July 15, 2011 — Contents


(1)  EDITORIAL:  Inflation Devastates Russia

(2)  EDITORIAL:  Boot Russia out of the COE!

(3)  EDITORIAL:  Closing the Vice on Russia

(4)  EDITORIAL:  Kositsyn, Paragon of Russia

(5)  Russia is Governed by Lunatics 

(6)  Yanukovich’s Ukraine apes Putin’s Russia

NOTE:  LR publisher and founder Kim Zigfeld’s latest installment on the mighty Pajamas Media megablog exposes the outrageous fraud of oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov’s sham political party as Putin consolidates his malignant dictatorship with the help of Barack Obama’s treacherous cowardice.

NOTE:  LR’s translation of Boris Nemtsov’s latest white paper has been republished by Nemtsov on his blog and in turn has been cited by the Washington Post as it reported on the latest outrage against Nemtsov, the Kremlin banning him from foreign travel for six months. Welcome back to the USSR! We condemn this apelike behavior and we condemn all those who tolerate it.  UPDATE:  The Kremlin has been forced to back down!

NOTE:  In another sign of the Russian apocalypse, as of July 7th Ramzan Kadyrov, or someone pretending to be him, has started Tweeting.

3 responses to “July 15, 2011 — Contents

  1. Proves the point that old habits die hard. In other words that the neo soviet cum fascist nature of KGB spy master Vova Putin’s empire has not, like the proverbial leopard, changed its spots and never will while he is at the helm.

    The demise of his darling Russia cannot escape the “dola” of justice, such is fate.

  2. On July 6, a massive anti-government protest took place in the town of Baksan, Kabardino-Balkaria. An estimated 600 unarmed young men blocked a vital highway connecting the capital of the republic, Nalchik, with the neighboring Stavropol region. The protesters demanded that the authorities put an end to killings and lift the anti-terrorist operation regime in the republic. Heavily armed Russian military forces reportedly tried to disperse the crowd by shooting in the air, but the protesters held their ground until 3 a.m., July 7, and then dispersed. The killing of an alleged rebel, 24-year-old Beslan Zeushev, in Baksan on July 6 presumably triggered the protest. Allegedly, the security services killed Zeushev in broad daylight when he was with his mother and subsequently put a weapon in his hands (www.voanews.com, July 7).

    On July 7, the Russian National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAK) reported that the security services had managed to kill four suspected rebels in Kabardino-Balkaria on July 6. In the NAK press release, Zeushev was called an active participant in the bandit underground who resisted the security services and had a handgun, two grenades and a home-made explosive device. For some reason, the Federal Security Service (FSB) accompanied the announcement about killing suspected rebels in Kabardino-Balkaria with photographs of several pieces of weaponry, perhaps designed to prove the slain people’s guilt (http://nak.fsb.ru, July 7).

    The youth revolt against the authorities in Kabardino-Balkaria indicated the government in the republic may be losing the battle for hearts and minds. Previously it was thought that the Circassian nationalists and radical Islamists could vie for influence in the republic and fight each other. Following the uprising, there seems to be fewer grounds for hostilities between the two social groups and in all likelihood they will both be the drivers of change in Kabardino-Balkaria.

    The republican government gave away the people to the security services, which try to restore order with terror and extralegal reprisals, Ibragim Yaganov, head of the Circassian nationalist organization Khase, told Voice of Americas Russian service, adding: People are shot at as if they were dogs in the streets, with no court hearing or investigation. Everyone lives in fear for their children, for the youth. People do not want to tolerate that anymore and are ready to undertake the most radical steps. According to Yaganov, over 1,000 young men have been killed in Kabardino-Balkaria over the past five years, even though the official numbers are much lower. The Circassian activist said he counted among those casualties young men who had left Kabardino-Balkaria for elsewhere in Russia to seek employment and were killed there, presumably for their cultural differences with ethnic Russians (www.voanews.com, July 7).

    A counter-terrorism operation regime was introduced in the key areas of Kabardino-Balkaria in February 2011, following the killing of tourists from Moscow and the overall deterioration of the security situation in this republic. On April 29, the security services managed in one strike to wipe out the bulk of the Kabardino-Balkarian insurgencys leadership. Since then, however, the publics anger against the Russian authorities has apparently been building up. The Russian State Duma deputy and Kremlin loyalist Sergei Markov admitted that lengthy counter-terrorism operation regimes eventually become inefficient and corrupt, but he defended the need for having such a regime in Kabardino-Balkaria. Meanwhile, people in the republic appear to be very suspicious of government actions. Ibragim Yaganov said that most people in Kabardino-Balkaria realized that the real reason for the introduction of a counter-terrorism operation regime in the republic was to carry out a redistribution of property (www.voanews.com, July 7).

    The Russian security services appear to be much more likely to benefit directly from the counter-terrorism operation regime since they acquire additional powers and resources. Unlike other volatile North Caucasian republics, the situation in Kabardino-Balkaria quickly got to the point where protesters started to organize for civil protest actions. Instead of an officially-approved and officially-manipulated anger against the militants, the general population in Kabardino-Balkaria seems increasingly inclined to acquire a radically different view, viewing the Russian security services as the main cause of their troubles.

    The dire socio-economic situation in the republic increases public disillusionment with the authorities. On July 4, a Gazprom subsidiary, Mezhregiongaz, reported that it cut gas supplies for the hot water providers in all apartment blocks in Nalchik on June 23, due to debts (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, July 4). Moscow seems to remain intent on developing tourism in the North Caucasus, including in the mountains of Kabardino-Balkaria, which feature the highest peak in Europe, Mount Elbrus. However, the ongoing counter-terrorist operation regime and general instability precludes any significant investments in the local economy.

    An average Russian region receives about one-quarter of its revenues from Moscow. In the North Caucasus, Chechnya and Ingushetia receive over 90 percent of their revenues from Moscow; Dagestan, about 80 percent; while the remaining republics receive over 60 percent of their revenues from the central government. Commenting on economic relations between the North Caucasus and Moscow, Gazeta.ru wrote: If the Russian Russians seriously regarded the North Caucasians as their compatriots, they would have tolerated the fact that the lagging territories [the North Caucasian republics] receive more money than the advanced ones, especially as [ethnic] Russian provinces also receive different amounts of subsidies. However, if the North Caucasus is some other land [not part of Russia proper], then the slogan for financial justice becomes absolutely absorbing (www.gazeta.ru, July 8). A popular rally took place in Moscow in April under the slogan Enough of feeding the Caucasus.

    At least part of the Russian government regards the North Caucasus as an alien territory, where there is less mutual trust and more crude force is permitted to rule the regions inhabitants. The latest events in Kabardino-Balkaria show that this approach could backfire, as the local people organize and resort to peaceful protest.

  3. Maybe Ramzan could try and pacify the Islamic Republic of Ramzanstan with his(?) twitting, because it appears he’s failing otherwise:

    On July 6, the Kavkazsky Uzel (Caucasian Knot) website reported new cases of arson attacks against relatives of suspected rebels in Chechnya. The website quoted sources in the Shali, Kurchaloi and Gudermes districts (who were not named for security reasons) as saying that that up to 120 persons recently had defected to the insurgents. This noticeable switch of allegiance from the government of Ramzan Kadyrov to the militants reportedly prompted a series of severe punitive actions by the authorities. The sources alleged that the security services captured close relatives of the people who had joined the insurgents and took them to the mountainous Vedeno district in southern Chechnya. Chechen officials denied both that large number of people had joined the insurgents and that retribution had been taken against their relatives (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, July 6).

    In September 2010, the Russian human rights organization Memorial reported that Chechen government forces used relatives of rebels as human shields while searching the wooded areas for militants (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, September 9, 2010). More recently, detained relatives of rebels may also have been taken to the Vedeno district to be used as human shields for Kadyrov’s forces. Kavkazsky Uzel also noted that Kadyrov had repeatedly warned relatives of the insurgents that they would be held responsible for the insurgents actions. In 2008 and 2009, arson attacks on the homes of relatives of militants were common in Chechnya, and there were several such incidents reported in 2010. However, since mid-2010, there had been no reports of such attacks in Chechnya until recently (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, July 6).

    Meanwhile, on July 5 the Chechen authorities introduced a counter-terrorism operation regime in the southern mountainous part of Grozny district and the adjacent part of Urus-Martan district. It is believed that the operation will continue well through October. The official explanation for the counter-terrorism operation is that it is a routine preemptive measure aimed at disrupting the militants’ supply chain and preventing them from preparing for the winter season. However, local observers have alternative explanations for the move. Announcing a counter-terrorism operation regime on part of the republics territory means the security services either received information about the militants preparing for large-scale actions and decided to avert attacks, or that there are many more militants in the republic and their ranks have significantly increased recently. Kavkazsky Uzel quoted sources who alleged that four or five people from Kadyrov’s own home village of Khosi-Yurt had also joined the insurgent forces (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, July 6). Kadyrov hailed the official end of the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya after many years in April 2009. So the Chechen authorities must be facing an extremely urgent threat to revert to a counter-terrorism regime.

    Even though there is little information coming out of Chechnya, recent events and Ramzan Kadyrov’s evolution point to the general trend in the republic. Having been fairly successful in rebuilding Chechnya, with substantial cash infusions from Moscow, Kadyrov now appears to be failing to go beyond that to develop the economy and employ people. Moscows efforts to boost economic development in Chechnya are also seriously hampered by the poor safety guarantees and Kadyrov’s antiquated despotism. Predictably, the Chechen authorities attempt to compensate for what seems to be an intrinsic economic ineptness by exporting workers. On July 11, it was reported that Grozny opened an official representation office in the city of Sochi, which will host the 2014 Winter Olympic Games and where extensive construction in preparation for the event is under way. Chechnya’s representation in Sochi is expected primarily to help Chechen construction workers who migrate from Chechnya, although there are currently slightly more than 300 Chechens in Sochi (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, July 11). The unemployment problem in Chechnya is exacerbated by the fact that young Chechen men are not drafted into the Russian army. Of the estimated 7,000 Chechens of draft age, only several dozen are expected to serve in Chechnya as auxiliary forces under the Russian interior ministry’s Yug and Sever battalions (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, July 11).

    After several years of improvements in the lives of ordinary Chechens, Kadyrov’s government appears to be stuck at the level of continual retaliatory operations against dissidents and egregious human rights violations. Consequently, the Chechen republic has become entangled in a vicious cycle of economic impotence, unemployment and persistent violence by government-sponsored groups and non-state actors, going back and forth from relative stability to low-grade civil war.

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