of list that Russian dictator Vladimir Putin officially received last week from his NASHI political cult as they held their annual retreat of indoctrination and scheming, funded by millions of dollars desperately needed federal funds.  Just as in Soviet times, the Putin regime is creating an elite society like the Communist Party and making membership a prerequisite to advancement in the halls of business, politics and industry, the better to control the actions of the mass population.  With every day that passes, Russia is more and more fully neo-Soviet.

Heroic Russian human rights activist Marina Litvinenko expressed the horror of the civilized world towards these proceedings:

Continue reading

Barbaric Russia, on the Rampage

The Moscow Times reports:

Young people who gathered to celebrate spring by blowing bubbles at an annual flash mob in central St. Petersburg were attacked by a group of suspected neo-Nazis who mistook the gathering for a gay pride event, flash mob organizers said.

Some 500 people stood blowing bubbles on the steps of Gorkovskaya metro station and in the surrounding Alexandrovsky Park at about 4 p.m. Sunday — the agreed time for the start of the flash mob — when about 30 men ran up and started beating them and firing rubber bullets.

Several people fell to the ground before the attackers fled at the sight of approaching OMON riot police officers. A reporter saw officers detain at least one attacker. Police also detained about 30 bubble-blowers for five hours on suspicion of walking on the grass, a charge that they denied, organizers said.

Unconfirmed media reports said at least two participants were injured, one with a concussion and the other from a rubber bullet from an attacker’s gun.

Repeated calls to the police’s press office went unanswered.

Continue reading

EDITORIAL: Here Comes NASHI

EDITORIAL

Here Comes NASHI

Translating from Grani.ru, FinRosForum reports:

Meeting at its annual summer camp in Seliger, the Kremlin-led youth group, Nashi, decided to establish bands of militia consisting of disadvantaged youngsters armed with stun guns. Under the plan, hundreds of thousands of Putin’s young stormtroopers would patrol Russia’s streets and have the right to check people’s IDs. The initiative to establish the Russian Militia Association (Vserossiiskaya Assotsiatsiya Druzhin, VAD) comes from Vasily Yakemenko, director of the Federal Agency on Youth Affairs (Rosmolodezh) and former leader of the Nashists. The organisation would be financed from the state budget and receive administrative support from Rosmolodezh.

Attentive readers will remember our report a two weeks ago on human rights activist Albert Pchelintsev, who was attacked by a gang of youth and shot in the mouth with . . . a stun gun.  Gazeta.ru has more details on the proposed new use of NASHI stormtroopers.

The horrors of this scenario are so ghastly and obvious the hardly need to be stated:

Continue reading

Putin’s Paranoia, Exposed

The Chicago Tribune’s ace Russia correspondent Alex Rodriguez reports on Vladimir Putin’s shameless, Stalin-like paranoia and tactics in dealing with dissent:

The spy was only 20, a soft-spoken college student with a pouty smile and a double life. She had 40 agents working for her and dossiers piling up on her home computer. She revved up recruits with talk of an enemy bent on government overthrow. Anna Bukovskaya’s band of young spies stalked about western Russia like Cold War operatives, infiltrating the enemy, jotting down names and numbers, and at times using hidden cameras to secretly film targets.The fruits of her network’s espionage were eventually relayed to the Russian government, Bukovskaya says. And the enemy? They were young Russians just like Bukovskaya, though young Russians belonging to youth groupscritical of the Kremlin and Russian authorities.

It all was very seamy, Bukovskaya says, and ultimately too much for her conscience to bear.

Continue reading

EDITORIAL: Squirting Nemtsov

EDITORIAL

Squirting Nemtsov

It’s hard to recall a more pathetic news report issuing from Russia in recent years than last Monday’s, which indicated that former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov had been squirted in the face with ammonium chloride while campaigning for mayor of his native city of Sochi.

Seasoned Russia watchers will remember that Nemtsov’s career in the public eye began with a similar incident, when rogue nationalist maniac Vladimir Zhirinovsky splashed a glass of orange juice over him during a vehement exchange on a TV talk show debate. 

How is it possible, we must ask, that these apes are unable to understand that by lashing out with violence they are merely confirming that they have been defeated in the arena of civilized politics? How can they fail to understand that by lashing out with violence, they are merely confirming — better than their foes ever could — the worst of their foes criticisms?

Well, because they are apes, that’s why.

Continue reading

NASHI in Finland

Just suppose, dear reader, that a bunch of anti-Putin foreign students decided to travel to Russia and participate in a demonstration against Putin on Red Square attacking a piece of anti-American neo-Soviet propaganda being circulated in Russian theaters.  How do you think the Kremlin would respond? Would it allow such a thing to occur?

FinRosForum reports:

The Russian government-supported youth movement, Nashi, plans to hold demonstrations in the Finnish capital, Helsinki, on 23 March 2009 against a seminar organised by the Estonian Embassy in Helsinki. Johan Bäckman, leader of the self-declared “Finnish Anti-Fascist Committee” (Safka), said Estonia’s pro-Moscow Nightwatch (Nochnoy Dozor) organisation will also take part in the demonstrations. The organisers of the planned demonstration repeat Kremlin’s assertion that the seminar, Fear Behind the Wall, is “anti-Russian” and “pro-Nazi.”

Continue reading

Nashi, in the Wilderness

The Times of London reports:

It should have been a celebration of their success in defending Vladimir Putin’s Russia from a democratic revolution. Instead, the annual summer camp of the youth movement Nashi (Ours) seems a listless affair. The ideologues behind it admit that Nashi has run out of steam now that Dmitri Medvedev is in the Kremlin as Mr Putin’s handpicked successor. The face of Mr Putin, now Prime Minister, still hangs from banners spread across the campsite, on the shores of Lake Seliger, 300 miles (480km) north of Moscow. Mr Medvedev is virtually invisible.

Even the anti-Western propaganda seems half-hearted compared with previous outpourings of hate against opposition leaders such as Mikhail Kasyanov, a former Prime Minister, and Garry Kasparov, the former chess champion. Nashi’s principal “enemy” this time is a pig named after Toomas Hendrik Ilves, the President of Estonia. An Estonian tricolour flies over his sty in protest at the removal of a Red Army monument in the capital, Tallinn.

Fewer than 5,000 activists are at the two-week camp, half the number last time, as organisers struggle to find a purpose now that the presidential election is over. Street protest has given way to support for Russian economic development under the “Putin plan” to 2020.

Patriotism remains a constant theme, particularly the need to produce children for the Motherland. Igor Shuvalov, the First Deputy Prime Minister, toured the camp in a T-shirt with the slogan “Home, wife, children. I love my family”. Yuliya and Vitali Shuvayev were among 15 Nashi couples who demonstrated their devotion to the cause in a mass wedding. They spent their honeymoon in a group of tents formed in a heart shape under a banner proclaiming: “This is the miracle of Seliger.”

“Nashi means patriotism for us. That’s why we wanted to get married here,” Yuliya, 22, said. “We want three children because the first two are for the parents and the third is for growth of the country.”

Nashi has now splintered into different branches that support causes ranging from the Orthodox Church to business innovation. Some of its more muscular traditions remain. One section, Stal, organises street protests, while another trains young men to form street patrols with the police. The movement revives a Soviet-era tradition of volunteer druzhniki to maintain order. “A lot of young people have nothing to do and just watch TV, so we tell them that if they want to help the country then here’s their chance,” Roman Verbitsky, the Stal leader, said. Mr Shuvalov laughed as he passed a derelict shed symbolising Mr Kasparov’s movement, The Other Russia, which was hounded by riot police during anti-Putin demonstrations before the elections.

Nashi was founded in 2005 as a response to the pro-democracy Orange Revolution that had swept Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia. Sergei Markov, a United Russia MP and a key Nashi ideologist, admitted that the movement had “lost its mission”. He told The Times: “The mission was to prevent an Orange Revolution.” Asked whether Nashi had any place when the Kremlin under President Medvedev was attempting to present a more liberal face to the West, Dr Markov replied: “Nashi is part of pop culture now and they are fans of Putin. Medvedev for them is a bureaucrat, while Putin is a hero.”

The AFP has more:

Military training, satirical shows and US-style business seminars were among the strange mix of activities on offer at this year’s summer camp for Nashi — the Kremlin’s youth movement. With political power in Russia now firmly in the hands of President Dmitry Medvedev and his mentor, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, it seems that the massive group set up to counter any popular dissent has lost its focus. As the movement searches for a new purpose in Medvedev’s Russia, its activists say one solution could be to concentrate on beating the West at its own game by making the most of the country’s oil-fueled economic boom.

“Medvedev unfortunately doesn’t have the same attitude towards Nashi as Putin,” a senior member of the movement told AFP during a visit this month to the camp near Lake Seliger, 400 kilometres (250 miles) northeast of Moscow. “But it would be dangerous to let these young people go now. They could join the opposition,” said the Nashi member, who spoke on condition of anonymity, noting that there were three times fewer activists this year than last year. “The authorities have lost their interest in Nashi,” read a report on the Gazeta.ru news website. Nashi leader Nikita Borovikov was quoted in the report as saying: “The movement changes in line with the country’s agenda.”

Reflecting Kremlin thinking, events at the camp included a wedding of 20 couples who were then told to go and procreate to solve Russia’s demographic crisis, and the founding of an Orthodox group against Kosovo’s independence. Nashi, which translates as “Our People” [LR: No, it doesn’t. It translates as “us Slavic Russians”], was set up by Kremlin officials under Putin in 2005 immediately after Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, where youth activism proved decisive in toppling the country’s pro-Moscow government. They have held large-scale demonstrations as a show of force against Russia’s beleaguered opposition and have launched stinging campaigns against Kremlin critics, as well as trying to spread a Putin personality cult.

But this year, Nashi members said they wanted to focus on career prospects. “We have selected 340 students from 25 regions. Experts work with them to help them join the elites,” said Yelena Berezhnikova, head of one of the movement’s subgroups called “Personnel for Modernisation of the Country”. The library at the camp contained economic manuals, a biography of former US president Bill Clinton and a book by US management guru Tom Peters. One of the lectures on offer was entitled: “How to overcome US hegemony.”

But while some Nashi activists charted out stellar careers to serve Russia’s national interests, others were busy mocking Russia critics or undergoing military training to fight against the anti-Kremlin opposition. Activists organised a show at the camp in which a character covered in dollars representing the United States walked around with a pig on a leash. The pig was named after Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves.

Relations between Estonia and Russia are testy as Kremlin officials say the Baltic country discriminates against its large ethnic-Russian minority. One of the Nashi slogans for the show read: “If you lose control, you get fucked!” For more direct action, the movement even showed off a military wing that trains reformed alcoholics and drug addicts and turns them into street fighters who patrol cities alongside Russian police to clamp down on “disorder.” The peaceful transition of power from Putin to his ally Medvedev is paraded by the Nashi as a victory. But Matvei Matyushin, one of the group’s leaders, said: “It seems that everything’s okay but we have to remain vigilant.”

The Sunday Confession

Reuters reports:

A prominent member of the youth wing of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party says he has been snorting cocaine and taking ecstasy pills for years, according to an interview published on Thursday.

United Russia, the de facto ruling party, advocates family values and a healthy life style. Its members include many famous sportsmen and showbiz celebrities. “The most terrible period is over now, and I am happy I have mustered up my will (to fight drug addiction),” pop singer Vlad Topalov, 22, told the Moskovsky Komsomolets popular daily. He said he had sniffed cocaine for the last four years.

The peroxide blond heartthrob, one of the best known faces in the pro-Kremlin Young Guard movement, is hugely popular with teenage girls in Russia and other ex-Soviet states. Young Guard leaders could decide to exclude the singer from their ranks because of the interview, a Young Guard activist told the Ekho Moskvy radio station. Topalov said he had suffered temporary kidney failure, fell out with his father and his drug abuse was a reason for the break-up of a popular singing duet.

Another Original LR Translation: Humped and Dumped (by our Original Translator)

Prologue: It seems that Nashi has now served its purpose to the Kremlin and is going the way of all things, before it becomes too confident and hence threatening to the insecure but nonetheless malignant little troll who struts upon the Kremlin’s parapets. We predicted some time ago, in a translation of Nashi’s bizarre call for middle managers that Nashi would not make good on its promise to help all its young “volunteer management trainees” get jobs in “major Russian corporations.” In this regard, the following piece establishes that Nashi has now shown itself to be nothing more than a classic Russian pyramid scheme, just like the infamous MMM. (Remember them?). The authors of the following piece devastatingly refute any positive interpretation of why Nashi was disbanded – for example as some kind of a move away from the Putinjugend model, maybe because of Medvedev being named as his successor. This is nothing but: (a) a tactical move, to save the Kremlin a pile of money that Putin and Co. can then sock away in their Swiss bank accounts; (b) a strategic move, for making the group less obviously tied to the Kremlin, so it can become even more violent and cruel; and (c) a cynical loss of interest by the crass manipulators who used to run the organization, who never had any long-term vision for Russia at all, only for themselves.

Humped and Dumped

Yezhednevniy Zhurnal

January 29, 2008

The youth movement NASHI [“us slavic Russians”] is ending its existence as a centralized, federation-wide project. The leader of the organization, Nikita Borovik, announced to the newspaper “Kommersant” that the regional leaders of Nashi decided at a recent conference to preserve only five of their previous 50 regional offices – in Vladimir, Ivanov, Tulskiy, Voronezh, and Yaroslav. Activists from other regions will still be allowed to participate in special Nashi projects (“Our Army”, “Volunteer Youth Brigade”, Orthodox Corps”, Lessons in Friendship”, etc.). Sources in the Kremlin told the newspaper that there were no longer any plans use Nashi activists actively for political purposes, and Nashi-generated crowds would not be needed in the coming elections. Still, there would be no “formal closing” of Nashi, according to the Presidential Administration: the authorities would not leave the young people “unsupervised”. A portion of the group’s financing would also remain – like the 10 million rubles allotted for the group’s traditional summer camp at Lake Seliger. So what has long been predicted has finally come to pass: the big, bad old men used the starry-eyed little Nashisti for their own PR purposes, and now… “Thanks for the memories, goodbye.” Experts are certain that Borovikov’s announcement is only the “first cut”, and eventually the remaining five offices will also be closed, and financing for the group will be completely cut off.

———–

Sergey Udaltsov, Communist Youth Avant-garde (AKM):

For me personally, the news came as no surprise. I have long expected it. From the moment the Nashi movement was created, as with many others like it, it was obvious to me and a lot of other people that the movement was contrived, temporary and in essence something of a commercial project, especially for the movement’s leaders, who I suspect have already received their due dividends. Most significantly, from the very beginning this group had no discernible ideology; just support for the president and his policies – essentially apologia for the authorities and forceful suppression of all their opponents; no ideology or anything resembling it here, just storm troopers.

Hence, everything that is happening here is to be expected, with plenty of precedent: recall the movement “Walking Together” (Iduschiye Vmeste), which also lasted a few years and then passed away, and which almost no one remembers today. Following its demise, “Walking Together” was essentially reincarnated as “Nashi”, but I think this time we are seeing something other than re-branding: there will be no successor organization. What happened was that Nashi had accumulated such an aggressive image that the authorities themselves came to see that the continued existence of such a movement carried with it more minuses that plusses, especially considering how negatively it was viewed from abroad. I think this is the reason they are now closing it down. Although, of course, the sacred pedestal never remains vacant for long: new people will appear, young and ambitious, wishing to build their careers and businesses upon it. There will be successors of some sort, but I think they will be of a different sort than we see today.

Besides the negative image there is other reason the movement was closed: the people who headed Nashi had already gotten everything they wanted from it. Mr. Yakemenko has essentially joined the government, and a string of Nashi functionaries have landed in the Duma (parliament) – after which they just lost interest. Hence, on the one hand Nashi was no longer needed by the Kremlin, and on the other was no longer needed by its own leadership: everything they wanted, they had already gotten out of it, and as far as they were concerned, I think, the rank and file could just go to hell.

———–

Ilya Barabanov, journalist/correspondent, The New Times

In the end they will not completely close “Nashi”. Why? Because it is much easier, having cut off their financing, to simply keep them alive as a small and, at first glance, hardly visible group of assets, ones that can be called upon when the need arises to advance certain interests. Nashi as a large bureaucratic machine required too much financial investment. And the absence of any connection to a political party made their activities look to everyone like the work of the Presidential Administration.

This image was advanced as well by regular meetings between the movement’s leaders and first Vladimir Putin then Vladislav Surkov. Considering the absurdity of most of Nashi’s activities, its very existence, far from helping, actually hurt the image of the authorities. The group “Young Russia” (Rossiya Molodaya) presents a more beneficial structure for the Administration. Their actions are not viewed as being those of Surkov, so they can permit themselves to be throwbacks/barbarians (“otmorozheniye”).

Having chopped up Nashi into a series of smaller subgroups, the movement’s handlers in the Administration can still use these assets in the future for more pointed and radical actions, since in the eyes of the mass media and public opinion the Kremlin bureaucrats will not be responsible for them. More simply put: small, impersonalized structures, which no one associates with Surkov, Putin or his successor, are much more useful than one huge money-sucking monster committing outrages in front of the Estonian embassy.

So the Nashi movement will continue, in the form of a series of small groups, and one can anticipate their radicalization. The destruction of Nashi is simply the destruction of a corrupt bureaucratic machine. Put in economic terms, the Kremlin bureaucrats are optimizing their assets. And it will hardly affect their colleagues from “Young Russia” at all. The Kremlin ideologues will always need for one purpose or another a group of thugs (“otmoroziki”), ready at any moment to pick up crowbars and baseball bats. It’s a little more complicated with the “Young Guards” (Molodaya Gvardiya). After the December elections, their reason for existence will have disappeared. I think they can expect a slow death, beginning immediately after the presidential elections. The authorities will stop funding them – and as soon as they stop giving them money, the kids will skedaddle.

The Moscow Times, however, reports that Nashi may not be fully on board with the Kremlin’s plans. Has Putin created a Frankenstein even he can’t control?

Pro-Kremlin youth group Nashi said Friday that it was seeking to double its membership this year and dismissed reports of its imminent demise. Nashi leader Nikita Borovikov said at a news conference that while the group was undergoing a reorganization, it was not drifting into irrelevance. “No one can stop us,” Borovikov said.

Kommersant and Vedomosti, citing Nashi members and sources in the presidential administration, reported recently that Nashi was becoming obsolete after United Russia swept to a landslide victory in the Dec. 2 State Duma elections. Borovikov said the reports were part of a campaign to discredit the group by “small movements” and “individual politicians who have disappeared from the political skyline.” He did not specify which groups or politicians were behind the purported campaign.

Part of Nashi’s reorganization includes transferring power to regional centers to implement various projects, including Mishki, or Bear Cubs, a patriotic children’s group under the Nashi auspices, Borovikov said. Nashi intends to organize rallies in Moscow and St. Petersburg with 100,000 activists, as well as send 1,000 activists to Grozny to support reconstruction projects in the Chechen capital, Borovikov said. Nashi members are also working on the presidential campaign of Dmitry Medvedev in the March 2 election. Medvedev, expected to win in a landslide, has the backing of President Vladimir Putin, to whom Nashi has pledged fealty.


The Sunday Atrocity: Now, Nashi Goes After the Children

The Moscow Times reports that just as there was Komsomol and Pioneers in the USSR, now there is “Nashi” and “Bear Cubs” in Russia:

Drawn up in dense rows 50 wide and 10 deep, members of Mishki, or Bear Cubs, a pro-presidential, children’s and early-teen movement, stood on Bolotnaya Ploshchad early Thursday afternoon waiting for their rally to begin. The lively group carried large, white flags sporting a fuzzy, brown teddy bear and the movement’s name in multicolored, balloon-shaped letters — very appealing for the children and youth.

Then one of the kids lit up a cigarette.

Yulia Zimova, the head of Mishki, said the organization was created to encourage children aged 8 to 15 to be more active in society. Only two months old, Mishki is just the latest in a broad array of pro-Kremlin youth groups. It joined 30,000 youngsters at a Nashi rally on Vasilyevsky Spusk, near the Kremlin, in the morning to celebrate the victory of President Vladimir Putin and United Russia, whose candidate list he led in Sunday’s State Duma elections, before holding its own rally later in the day. The rally was Nashi’s third since Sunday.

If Nashi can be likened to the Komsomol, the Soviet-era organization of high school and university students, then Mishki is a throwback to the Pioneers, the children’s group of the same period that survives today — except many of the “children” were old enough to shave. Their essential purpose, just like Nashi, is to support Putin. “I love the Mishki! I love Russia! I love Putin! Together, we will win!” children’s voices boomed from speakers set up on Vasilyevsky Spusk, near Red Square, during the morning Nashi rally.

But not a child was to be seen among the crowd.

The square was occupied instead by teenagers from Nashi and a number of the organization’s spin-offs. The groups came from cities all over Russia. “It’s important to have stability,” said Mikhail Prudnikov, 20, a Nashi member from Tambov. “I agree with the Constitution and we must not break it. But we must find a politically active role for Putin, maybe as prime minister.” Putin is prohibited by the Constitution from remaining in office past the end of his second consecutive term, in May. “I’m a Bear Cub because the most important cub in the country is the president,” said a young woman with dyed-blond hair wearing tight-fitting jeans, a stud through her left eyebrow and a black-and-gold fedora. She refused to give her name, saying only that she was 18 years old and from Nizhny Novgorod.

Confusingly, as the morning rally of Nashi organizations came to an end, a mother led her child, dressed in a Nashi coat, across the square. Asked whether the little girl was a Mishki member, the young mother laughed and said, “No, she’s Nashi!” During the Mishki portion of the rally, the new group’s members spelled out a giant letter to Putin on the ground, asking him to head the organization, Zimova said, adding that the president would be given a tape showing the letter. In a surreal twist, besides childish flags suited for a kindergarten, many of the Mishki teenaged girls held teddy bears, which they said were their own. Mishka is also the Russian word for teddy bear. Holding up a clean, pink stuffed bear, one of the 18-year-old girls said, “I’ve had Lavrik for a year.”

Another Original LR Translation: Annals of the Horrors of Nashi, Part I (by our Original Translator)

It turns out that long before the election results were known early Monday morning Russia time, Vladimir Putin’s Hitler-youth cult “Nashi” (“Us Slavic Russians”) had already figured them out. Therefore, it started printing up banners hailing Putin’s victory and attacking critics who had not yet spoken. They’ve appeared on the Russian web, and our original translator favors you with their English meanings, along with some commentary from a few leading opposition figures — all from the pages of the mighty Yezhedvny Zhurnal.

Assuming it’s True…

Yezhednevniy Zhurnal

November 30, 2007

“This guy tells me they’re printing this pamphlet in the print shop next door…”

TRANSLATION: On December 2nd we elected President Putin to be the National Leader of Russia. The President and his party won a devastating victory. They won in exactly the same way that over the past 5 years they have destroyed the terrorists in Chechnya, paid back all of Russia’s debts, regained our country’s respect, taken back the huge petroleum reserves of Sakhalin-2, and captured the 2014 Olympics for Sochi.


TRANSLATION: The USA had a different plan. It wanted the traitors and thieves to win – the American citizen Kasparov, the fascist Limonov, and Nemtsov, who sold off the country. They don’t agree that Putin won. The traitors still want to seize power and take Russia back to the oligarchic and chaotic 1990’s, and once again give the bandits and embezzlers the ability to rob our country and sell off our oil and gas for a pittance. From December3 until the official announcement of the election results, they will try to seize the city squares and buildings, incite disorder, and steal our victory. // You can watch all this on television. // Or you can stand up, with the President’s Team, and defend the independence of our country, be worthy of the Veterans who will come out on the streets with us. // In these historic times it is your to decide how you will live. COME OUT AND DEFEND THE COUNTRY! EARN THE RIGHT TO BE ON THE PRESIDENT’S TEAM! // [contact information and identification of the leaflet as a Nashi publication]…”)

Aleksandr Golts:

Assuming it is true that what appeared on LiveJournal (TN: the pamphlet above) is not a fake, this can mean only one thing: that an anti-constitutional overthrow of the government is being planned in Russia. And those who were planning it were looking for comrades or accomplices (as you prefer). What to do in this situation, everyone must decide for themselves.

Viktor Shenderovich:

Setting aside the artistic merits of the publication, let’s take a sniff at dry remains. A few observations, taken from the pamphlet:

1. Still three days before the elections, and they already know the results.

2. They know that these results will the result of falsifications, and are gathering their forces to physically suppress those who will try to prove this.

3. They need the falsified results as a basis for fraud and further speculation on theme of “Putin – the National Leader”. All of this, it goes without saying, is a crime, from beginning to end.

P.S. – A personal linguistic note regarding the phrase “a victory with devastating result” (победы с сокрушительным результатом): “Сокрушительный = уничтожающий [destructive], разрушительный [ruinous]” – Dictionary of the Russian Language, Ed. S. Ozhegov

And this is such an exceptional event that one cannot but agree with “Nashi”: The results of Putin’s victory will be, indeed, devastating.

That is, ruinous.

And destructive.

Boris Nemtsov:

If anyone had any doubt that a lowly and fraudulent dictatorship has been installed in Russia, they should take a look at this. There’s just one thing Putin doesn’t understand: you can’t build a strong country on such a rotten foundation, on such cynicism and barbarism. In reality, he has already lost the elections. His reputation is little different from that of [Belarusian President] Lukashenko’s. And in the eyes of thinking Russians he already looks weak and hysterical. No matter how hard the Pavlovian, half-drunk Leontievites and phony Nashisti provocateurs may try, they won’t be able to change this diagnosis. Sooner or later, not only Moscow and St. Petersburg, but the whole country is going to learn it. Now what kind of National Leader is that?

* * *

(TN: Shortly after YeZh posted the article above, the leaflet in question was posted on another online journal with confirmation from Kristina Potupchik, press secretary for the of the Nashi organization, that it was in fact produced by Nashi. Potupchik characterized the leaflets as “donated materials” in support of a demonstration planned for December 3 in Moscow, at which 10,000 people were expected to attend.)

Annals of the Horrors of Nashi, Part II

The Associated Press has more details and context on the story we report above regarding Nashi’s propaganda leaflets

Nashi, the pro-Kremlin youth group, accused the United States of planning to incite “thieves and traitors” to seize key public buildings and squares and urged the crowd at a post-election celebration to help thwart the attempt. Organizers told some 5,000 activists at a rally on Vasilyevsky Spusk, near the Kremlin, that the United States and the West were hoping to overturn the massive victory of United Russia, whose ticket was led by President Vladimir Putin, in Sunday’s State Duma elections. United Russia won in a landslide. “We will not let anyone take over our victory,” Nikita Belokonev, a senior Nashi activist, told the crowd, which had gathered in the bitter cold. “There are people in the country who want to steal our victory, and there are countries not happy about the elections.”

Opposition leader and former world chess champion Garry Kasparov said Nashi activists attacked the office of The Other Russia, a coalition of several opposition movements that Kasparov helps lead. He did not immediately provide any further details. Leila Guliyeva, a Nashi activist from Moscow, said at the rally that she had been told that the United States and Britain had mustered “military squads” to occupy Russia’s main cities, and that Nashi activists would seek to “protect the streets of Moscow from being seized by these people.”

Activists circulated through the crowd, handing out a leaflet warning that the United States was trying to sabotage Putin’s triumph. A cartoon, drawn in the style of a Soviet propaganda poster, depicts a sinister Uncle Sam sitting on sacks of money with names of Russian opposition leaders written on them. “They wanted traitors and thieves to win,” the text says. “Between Dec. 3 and 6, before the official announcement of the election’s result, [the traitors] will try to seize squares and buildings, provoke disorder, take our victory from us.”

A U.S. Embassy spokeswoman called the claim “ridiculous.”

Several pro-Putin youth groups have sprung up in recent years, drawing thousands of members. Many have been organized and funded by the Kremlin and its business allies, concerned about the role that youth groups played in mass demonstrations in Ukraine and Georgia that helped bring pro-Western governments to power. Opposition leaders, including Kasparov, were repeatedly harassed by pro-Kremlin youth in the run-up to Sunday’s vote, with activists stalking leaders, disrupting news conferences and playing recordings of loud, maniacal laughter at protests. Kasparov said one pro-Kremlin youth handcuffed himself to Kasparov’s car three times. Boris Nemtsov, a leader of the liberal Union of Right Forces party, said recently that a 19-year-old Nashi activist tried to put a butterfly net with a sign saying “political insect” on his head, while others have pelted him with condoms. Nemtsov said he punched the 19-year-old with the net.

Annals of the Horrors of Nashi: The Story of Schlegel the "Russian"


The Telegraph reports:

With a Vladimir Putin badge pinned to his bright red campaign scarf, Robert Schlegel is preaching a revolution the likes of which Russia has never seen. Things will, he promises, keep going just as they are. “After 100 years of our country being in total crisis, we at last have a chance to live normally,” he declared proudly. “Thanks to President Putin, we, the young generation, have prospects like never before.” [LR: The picture at the top depicts one such brilliant brand-new opportunity for Russian youth. Impressive, isn’t it? Can you imagine, do you dare, what Slavic Russians would say about a man named “Schlegel” if he were criticizing Putin rather than fawning over him?]

In the case of Mr Schlegel, a 23-year-old video production boss, those prospects are well-advanced. He is standing for office in this week’s parliamentary elections and could become the Duma’s youngest member. The reason he may beat candidates twice or three times his age is not simply down to the overwhelming dominance of United Russia, the pro-Putin party under whose ticket he is running. Mr Schlegel is also a leading member of Nashi, the 100,000-strong, Kremlin-backed youth movement set up to promote “Red” revolution rather than “Orange”.

Viewed warily by some Russians as a cross between the Soviet-era Konsomol and Germany’s Hitler Youth, ostensibly Nashi is only a movement to promote “positive role models” for young Russians, but those who sign up are fed an aggressively patriotic ideology and anti-Western agenda. Members go on summer camps where they are urged to procreate to increase the size of the Russian race and to undergo military service to deter America from invading. The group also takes part in noisy — sometimes violent — demonstrations against pro-Western groups. Last year they were accused of intimidation against the British ambassador, Anthony Brenton, after he attended a conference organised by Other Russia, the anti-Kremlin coalition headed by the former chess champion Garry Kasparov.

For almost five months, Nashi youths picketed the British embassy and Mr Brenton’s residence, heckling him at public speeches. The campaign tailed off only when Mr Brenton, who des­cribed it as harassment “bordering on violence”, lodged a complaint with the Kremlin. Now, though, Nashi’s influence is expanding into the corridors of power. It is putting up 15 candidates for parliamentary office. None is beyond the mid-20s, but all are high on United Russia’s party list, making them among the first in line for the share of seats.

The move is being viewed with alarm by opposition groups. They see it as an attempt to create a new political class of pro-Kremlin Putin clones, continuing his increasingly authoritarian style of rule. Even more alarmingly, that theory is one thing the Putintni, as they are dubbed, agree with. “Yes, we do see ourselves as providing the political elite of the future,” said Mr Schlegel. “A lot of the ­people in government are old or not particularly competent and the idea is to have a professional revolution by young, educated and technologically literate people.”Nashi denies it has fascist overtones yet, asked about the group’s harassment of the British ambassador, Mr Schlegel makes no attempt to hide his contempt for Western culture. “He attended a meeting of people Nashi considers enemies of the country,” he said. “We didn’t attack him, we just want him to apologise. One of our guys had his nose broken by the ambassador’s security: if he’d been a liberal, there’d have been a huge fuss.” Mr Schlegel’s message that Russians have never had it so good goes down well in Moscow. Voters are enjoying unprecedented prosperity thanks to booming oil prices and, with Mr Putin at the top of its list, United Russia is tipped to win up to 70 per cent of the seats in next Sunday’s polls.

The constitution bars Mr Putin from standing for a third term in March’s presidential elections. But by nominating a tame successor — and possibly using his party’s parliamentary majority to gain the post of prime minister — Mr Putin will effectively remain in charge. Less enamoured of the status­ quo are Russia’s opposition politicians, who claim that a series of Putin-imposed curbs have reduced the elections to a Soviet-era sham. A new requirement that parties must get at least seven per cent of the vote to have representation in parliament is expected to prevent the pro-European Yabloko party’s 300 candidates holding any seats at all. Instead, the only anti-Putin groups likely to do so are the Communists and the far Right — scarcely the West’s idea of a healthy opposition.

Washington and London’s discomfiture deepened last week as Mr Putin used a rally on Wednesday to rail against them for backing “Orange”- style parties in the election, the credibility of which is already in doubt after a boycott by international monitors over restrictions on the number of observers they can send. “The election result has been decided already,” said Sergei Mitrokhin, 44, a Moscow city councillor who is standing for the Yabloko party. “The government is just a technicality now — all decisions are being made by Mr Putin, who is taking the country towards dictatorship.” Mr Putin’s international spokesman, Dimitri Peskov, insists the seven per cent rule is simply to discourage a plethora of tiny parties taking office. He dismisses suggestions that Nashi represents a post-communist version of the old Soviet nomenklatura.

Mr Schlegel, however, sees election to the Duma as only the first step in Nashi’s long march through the institutions. As the party’s application form declares: “We are coming.”

That’s what the Komsomol said. Actually, they were going, too. Going right into the dustbin of history. If this guy is like this at his age, can you imagine what he’ll be like at 50? Think Politburo and you’ll be in the right zip code. Scary, isn’t it? If this is Russia’s future it has none at all.

DAN and MT on NASHI’s Latest Outrage

Darkness at Noon comments on the story we reported yesterday regarding Putin’s deputization of Nashi fanatics to carry out police duties:

It takes a lot to bring me out of semi-retirement. Especially considering that I have far more important things to do, like writing a dissertation. (OK, in the big picture I realize that my dissertation isn’t all that important). It takes even more to get me to write about current Russian events, but when this story passed across my desk this morning it sent chills so far down my spine that I could not help noting it on the blog.

The story came from the September 24, 2007 edition of the Moscow Times and can be found (at least temporarily) here. The headline announces, “Nashi Brigades to Enforce Public Order.” I won’t get into the background and history of Nashi, as there are others who have already done that quite well.

The pro-Kremlin youth organization, Nashi (“Ours”), has recently begun organizing volunteer patrol brigades to help “enforce public order.” While some might argue that this is simply a large-scale form of the “neighborhood watch,” there is plenty of evidence to suggest that something more sinister is lurking below the surface. Or at least the potential for something sinister.

Consider the following choice quotes from Nashi activists which appeared in the Moscow Times article:

*”‘In December, volunteers will head out on their own to patrol the streets and help Moscow police to control the situation,’ Nashi said in a statement posted on its web site.”

*”We are taking a civic-minded position,” Lobkov said outside the library. “We don’t know what the opposition will plan, so we have to be ready.”

*[The opposition movement “Other Russia”] plans to hold a Dissenters’ March in central Moscow on Oct. 7 and hopes to attract 5,000. “It’s no secret” that the Nashi patrols will be mobilized for the opposition rally, Lobkov said. Asked separately what specific threats the patrols would head off, teenage Nashi activists Svetlana, Yegor and Anastasia gave identical answers. “The opposition wants to destabilize Russia,” each of them answered.

*A city law on the patrols allows volunteers to “take physical action” if a lawbreaker is “actively disobedient” or resists. The law allows force as a last resort and “within the boundaries of the right to necessary defense.” Lobkov, however, said Nashi activists would not use physical force, a position echoed by city police spokeswoman Alevtina Belousova.

*”We will carry out appropriate countermeasures should our opponents take to the streets” said television personality Ivan Demidov, a leader of Young Guard, the youth wing of the pro-Kremlin party United Russia.

Perhaps most disturbing about these quotes and the movement they represent is the fact that these activists view opposition – any opposition – as destabilizing. Opposition to the Kremlin, they believe, is a threat to the state and to Russia. Their desire is not to tolerate competition in the “marketplace of ideas” that is characteristic of a liberal democratic society, but rather to control the spread of ideas which contradict their own. In other words, they are engaging in a policy of containment. Opposition to the Kremlin is a threat which must be contained. The disturbing part of all of this, of course, is the fact that under a functioning democracy opposition is viewed as not only desirable but absolutely necessary. A democracy without opposition is not much of a democracy at all! That opposition should be viewed as an evil threat which must be contained speaks volumes of the Nashistis’ understanding of democracy and politics in general.

Disturbing as this might be, it has even greater implications for the future of Russia’s political development. One key characteristic of any democratic regime is the presence of multiple centers of political power. In other words, a variety of institutions, organizations, and structures that operate independently to exert political power. This might include the traditional “checks and balances” of the American system, but it extends to other realms outside the traditional three brances of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial). For example, civic organizations can influence the political process, as can political parties, regional and local leaders, the media, even business people. Like it or not, lobbyists too are independent centers that exert influence on the political system and thus weild some form of political power.

The point of all of this is that under democracy there is a plurality of actors who can affect the political process. One of the defining characteristics of Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, has been the gradual reduction in the number of politically influential spheres. One by one the independent centers of political power have had their wings clipped by a strengthening Kremlin. The president selects members of the Federation Council and governors. The elimination of single-member districts from the Duma electoral system make it literally impossible for independent politicians to serve in the Duma. The raising of the representation barrier in Duma elections from 5% to 7% has reduced the number of parties that are represented in the Duma. The marshalling of state resources for the benefit of United Russia has both weakened opposition parties while making the Duma itself a pliant extension of the Kremilin’s arm. Independent nationwide media has come under government control while big business and the oligarchs who run them have been taught a valuable lesson by the example of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. NGOs and civil society organizations have been burdened by complicated re-registration procedures while sometimes facing the threat of being branded an “extremist organization” subject to liquidation. In short, there are fewer and fewer actors that can exert any sort of political influence, let alone serve as a viable opposition.

As independent political centers are reduced, ordinary citizens are left with fewer and fewer means by which they can make their views known and influence the politics of their country. There comes a point at which their views can be expressed in the only place left open and unregulated: the streets. Thus, rallies, demonstrations, and protests are the last stand for those who wish to influence the politics of an authoritarianizing regime. It is no coincidence that as Putin’s Russia has become more autocratic we’ve seen an increase in the number, frequency, and intensity of political protests. Nothing else can capture the attention of the regime, and it is now clear that the Kremlin’s attention has been captured.

It is also clear now why Nashi and its Kremlin backers are so fearful of opposition and see the need to enforce order: public protests are the last means by which their power and control are threatened, and it is a threat which – like the Duma, the Federation Council, political parties, independent media, civic organizations, and oligarchs – must be contained. Russia’s leaders have stated on several occasions that an “Orange Revolution” will not take place in Russia. Nashi’s activists seem determined to make sure of it.

And so, come this fall, the Nashisti will take to the streets in massive numbers to “carry out appropriate countermeasures” against the fifth column of Russian society, the democratic opposition. What is frightening is the language Nashi is using – this is the language of battle, the language of warfare. Though they deny that they will use physical force, they are permitted by law to use force if an individual is actively disobedient. Thus, any refusal to comply with a Nashi activist’s instructions could be construed as active disobedience and worthy of physical force. While they may claim that no force will be used, this is hardly a credible claim from an organization that casts its mission on the streets in the language of violence. In the heat of “battle” do we really expect the Nashi brigades to maintain the discipline to refrain from using physical force? Certainly not. Nor can we expect oversight or justice for those who are injured at the hands of a Nashi activist “maintaining order.” Can one really imagine the police taking the word of an opposition protester over that of a Nashi patriot?

And so, we have many new sounds to look forward to this fall in Russia: the sounds of boots marching in step, the sounds of skulls cracking on pavement, and perhaps most troubling, the sound of the final nail being pounded into the coffin of public protest and democratic opposition.

The Moscow Times editorial board also weighs in on this subject:

Nashi, the youth group that is the bane of any foreign or Russian politician who has dared oppose the Kremlin, is becoming a militia of sorts. As reported by David Nowak in Monday’s issue, the group has struck an agreement with the Moscow police force to maintain public order with brigades of unarmed volunteers. But what kind of order could Nashi possibly offer? To help provide an idea, here’s a sampling of some of the group’s activities since it emerged in early 2005.

  • February 2005: Holds initial training conference for 200 youths in the Moscow region. Beats up and throws out a Yabloko youth leader who snuck in.
  • March: Declares itself to be a “healthy reaction” to the now-banned National Bolshevik youth group.
  • April: Calls founding congress and vows to fight corrupt bureaucrats, liberal politicians including Vladimir Ryzhkov and Garry Kasparov, fascists, ultranationalists and U.S. influence. The same day the congress is held, a young man strikes Kasparov over the head with a chessboard. Kasparov and Yabloko blame Nashi for the attack.
  • July: Holds its first annual summer camp, with lectures about elections, patriotism and the handling of weapons. President Vladimir Putin meets with delegates.
  • August: Blamed for an attack on National Bolshevik Party activists by masked men wielding baseball bats and gas pistols.
  • October: Accused by Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov of staging violent attacks on the opposition.
  • July 2006: Disrupts conference held by The Other Russia opposition coalition, whose leaders include Kasparov, Mikhail Kasyanov and National Bolshevik founder Eduard Limonov.
  • July-December: Pickets the British Embassy and hounds Ambassador Tony Brenton and his family after Brenton attends The Other Russia conference.
  • May 2007: Storms a news conference called by Estonian Ambassador Marina Kaljurand to demand that Estonia apologize for its relocation of a Soviet monument in Tallinn. Camps out at the Estonia Embassy for seven days.
  • September: Forms brigades to head off possible political unrest during State Duma elections in December.

Nashi is believed to be the brainchild of Kremlin deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov, who is also credited with creating United Russia and Rodina. Its financing is murky, although it denies accepting money from the state. The last thing Moscow needs is unrest during the election season. Nashi, however, lacks credibility when it comes to maintaining order. It’s clear that Nashi has been involved in violent activities. It’s clear that Nashi has its own agenda.

People charged with maintaining order should be impartial and responsible. Nashi isn’t.

DAN and MT on NASHI’s Latest Outrage

Darkness at Noon comments on the story we reported yesterday regarding Putin’s deputization of Nashi fanatics to carry out police duties:

It takes a lot to bring me out of semi-retirement. Especially considering that I have far more important things to do, like writing a dissertation. (OK, in the big picture I realize that my dissertation isn’t all that important). It takes even more to get me to write about current Russian events, but when this story passed across my desk this morning it sent chills so far down my spine that I could not help noting it on the blog.

The story came from the September 24, 2007 edition of the Moscow Times and can be found (at least temporarily) here. The headline announces, “Nashi Brigades to Enforce Public Order.” I won’t get into the background and history of Nashi, as there are others who have already done that quite well.

The pro-Kremlin youth organization, Nashi (“Ours”), has recently begun organizing volunteer patrol brigades to help “enforce public order.” While some might argue that this is simply a large-scale form of the “neighborhood watch,” there is plenty of evidence to suggest that something more sinister is lurking below the surface. Or at least the potential for something sinister.

Consider the following choice quotes from Nashi activists which appeared in the Moscow Times article:

*”‘In December, volunteers will head out on their own to patrol the streets and help Moscow police to control the situation,’ Nashi said in a statement posted on its web site.”

*”We are taking a civic-minded position,” Lobkov said outside the library. “We don’t know what the opposition will plan, so we have to be ready.”

*[The opposition movement “Other Russia”] plans to hold a Dissenters’ March in central Moscow on Oct. 7 and hopes to attract 5,000. “It’s no secret” that the Nashi patrols will be mobilized for the opposition rally, Lobkov said. Asked separately what specific threats the patrols would head off, teenage Nashi activists Svetlana, Yegor and Anastasia gave identical answers. “The opposition wants to destabilize Russia,” each of them answered.

*A city law on the patrols allows volunteers to “take physical action” if a lawbreaker is “actively disobedient” or resists. The law allows force as a last resort and “within the boundaries of the right to necessary defense.” Lobkov, however, said Nashi activists would not use physical force, a position echoed by city police spokeswoman Alevtina Belousova.

*”We will carry out appropriate countermeasures should our opponents take to the streets” said television personality Ivan Demidov, a leader of Young Guard, the youth wing of the pro-Kremlin party United Russia.

Perhaps most disturbing about these quotes and the movement they represent is the fact that these activists view opposition – any opposition – as destabilizing. Opposition to the Kremlin, they believe, is a threat to the state and to Russia. Their desire is not to tolerate competition in the “marketplace of ideas” that is characteristic of a liberal democratic society, but rather to control the spread of ideas which contradict their own. In other words, they are engaging in a policy of containment. Opposition to the Kremlin is a threat which must be contained. The disturbing part of all of this, of course, is the fact that under a functioning democracy opposition is viewed as not only desirable but absolutely necessary. A democracy without opposition is not much of a democracy at all! That opposition should be viewed as an evil threat which must be contained speaks volumes of the Nashistis’ understanding of democracy and politics in general.

Disturbing as this might be, it has even greater implications for the future of Russia’s political development. One key characteristic of any democratic regime is the presence of multiple centers of political power. In other words, a variety of institutions, organizations, and structures that operate independently to exert political power. This might include the traditional “checks and balances” of the American system, but it extends to other realms outside the traditional three brances of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial). For example, civic organizations can influence the political process, as can political parties, regional and local leaders, the media, even business people. Like it or not, lobbyists too are independent centers that exert influence on the political system and thus weild some form of political power.

The point of all of this is that under democracy there is a plurality of actors who can affect the political process. One of the defining characteristics of Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, has been the gradual reduction in the number of politically influential spheres. One by one the independent centers of political power have had their wings clipped by a strengthening Kremlin. The president selects members of the Federation Council and governors. The elimination of single-member districts from the Duma electoral system make it literally impossible for independent politicians to serve in the Duma. The raising of the representation barrier in Duma elections from 5% to 7% has reduced the number of parties that are represented in the Duma. The marshalling of state resources for the benefit of United Russia has both weakened opposition parties while making the Duma itself a pliant extension of the Kremilin’s arm. Independent nationwide media has come under government control while big business and the oligarchs who run them have been taught a valuable lesson by the example of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. NGOs and civil society organizations have been burdened by complicated re-registration procedures while sometimes facing the threat of being branded an “extremist organization” subject to liquidation. In short, there are fewer and fewer actors that can exert any sort of political influence, let alone serve as a viable opposition.

As independent political centers are reduced, ordinary citizens are left with fewer and fewer means by which they can make their views known and influence the politics of their country. There comes a point at which their views can be expressed in the only place left open and unregulated: the streets. Thus, rallies, demonstrations, and protests are the last stand for those who wish to influence the politics of an authoritarianizing regime. It is no coincidence that as Putin’s Russia has become more autocratic we’ve seen an increase in the number, frequency, and intensity of political protests. Nothing else can capture the attention of the regime, and it is now clear that the Kremlin’s attention has been captured.

It is also clear now why Nashi and its Kremlin backers are so fearful of opposition and see the need to enforce order: public protests are the last means by which their power and control are threatened, and it is a threat which – like the Duma, the Federation Council, political parties, independent media, civic organizations, and oligarchs – must be contained. Russia’s leaders have stated on several occasions that an “Orange Revolution” will not take place in Russia. Nashi’s activists seem determined to make sure of it.

And so, come this fall, the Nashisti will take to the streets in massive numbers to “carry out appropriate countermeasures” against the fifth column of Russian society, the democratic opposition. What is frightening is the language Nashi is using – this is the language of battle, the language of warfare. Though they deny that they will use physical force, they are permitted by law to use force if an individual is actively disobedient. Thus, any refusal to comply with a Nashi activist’s instructions could be construed as active disobedience and worthy of physical force. While they may claim that no force will be used, this is hardly a credible claim from an organization that casts its mission on the streets in the language of violence. In the heat of “battle” do we really expect the Nashi brigades to maintain the discipline to refrain from using physical force? Certainly not. Nor can we expect oversight or justice for those who are injured at the hands of a Nashi activist “maintaining order.” Can one really imagine the police taking the word of an opposition protester over that of a Nashi patriot?

And so, we have many new sounds to look forward to this fall in Russia: the sounds of boots marching in step, the sounds of skulls cracking on pavement, and perhaps most troubling, the sound of the final nail being pounded into the coffin of public protest and democratic opposition.

The Moscow Times editorial board also weighs in on this subject:

Nashi, the youth group that is the bane of any foreign or Russian politician who has dared oppose the Kremlin, is becoming a militia of sorts. As reported by David Nowak in Monday’s issue, the group has struck an agreement with the Moscow police force to maintain public order with brigades of unarmed volunteers. But what kind of order could Nashi possibly offer? To help provide an idea, here’s a sampling of some of the group’s activities since it emerged in early 2005.

  • February 2005: Holds initial training conference for 200 youths in the Moscow region. Beats up and throws out a Yabloko youth leader who snuck in.
  • March: Declares itself to be a “healthy reaction” to the now-banned National Bolshevik youth group.
  • April: Calls founding congress and vows to fight corrupt bureaucrats, liberal politicians including Vladimir Ryzhkov and Garry Kasparov, fascists, ultranationalists and U.S. influence. The same day the congress is held, a young man strikes Kasparov over the head with a chessboard. Kasparov and Yabloko blame Nashi for the attack.
  • July: Holds its first annual summer camp, with lectures about elections, patriotism and the handling of weapons. President Vladimir Putin meets with delegates.
  • August: Blamed for an attack on National Bolshevik Party activists by masked men wielding baseball bats and gas pistols.
  • October: Accused by Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov of staging violent attacks on the opposition.
  • July 2006: Disrupts conference held by The Other Russia opposition coalition, whose leaders include Kasparov, Mikhail Kasyanov and National Bolshevik founder Eduard Limonov.
  • July-December: Pickets the British Embassy and hounds Ambassador Tony Brenton and his family after Brenton attends The Other Russia conference.
  • May 2007: Storms a news conference called by Estonian Ambassador Marina Kaljurand to demand that Estonia apologize for its relocation of a Soviet monument in Tallinn. Camps out at the Estonia Embassy for seven days.
  • September: Forms brigades to head off possible political unrest during State Duma elections in December.

Nashi is believed to be the brainchild of Kremlin deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov, who is also credited with creating United Russia and Rodina. Its financing is murky, although it denies accepting money from the state. The last thing Moscow needs is unrest during the election season. Nashi, however, lacks credibility when it comes to maintaining order. It’s clear that Nashi has been involved in violent activities. It’s clear that Nashi has its own agenda.

People charged with maintaining order should be impartial and responsible. Nashi isn’t.

DAN and MT on NASHI’s Latest Outrage

Darkness at Noon comments on the story we reported yesterday regarding Putin’s deputization of Nashi fanatics to carry out police duties:

It takes a lot to bring me out of semi-retirement. Especially considering that I have far more important things to do, like writing a dissertation. (OK, in the big picture I realize that my dissertation isn’t all that important). It takes even more to get me to write about current Russian events, but when this story passed across my desk this morning it sent chills so far down my spine that I could not help noting it on the blog.

The story came from the September 24, 2007 edition of the Moscow Times and can be found (at least temporarily) here. The headline announces, “Nashi Brigades to Enforce Public Order.” I won’t get into the background and history of Nashi, as there are others who have already done that quite well.

The pro-Kremlin youth organization, Nashi (“Ours”), has recently begun organizing volunteer patrol brigades to help “enforce public order.” While some might argue that this is simply a large-scale form of the “neighborhood watch,” there is plenty of evidence to suggest that something more sinister is lurking below the surface. Or at least the potential for something sinister.

Consider the following choice quotes from Nashi activists which appeared in the Moscow Times article:

*”‘In December, volunteers will head out on their own to patrol the streets and help Moscow police to control the situation,’ Nashi said in a statement posted on its web site.”

*”We are taking a civic-minded position,” Lobkov said outside the library. “We don’t know what the opposition will plan, so we have to be ready.”

*[The opposition movement “Other Russia”] plans to hold a Dissenters’ March in central Moscow on Oct. 7 and hopes to attract 5,000. “It’s no secret” that the Nashi patrols will be mobilized for the opposition rally, Lobkov said. Asked separately what specific threats the patrols would head off, teenage Nashi activists Svetlana, Yegor and Anastasia gave identical answers. “The opposition wants to destabilize Russia,” each of them answered.

*A city law on the patrols allows volunteers to “take physical action” if a lawbreaker is “actively disobedient” or resists. The law allows force as a last resort and “within the boundaries of the right to necessary defense.” Lobkov, however, said Nashi activists would not use physical force, a position echoed by city police spokeswoman Alevtina Belousova.

*”We will carry out appropriate countermeasures should our opponents take to the streets” said television personality Ivan Demidov, a leader of Young Guard, the youth wing of the pro-Kremlin party United Russia.

Perhaps most disturbing about these quotes and the movement they represent is the fact that these activists view opposition – any opposition – as destabilizing. Opposition to the Kremlin, they believe, is a threat to the state and to Russia. Their desire is not to tolerate competition in the “marketplace of ideas” that is characteristic of a liberal democratic society, but rather to control the spread of ideas which contradict their own. In other words, they are engaging in a policy of containment. Opposition to the Kremlin is a threat which must be contained. The disturbing part of all of this, of course, is the fact that under a functioning democracy opposition is viewed as not only desirable but absolutely necessary. A democracy without opposition is not much of a democracy at all! That opposition should be viewed as an evil threat which must be contained speaks volumes of the Nashistis’ understanding of democracy and politics in general.

Disturbing as this might be, it has even greater implications for the future of Russia’s political development. One key characteristic of any democratic regime is the presence of multiple centers of political power. In other words, a variety of institutions, organizations, and structures that operate independently to exert political power. This might include the traditional “checks and balances” of the American system, but it extends to other realms outside the traditional three brances of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial). For example, civic organizations can influence the political process, as can political parties, regional and local leaders, the media, even business people. Like it or not, lobbyists too are independent centers that exert influence on the political system and thus weild some form of political power.

The point of all of this is that under democracy there is a plurality of actors who can affect the political process. One of the defining characteristics of Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, has been the gradual reduction in the number of politically influential spheres. One by one the independent centers of political power have had their wings clipped by a strengthening Kremlin. The president selects members of the Federation Council and governors. The elimination of single-member districts from the Duma electoral system make it literally impossible for independent politicians to serve in the Duma. The raising of the representation barrier in Duma elections from 5% to 7% has reduced the number of parties that are represented in the Duma. The marshalling of state resources for the benefit of United Russia has both weakened opposition parties while making the Duma itself a pliant extension of the Kremilin’s arm. Independent nationwide media has come under government control while big business and the oligarchs who run them have been taught a valuable lesson by the example of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. NGOs and civil society organizations have been burdened by complicated re-registration procedures while sometimes facing the threat of being branded an “extremist organization” subject to liquidation. In short, there are fewer and fewer actors that can exert any sort of political influence, let alone serve as a viable opposition.

As independent political centers are reduced, ordinary citizens are left with fewer and fewer means by which they can make their views known and influence the politics of their country. There comes a point at which their views can be expressed in the only place left open and unregulated: the streets. Thus, rallies, demonstrations, and protests are the last stand for those who wish to influence the politics of an authoritarianizing regime. It is no coincidence that as Putin’s Russia has become more autocratic we’ve seen an increase in the number, frequency, and intensity of political protests. Nothing else can capture the attention of the regime, and it is now clear that the Kremlin’s attention has been captured.

It is also clear now why Nashi and its Kremlin backers are so fearful of opposition and see the need to enforce order: public protests are the last means by which their power and control are threatened, and it is a threat which – like the Duma, the Federation Council, political parties, independent media, civic organizations, and oligarchs – must be contained. Russia’s leaders have stated on several occasions that an “Orange Revolution” will not take place in Russia. Nashi’s activists seem determined to make sure of it.

And so, come this fall, the Nashisti will take to the streets in massive numbers to “carry out appropriate countermeasures” against the fifth column of Russian society, the democratic opposition. What is frightening is the language Nashi is using – this is the language of battle, the language of warfare. Though they deny that they will use physical force, they are permitted by law to use force if an individual is actively disobedient. Thus, any refusal to comply with a Nashi activist’s instructions could be construed as active disobedience and worthy of physical force. While they may claim that no force will be used, this is hardly a credible claim from an organization that casts its mission on the streets in the language of violence. In the heat of “battle” do we really expect the Nashi brigades to maintain the discipline to refrain from using physical force? Certainly not. Nor can we expect oversight or justice for those who are injured at the hands of a Nashi activist “maintaining order.” Can one really imagine the police taking the word of an opposition protester over that of a Nashi patriot?

And so, we have many new sounds to look forward to this fall in Russia: the sounds of boots marching in step, the sounds of skulls cracking on pavement, and perhaps most troubling, the sound of the final nail being pounded into the coffin of public protest and democratic opposition.

The Moscow Times editorial board also weighs in on this subject:

Nashi, the youth group that is the bane of any foreign or Russian politician who has dared oppose the Kremlin, is becoming a militia of sorts. As reported by David Nowak in Monday’s issue, the group has struck an agreement with the Moscow police force to maintain public order with brigades of unarmed volunteers. But what kind of order could Nashi possibly offer? To help provide an idea, here’s a sampling of some of the group’s activities since it emerged in early 2005.

  • February 2005: Holds initial training conference for 200 youths in the Moscow region. Beats up and throws out a Yabloko youth leader who snuck in.
  • March: Declares itself to be a “healthy reaction” to the now-banned National Bolshevik youth group.
  • April: Calls founding congress and vows to fight corrupt bureaucrats, liberal politicians including Vladimir Ryzhkov and Garry Kasparov, fascists, ultranationalists and U.S. influence. The same day the congress is held, a young man strikes Kasparov over the head with a chessboard. Kasparov and Yabloko blame Nashi for the attack.
  • July: Holds its first annual summer camp, with lectures about elections, patriotism and the handling of weapons. President Vladimir Putin meets with delegates.
  • August: Blamed for an attack on National Bolshevik Party activists by masked men wielding baseball bats and gas pistols.
  • October: Accused by Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov of staging violent attacks on the opposition.
  • July 2006: Disrupts conference held by The Other Russia opposition coalition, whose leaders include Kasparov, Mikhail Kasyanov and National Bolshevik founder Eduard Limonov.
  • July-December: Pickets the British Embassy and hounds Ambassador Tony Brenton and his family after Brenton attends The Other Russia conference.
  • May 2007: Storms a news conference called by Estonian Ambassador Marina Kaljurand to demand that Estonia apologize for its relocation of a Soviet monument in Tallinn. Camps out at the Estonia Embassy for seven days.
  • September: Forms brigades to head off possible political unrest during State Duma elections in December.

Nashi is believed to be the brainchild of Kremlin deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov, who is also credited with creating United Russia and Rodina. Its financing is murky, although it denies accepting money from the state. The last thing Moscow needs is unrest during the election season. Nashi, however, lacks credibility when it comes to maintaining order. It’s clear that Nashi has been involved in violent activities. It’s clear that Nashi has its own agenda.

People charged with maintaining order should be impartial and responsible. Nashi isn’t.

DAN and MT on NASHI’s Latest Outrage

Darkness at Noon comments on the story we reported yesterday regarding Putin’s deputization of Nashi fanatics to carry out police duties:

It takes a lot to bring me out of semi-retirement. Especially considering that I have far more important things to do, like writing a dissertation. (OK, in the big picture I realize that my dissertation isn’t all that important). It takes even more to get me to write about current Russian events, but when this story passed across my desk this morning it sent chills so far down my spine that I could not help noting it on the blog.

The story came from the September 24, 2007 edition of the Moscow Times and can be found (at least temporarily) here. The headline announces, “Nashi Brigades to Enforce Public Order.” I won’t get into the background and history of Nashi, as there are others who have already done that quite well.

The pro-Kremlin youth organization, Nashi (“Ours”), has recently begun organizing volunteer patrol brigades to help “enforce public order.” While some might argue that this is simply a large-scale form of the “neighborhood watch,” there is plenty of evidence to suggest that something more sinister is lurking below the surface. Or at least the potential for something sinister.

Consider the following choice quotes from Nashi activists which appeared in the Moscow Times article:

*”‘In December, volunteers will head out on their own to patrol the streets and help Moscow police to control the situation,’ Nashi said in a statement posted on its web site.”

*”We are taking a civic-minded position,” Lobkov said outside the library. “We don’t know what the opposition will plan, so we have to be ready.”

*[The opposition movement “Other Russia”] plans to hold a Dissenters’ March in central Moscow on Oct. 7 and hopes to attract 5,000. “It’s no secret” that the Nashi patrols will be mobilized for the opposition rally, Lobkov said. Asked separately what specific threats the patrols would head off, teenage Nashi activists Svetlana, Yegor and Anastasia gave identical answers. “The opposition wants to destabilize Russia,” each of them answered.

*A city law on the patrols allows volunteers to “take physical action” if a lawbreaker is “actively disobedient” or resists. The law allows force as a last resort and “within the boundaries of the right to necessary defense.” Lobkov, however, said Nashi activists would not use physical force, a position echoed by city police spokeswoman Alevtina Belousova.

*”We will carry out appropriate countermeasures should our opponents take to the streets” said television personality Ivan Demidov, a leader of Young Guard, the youth wing of the pro-Kremlin party United Russia.

Perhaps most disturbing about these quotes and the movement they represent is the fact that these activists view opposition – any opposition – as destabilizing. Opposition to the Kremlin, they believe, is a threat to the state and to Russia. Their desire is not to tolerate competition in the “marketplace of ideas” that is characteristic of a liberal democratic society, but rather to control the spread of ideas which contradict their own. In other words, they are engaging in a policy of containment. Opposition to the Kremlin is a threat which must be contained. The disturbing part of all of this, of course, is the fact that under a functioning democracy opposition is viewed as not only desirable but absolutely necessary. A democracy without opposition is not much of a democracy at all! That opposition should be viewed as an evil threat which must be contained speaks volumes of the Nashistis’ understanding of democracy and politics in general.

Disturbing as this might be, it has even greater implications for the future of Russia’s political development. One key characteristic of any democratic regime is the presence of multiple centers of political power. In other words, a variety of institutions, organizations, and structures that operate independently to exert political power. This might include the traditional “checks and balances” of the American system, but it extends to other realms outside the traditional three brances of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial). For example, civic organizations can influence the political process, as can political parties, regional and local leaders, the media, even business people. Like it or not, lobbyists too are independent centers that exert influence on the political system and thus weild some form of political power.

The point of all of this is that under democracy there is a plurality of actors who can affect the political process. One of the defining characteristics of Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, has been the gradual reduction in the number of politically influential spheres. One by one the independent centers of political power have had their wings clipped by a strengthening Kremlin. The president selects members of the Federation Council and governors. The elimination of single-member districts from the Duma electoral system make it literally impossible for independent politicians to serve in the Duma. The raising of the representation barrier in Duma elections from 5% to 7% has reduced the number of parties that are represented in the Duma. The marshalling of state resources for the benefit of United Russia has both weakened opposition parties while making the Duma itself a pliant extension of the Kremilin’s arm. Independent nationwide media has come under government control while big business and the oligarchs who run them have been taught a valuable lesson by the example of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. NGOs and civil society organizations have been burdened by complicated re-registration procedures while sometimes facing the threat of being branded an “extremist organization” subject to liquidation. In short, there are fewer and fewer actors that can exert any sort of political influence, let alone serve as a viable opposition.

As independent political centers are reduced, ordinary citizens are left with fewer and fewer means by which they can make their views known and influence the politics of their country. There comes a point at which their views can be expressed in the only place left open and unregulated: the streets. Thus, rallies, demonstrations, and protests are the last stand for those who wish to influence the politics of an authoritarianizing regime. It is no coincidence that as Putin’s Russia has become more autocratic we’ve seen an increase in the number, frequency, and intensity of political protests. Nothing else can capture the attention of the regime, and it is now clear that the Kremlin’s attention has been captured.

It is also clear now why Nashi and its Kremlin backers are so fearful of opposition and see the need to enforce order: public protests are the last means by which their power and control are threatened, and it is a threat which – like the Duma, the Federation Council, political parties, independent media, civic organizations, and oligarchs – must be contained. Russia’s leaders have stated on several occasions that an “Orange Revolution” will not take place in Russia. Nashi’s activists seem determined to make sure of it.

And so, come this fall, the Nashisti will take to the streets in massive numbers to “carry out appropriate countermeasures” against the fifth column of Russian society, the democratic opposition. What is frightening is the language Nashi is using – this is the language of battle, the language of warfare. Though they deny that they will use physical force, they are permitted by law to use force if an individual is actively disobedient. Thus, any refusal to comply with a Nashi activist’s instructions could be construed as active disobedience and worthy of physical force. While they may claim that no force will be used, this is hardly a credible claim from an organization that casts its mission on the streets in the language of violence. In the heat of “battle” do we really expect the Nashi brigades to maintain the discipline to refrain from using physical force? Certainly not. Nor can we expect oversight or justice for those who are injured at the hands of a Nashi activist “maintaining order.” Can one really imagine the police taking the word of an opposition protester over that of a Nashi patriot?

And so, we have many new sounds to look forward to this fall in Russia: the sounds of boots marching in step, the sounds of skulls cracking on pavement, and perhaps most troubling, the sound of the final nail being pounded into the coffin of public protest and democratic opposition.

The Moscow Times editorial board also weighs in on this subject:

Nashi, the youth group that is the bane of any foreign or Russian politician who has dared oppose the Kremlin, is becoming a militia of sorts. As reported by David Nowak in Monday’s issue, the group has struck an agreement with the Moscow police force to maintain public order with brigades of unarmed volunteers. But what kind of order could Nashi possibly offer? To help provide an idea, here’s a sampling of some of the group’s activities since it emerged in early 2005.

  • February 2005: Holds initial training conference for 200 youths in the Moscow region. Beats up and throws out a Yabloko youth leader who snuck in.
  • March: Declares itself to be a “healthy reaction” to the now-banned National Bolshevik youth group.
  • April: Calls founding congress and vows to fight corrupt bureaucrats, liberal politicians including Vladimir Ryzhkov and Garry Kasparov, fascists, ultranationalists and U.S. influence. The same day the congress is held, a young man strikes Kasparov over the head with a chessboard. Kasparov and Yabloko blame Nashi for the attack.
  • July: Holds its first annual summer camp, with lectures about elections, patriotism and the handling of weapons. President Vladimir Putin meets with delegates.
  • August: Blamed for an attack on National Bolshevik Party activists by masked men wielding baseball bats and gas pistols.
  • October: Accused by Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov of staging violent attacks on the opposition.
  • July 2006: Disrupts conference held by The Other Russia opposition coalition, whose leaders include Kasparov, Mikhail Kasyanov and National Bolshevik founder Eduard Limonov.
  • July-December: Pickets the British Embassy and hounds Ambassador Tony Brenton and his family after Brenton attends The Other Russia conference.
  • May 2007: Storms a news conference called by Estonian Ambassador Marina Kaljurand to demand that Estonia apologize for its relocation of a Soviet monument in Tallinn. Camps out at the Estonia Embassy for seven days.
  • September: Forms brigades to head off possible political unrest during State Duma elections in December.

Nashi is believed to be the brainchild of Kremlin deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov, who is also credited with creating United Russia and Rodina. Its financing is murky, although it denies accepting money from the state. The last thing Moscow needs is unrest during the election season. Nashi, however, lacks credibility when it comes to maintaining order. It’s clear that Nashi has been involved in violent activities. It’s clear that Nashi has its own agenda.

People charged with maintaining order should be impartial and responsible. Nashi isn’t.

DAN and MT on NASHI’s Latest Outrage

Darkness at Noon comments on the story we reported yesterday regarding Putin’s deputization of Nashi fanatics to carry out police duties:

It takes a lot to bring me out of semi-retirement. Especially considering that I have far more important things to do, like writing a dissertation. (OK, in the big picture I realize that my dissertation isn’t all that important). It takes even more to get me to write about current Russian events, but when this story passed across my desk this morning it sent chills so far down my spine that I could not help noting it on the blog.

The story came from the September 24, 2007 edition of the Moscow Times and can be found (at least temporarily) here. The headline announces, “Nashi Brigades to Enforce Public Order.” I won’t get into the background and history of Nashi, as there are others who have already done that quite well.

The pro-Kremlin youth organization, Nashi (“Ours”), has recently begun organizing volunteer patrol brigades to help “enforce public order.” While some might argue that this is simply a large-scale form of the “neighborhood watch,” there is plenty of evidence to suggest that something more sinister is lurking below the surface. Or at least the potential for something sinister.

Consider the following choice quotes from Nashi activists which appeared in the Moscow Times article:

*”‘In December, volunteers will head out on their own to patrol the streets and help Moscow police to control the situation,’ Nashi said in a statement posted on its web site.”

*”We are taking a civic-minded position,” Lobkov said outside the library. “We don’t know what the opposition will plan, so we have to be ready.”

*[The opposition movement “Other Russia”] plans to hold a Dissenters’ March in central Moscow on Oct. 7 and hopes to attract 5,000. “It’s no secret” that the Nashi patrols will be mobilized for the opposition rally, Lobkov said. Asked separately what specific threats the patrols would head off, teenage Nashi activists Svetlana, Yegor and Anastasia gave identical answers. “The opposition wants to destabilize Russia,” each of them answered.

*A city law on the patrols allows volunteers to “take physical action” if a lawbreaker is “actively disobedient” or resists. The law allows force as a last resort and “within the boundaries of the right to necessary defense.” Lobkov, however, said Nashi activists would not use physical force, a position echoed by city police spokeswoman Alevtina Belousova.

*”We will carry out appropriate countermeasures should our opponents take to the streets” said television personality Ivan Demidov, a leader of Young Guard, the youth wing of the pro-Kremlin party United Russia.

Perhaps most disturbing about these quotes and the movement they represent is the fact that these activists view opposition – any opposition – as destabilizing. Opposition to the Kremlin, they believe, is a threat to the state and to Russia. Their desire is not to tolerate competition in the “marketplace of ideas” that is characteristic of a liberal democratic society, but rather to control the spread of ideas which contradict their own. In other words, they are engaging in a policy of containment. Opposition to the Kremlin is a threat which must be contained. The disturbing part of all of this, of course, is the fact that under a functioning democracy opposition is viewed as not only desirable but absolutely necessary. A democracy without opposition is not much of a democracy at all! That opposition should be viewed as an evil threat which must be contained speaks volumes of the Nashistis’ understanding of democracy and politics in general.

Disturbing as this might be, it has even greater implications for the future of Russia’s political development. One key characteristic of any democratic regime is the presence of multiple centers of political power. In other words, a variety of institutions, organizations, and structures that operate independently to exert political power. This might include the traditional “checks and balances” of the American system, but it extends to other realms outside the traditional three brances of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial). For example, civic organizations can influence the political process, as can political parties, regional and local leaders, the media, even business people. Like it or not, lobbyists too are independent centers that exert influence on the political system and thus weild some form of political power.

The point of all of this is that under democracy there is a plurality of actors who can affect the political process. One of the defining characteristics of Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, has been the gradual reduction in the number of politically influential spheres. One by one the independent centers of political power have had their wings clipped by a strengthening Kremlin. The president selects members of the Federation Council and governors. The elimination of single-member districts from the Duma electoral system make it literally impossible for independent politicians to serve in the Duma. The raising of the representation barrier in Duma elections from 5% to 7% has reduced the number of parties that are represented in the Duma. The marshalling of state resources for the benefit of United Russia has both weakened opposition parties while making the Duma itself a pliant extension of the Kremilin’s arm. Independent nationwide media has come under government control while big business and the oligarchs who run them have been taught a valuable lesson by the example of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. NGOs and civil society organizations have been burdened by complicated re-registration procedures while sometimes facing the threat of being branded an “extremist organization” subject to liquidation. In short, there are fewer and fewer actors that can exert any sort of political influence, let alone serve as a viable opposition.

As independent political centers are reduced, ordinary citizens are left with fewer and fewer means by which they can make their views known and influence the politics of their country. There comes a point at which their views can be expressed in the only place left open and unregulated: the streets. Thus, rallies, demonstrations, and protests are the last stand for those who wish to influence the politics of an authoritarianizing regime. It is no coincidence that as Putin’s Russia has become more autocratic we’ve seen an increase in the number, frequency, and intensity of political protests. Nothing else can capture the attention of the regime, and it is now clear that the Kremlin’s attention has been captured.

It is also clear now why Nashi and its Kremlin backers are so fearful of opposition and see the need to enforce order: public protests are the last means by which their power and control are threatened, and it is a threat which – like the Duma, the Federation Council, political parties, independent media, civic organizations, and oligarchs – must be contained. Russia’s leaders have stated on several occasions that an “Orange Revolution” will not take place in Russia. Nashi’s activists seem determined to make sure of it.

And so, come this fall, the Nashisti will take to the streets in massive numbers to “carry out appropriate countermeasures” against the fifth column of Russian society, the democratic opposition. What is frightening is the language Nashi is using – this is the language of battle, the language of warfare. Though they deny that they will use physical force, they are permitted by law to use force if an individual is actively disobedient. Thus, any refusal to comply with a Nashi activist’s instructions could be construed as active disobedience and worthy of physical force. While they may claim that no force will be used, this is hardly a credible claim from an organization that casts its mission on the streets in the language of violence. In the heat of “battle” do we really expect the Nashi brigades to maintain the discipline to refrain from using physical force? Certainly not. Nor can we expect oversight or justice for those who are injured at the hands of a Nashi activist “maintaining order.” Can one really imagine the police taking the word of an opposition protester over that of a Nashi patriot?

And so, we have many new sounds to look forward to this fall in Russia: the sounds of boots marching in step, the sounds of skulls cracking on pavement, and perhaps most troubling, the sound of the final nail being pounded into the coffin of public protest and democratic opposition.

The Moscow Times editorial board also weighs in on this subject:

Nashi, the youth group that is the bane of any foreign or Russian politician who has dared oppose the Kremlin, is becoming a militia of sorts. As reported by David Nowak in Monday’s issue, the group has struck an agreement with the Moscow police force to maintain public order with brigades of unarmed volunteers. But what kind of order could Nashi possibly offer? To help provide an idea, here’s a sampling of some of the group’s activities since it emerged in early 2005.

  • February 2005: Holds initial training conference for 200 youths in the Moscow region. Beats up and throws out a Yabloko youth leader who snuck in.
  • March: Declares itself to be a “healthy reaction” to the now-banned National Bolshevik youth group.
  • April: Calls founding congress and vows to fight corrupt bureaucrats, liberal politicians including Vladimir Ryzhkov and Garry Kasparov, fascists, ultranationalists and U.S. influence. The same day the congress is held, a young man strikes Kasparov over the head with a chessboard. Kasparov and Yabloko blame Nashi for the attack.
  • July: Holds its first annual summer camp, with lectures about elections, patriotism and the handling of weapons. President Vladimir Putin meets with delegates.
  • August: Blamed for an attack on National Bolshevik Party activists by masked men wielding baseball bats and gas pistols.
  • October: Accused by Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov of staging violent attacks on the opposition.
  • July 2006: Disrupts conference held by The Other Russia opposition coalition, whose leaders include Kasparov, Mikhail Kasyanov and National Bolshevik founder Eduard Limonov.
  • July-December: Pickets the British Embassy and hounds Ambassador Tony Brenton and his family after Brenton attends The Other Russia conference.
  • May 2007: Storms a news conference called by Estonian Ambassador Marina Kaljurand to demand that Estonia apologize for its relocation of a Soviet monument in Tallinn. Camps out at the Estonia Embassy for seven days.
  • September: Forms brigades to head off possible political unrest during State Duma elections in December.

Nashi is believed to be the brainchild of Kremlin deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov, who is also credited with creating United Russia and Rodina. Its financing is murky, although it denies accepting money from the state. The last thing Moscow needs is unrest during the election season. Nashi, however, lacks credibility when it comes to maintaining order. It’s clear that Nashi has been involved in violent activities. It’s clear that Nashi has its own agenda.

People charged with maintaining order should be impartial and responsible. Nashi isn’t.

Annals of Neo-Soviet Horror: Putin Deputizes Nashi

The Moscow Times reports:

They’ve been accused of illegal behavior ranging from harassment of diplomats to violent mob attacks. But with State Duma elections just months away, activists from the pro-Kremlin youth group Nashi are teaming up with city police to keep the streets quiet. Critics have accused authorities of turning a blind eye as Nashi’s members intimidate political foes. But last week, Nashi began mobilizing brigades of volunteers trained by city police to enforce public order. Some 200 Nashi activists, accompanied by actual police officers, have already begun patrolling the streets, wearing red armbands to show their status as druzhinniki, members of a volunteer corps that dates back to Soviet times, said Oleg Lobkov, a Nashi leader heading up the volunteer patrol program.

Nashi is hoping to have some 5,000 activists conducting volunteer patrols in Moscow alone by December, Lobkov said. Druzhinniki are roughly analogous to the Guardian Angels in the United States. While these people’s patrols have traditionally focused on plucking the odd drunk off the street, Nashi has made it clear that its brigades are being formed specifically to head off any political unrest during Duma elections in December.

“In December, volunteers will head out on their own to patrol the streets and help Moscow police to control the situation,” Nashi said in a statement posted on its web site.

Many believe Nashi, by far the largest and most powerful pro-Kremlin youth group, was set up as a response to Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004, in which youth-led street protests helped give the presidency to pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko.

The leaders of Nashi, whose financing is opaque, deny that they receive Kremlin funding. But the organization has been closely linked to Vladislav Surkov, deputy head of the presidential administration.

Nashi held a training session Tuesday outside the Russian State Library, often referred to by its old name, the Lenin Library, in central Moscow for around 200 activists from various regions.

“We are taking a civic-minded position,” Lobkov said outside the library. “We don’t know what the opposition will plan, so we have to be ready.”

Nashi says the country’s stability is under threat from groups such as The Other Russia, a coalition of opposition forces whose leaders include former world chess champion Garry Kasparov and writer Eduard Limonov, founder of the banned National Bolshevik Party.

The coalition plans to hold a Dissenters’ March in central Moscow on Oct. 7 and hopes to attract 5,000.

“It’s no secret” that the Nashi patrols will be mobilized for the opposition rally, Lobkov said.

Asked separately what specific threats the patrols would head off, teenage Nashi activists Svetlana, Yegor and Anastasia gave identical answers.

“The opposition wants to destabilize Russia,” each of them answered.

Some activists said they couldn’t name the threat but that it was important to protect the stability of the country. Others shrugged and walked off.

“It was Nashi’s idea to help,” said a city police spokesman, who declined to give his name. “Kozlov told them that in order to legally help keep public order, they must become volunteers.”

Deputy City Police Chief Vyacheslav Kozlov suggested to Nashi representatives that they begin by forming volunteer patrols, the spokesman said Friday.

Kozlov oversaw police operations during the April 14 Dissenters’ March, which OMON riot police violently quashed.

A city law on the patrols allows volunteers to “take physical action” if a lawbreaker is “actively disobedient” or resists. The law allows force as a last resort and “within the boundaries of the right to necessary defense.”

Lobkov, however, said Nashi activists would not use physical force, a position echoed by city police spokeswoman Alevtina Belousova.

“The volunteers will not take physical action, and they are not armed,” Belousova said.

She said police welcomed the help.

“We don’t care which organization the citizens come from,” Belousova said. “As long as they are registered volunteers, then they can help out.”

Other pro-Kremlin youth groups have promised to mobilize their activists to head off opposition rallies.

“We will carry out appropriate countermeasures should our opponents take to the streets” said television personality Ivan Demidov, a leader of Young Guard, the youth wing of the pro-Kremlin party United Russia.

It is the “duty” of all pro-Kremlin youth groups to act accordingly, Demidov said.

While Nashi is fashioning itself as a protector of public order, the opposition and foreign governments have accused the youth group of using violence and intimidation for political ends.

Limonov accused Nashi members of being involved in a savage attack in August 2005 in which masked men wielding baseball bats and air guns assaulted opposition youth activists. Witnesses said some of the attackers were wearing T-shirts bearing the Nashi emblem. Nashi dismissed the accusations, saying the group’s activities were “based on the principle of nonviolence.”

Earlier this year, Estonia accused Russia of failing to protect foreign diplomats after Nashi activists mounted a noisy demonstration outside the Estonian Embassy with demands that Tallinn apologize for its controversial decision to move a Soviet-era World War II memorial. Dozens of activists also stormed a news conference being given by Estonian Ambassador Marina Kaljurand.

Nashi members were also accused of harassing British Ambassador Anthony Brenton after he met with leaders of The Other Russia last year.

Ilya Yashin, head of the youth wing of the liberal Yabloko party, called the formation of the Nashi patrols “exceptionally dangerous.”

“It will come to a point where politics in Russia will end with fistfights on the streets,” Yashin said. “[Nashi volunteers] lack a deeper understanding of politics. When young, lively people are politically indoctrinated and given the backing of the state, they feel invincible. And that is very dangerous.”

While the Nashi patrols are being mobilized for election season, a nationalist youth group last week earned public praise from the country’s top migration official for carrying out a cunning vigilante crackdown on illegal foreign workers.

Federal Migration Service chief Konstantin Romodanovsky lauded members of youth group Mestniye for rounding up 72 people attempting to obtain work illegally, Interfax reported.

Mestniye spokesman Andrei Groznetsky said activists posing as businessmen promised jobs to migrant workers near a market in northeast Moscow. After agreeing on a wage, the activists drove them away and dropped the workers off at a nearby migration service office to have their documents checked, Groznetsky said.

“We are in permanent contact with the authorities,” Groznetsky said. “We have experience in helping them intercept illegal activities, and they are free to call on that experience any time.”

Nashi Rounds up the Usual Suspects

The Moscow Times reports that the Soviet habit of informing on one’s neighbors is being reborn with vigor in Vladmir Putin’s Russia, starting with the children:

The Federal Migration Service on Monday lauded members of a nationalist youth group for rounding up dozens of illegal foreign workers and turning them over to authorities. Migration service chief Konstantin Romodanovsky told reporters that Mestniye members “really helped” the agency in detaining 72 people attempting to obtain work illegally, Interfax reported. Romodanovsky did not elaborate on the nature of Mestniye’s assistance, but the youth group’s spokesman, Andrei Groznetsky, said activists used subterfuge to blow the whistle on the workers. In a daylong operation Saturday, Mestniye activists pulled up in cars to a market near Yaroslavskoye Shosse in northeast Moscow where migrant workers typically wait for temporary manual labor jobs. “It’s no secret that they hide in groups next to the building materials store near the market looking for work,” Groznetsky said. The driver, posing as a businessman in search of cheap labor to renovate his dacha, would call over three or four foreigners standing nearby and offer them 1,000 rubles each for four hours of work, Groznetsky said. But instead of taking them to the dacha, the driver would then drop the workers off at a nearby migration service office to have their documents checked, he said. “We have close links with the Federal Migration Service and have helped them before,” Groznetsky said.

Created two years ago as a pro-Kremlin youth group, Mestniye has drifted more toward anti-immigration stunts in line ideologically with the ultranationalist Movement Against Illegal Immigration. This summer Mestniye activists distributed fliers urging Russians not to take taxi rides in cars driven by illegal immigrants. The flier showed a picture of a young blond woman refusing a ride from a leering, dark-skinned driver. Romodanovsky defended the use of the Mestniye activists in cracking down on illegal immigration, despite the fact that they can occasionally be “very combative.” “If they are utilized wisely, they can be useful,” Romodanovsky said at the news conference.

Crazed Kremlin Keeps Assaulting Britain

The Times of London reports:

A RUSSIAN activist expected to take over a sinister youth group with ties to the Kremlin has warned that a campaign of harassment against the British ambassador in Moscow will be resumed if he shows support for the country’s beleaguered opposition in the run-up to parliamentary elections in December. Nikita Borovikov, 26, who is being groomed to take over Nashi, a 100,000-strong youth movement, later this year, gave a vigorous defence of a previous campaign against Anthony Brenton. The envoy was stalked for several months, an experience he called “psychological harassment bordering on violence”.

“I don’t see anything wrong in the way Nashi expressed its displeasure at the fact that Brenton attended an opposition conference,” said Borovikov. “If he thinks we broke any laws he is welcome to sue.

“Should he again express support for people we think are traitors and fascists, we will do exactly the same. We see it as our duty as patriotic citizens to make sure he hears our protests.”

Shortly after Brenton spoke at a conference last year organised by Other Russia, a coalition of opposition groups headed by Garry Kasparov, the former world chess champion, militants from Nashi, which means “our own”, followed the ambassador for six months with a banner demanding he apologise. They shouted abuse as he shopped for cat food, obstructed his car, advertised his movements on the internet and disrupted him when he spoke publicly. The campaign stopped some weeks after the Foreign Office lodged a complaint with the Russian foreign ministry. “What’s the problem?” asked Borovikov. “Why can’t Britain, which is always preaching about democracy, stand someone staging a peaceful protest?”

Renewed intimidation of the ambassador would anger the Foreign Office and further damage Anglo-Russian relations at a time when they are at their most strained since the end of the cold war following Moscow’s refusal to extradite Andrei Lugovoi, the prime suspect in the murder of the former KGB officer Alexander Litvin-enko in London. Polite, clean-cut and articulate, the young commissar – as the movement’s deputy leaders are known in honour of Bolshe-vik officials – said he was against extremism but at times his views seemed to differ little from those of generations of KGB cold warriors. Borovikov, who declined to be photographed, said Nashi believed the West was seeking a revolution in Russia similar to popular revolts in the former Soviet states of Georgia and Ukraine. In tune with thinking in the Kremlin, which argues that the uprisings were the work of western intelligence, Nashi says it is determined to prevent a west-ern-backed coup when Russia votes for a parliament in December and a president in March.

“The US, Britain and the rest of Europe don’t like the fact that Russia is becoming strong again,” said Borovikov. “They want to get their hands on our oil and gas and are plotting to try to bring in a government which is open to influence. We will do all we can to safeguard our interests and independence.” Some liberals call them “Nash-ists”, a play on “fascists”, but the group was modelled on the Komsomol, the Communist party youth organisation. It was inspired by Vladislav Surkov, a close aide to President Vladimir Putin who wanted to protect the Kremlin from any uprising such as the one that toppled the government of Ukraine.

Most independent experts believe Ukraine’s “orange revolution” was a genuine popular protest movement but the Kremlin’s mistrust of the West was fuelled by evidence that the US State Department helped fund it. With Kremlin funding and members from 50 Russian cities, Nashi has become a powerful tool in the drive to boost patriotism among the country’s youth. Its activists march in T-shirts emblazoned with Putin’s portrait. The group’s flag, a diagonal white cross on a red background, mixes Soviet and Russian imperial imagery. Besides harassing the British ambassador, the group has also campaigned to mobilise blood donors and crack down on alcohol sales to children. Other activities are more disquieting. Each year the group holds a “summer camp” – Putin and several other Kremlin figures have attended – and this year activists put up large posters of Kasparov and Mikhail Kasy-anov, the former prime minister turned opposition figure, that had been altered to make them look like prostitutes.

When Estonia, the tiny Baltic state, angered the Kremlin in May by moving a Soviet-era military monument, Nashi activists stormed a press conference by Estonia’s ambassador, retreating only when the diplomat’s bodyguards sprayed them with mace. Moving Together, the youth movement from which Nashi evolved, staged public book burnings of works it regarded as unpatriotic. “Nashi will do all it can to help pro-Kremlin parties in the December parliamentary elections,” Borovikov said. “We’ll be picketing the opposition to make sure young people understand that these are puppets of the West who only want to sell out our country.” While Nashi has condemned nationalism, critics say the Kremlin’s endorsement of the youth group’s fervent brand of patriotism has encouraged antiwestern sentiment and intolerance. Last week a member of Kasparov’s party was taken to hospital after being badly beaten by unidentified assailants.

Since coming to power nearly eight years ago, Putin, most recently seen parading a bare chest during a fishing holiday designed to underscore his “strong-man” credentials, has been at the forefront of efforts to make his country more patriotic. The West was alarmed by the resumption last month of reconnaissance flights by Russian bombers along western Europe’s borders, and the aggressiveness is expected to intensify: Russia is set to bolster its military and boost its overseas espionage. “The worrying thing is that whereas 15 years ago young Russians embraced the West with great enthusiasm, now more and more look to us with deep-seated mistrust,” said a former senior British diplomat. “It would not matter, were it not for the fact that they are Russia’s next generation of political leaders.”

A reader writes by e-mail:

This is the Daily Herald (a pro-Soviet British newspaper) of 5th March 1928:

“Moscow March 4, 1928.

A large an enthusiastic crowd of people, mostly ticket-holders, today witnessed a curious but brilliant ceremony at the Moscow aerodrome.14 Battle planes were, with much ceremony, presented to the Red Air Force, and the fuselage of each one bore the following inscription in big red letters: “Our Answer to Chamberlain.” (Sir Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary of the time).

These Russian built machines are, in fact, the first batch to be delivered out of 66 already built by public conscription subscription to “commemorate” the breach of relations with Great Britain”.

Winston Churchill a few months earlier referred to the Soviet government as “treacherous, incorrigible, and unfit for civilised intercourse”

That was 80 years ago. Does anything change? Not, apparently in the government of the Russian state.