Exposing Putin’s Plans to Violently Liquidate Opposition

Paul Goble reports:

The way in which Moscow is arming and training units assigned to the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty suggests that these forces will be used against domestic opposition groups in the member states – not excluding the Russian Federation, according to some analysts — rather than exclusively against foreign aggressors.

Col.Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn, the deputy chief of the unified staff of the ODKB (its Russian acronym), said that “the international forces subordinate to him soon will begin to receive as armaments water cannon, traumatic pistols, tear gas and noise grenades – all “so-called non-lethal” weapons.

Up until now, such weapons have generally been used by the police or special services rather than by national armies or international alliances. Obviously, “tank columns are not dispersed by water cannon.” Indeed, most of the units in the ODKB are “motorized rifle battalions, the chief task of which is repulsing a foreign threat.”

The ODKB was set up in 2002 as “a military-political bloc,” and its member states, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and Tajikistan, agreed last year to form a rapid reaction force, a large segment of which consists of Russian units drawn from the Volga-Urals Military District.
Many both in these countries and internationally viewed the ODKB as an effort by Moscow to create “almost a counterweight to the forces of NATO.” But because the organization did not involve large forces and even more because the ODKB increasingly focused not to the West but to Central Asia, ever fewer people share that view.

But on one aspect of the ODKB, most continued to agree: Its primary focus was about repulsing potential foreign aggressors rather than dealing with internal threats. But now, as a result of events in Kyrgyzstan and the declaration of Nogovitsyn, at least some analysts are shifting their view in that regard.
And that is the case even though Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has repeatedly said that “the application of ODKB forces is possible only if there is an attack from the outside against one of the states which is a member” of the group. The ODKB agreement, the Russian leader insists, do not allow for anything else. The events in Kyrgyzstan, however, led many to discuss whether ODKB forces might be used against what were after all domestic opponents of one of the signatory regimes, and “the logic” of the armaments Nogovitsyn says some of the ODKB forces will have suggests that some leaders of the ODKB consider such actions “extremely probable.”

Such views are likely to identify later this month, “Svobodnaya pressa” continues, when ODKB forces are scheduled to conduct a joint exercise using non-lethal force near Chebarkul, a step the organization would not be taking if it did not believe that it needed to develop a capacity to cope with domestic violence in its member states.

Leonid Ivashov, a retired colonel general who heads the Moscow Academy of Geopolitical Problems and a frequent critic of the incumbent Russian government, said that the trend in the ODKB forces was clear: the member states want an international capacity to intervene in the case of domestic violence in any of them. As a result, he continued, “the appearance of [non-lethal weaponry] in the units of the ODKB, the main part of which consists of [Russian] soldiers and officers] will mean that there has begun a reorientation of army structures toward the struggle with the recent growth in protest attitudes across the post-Soviet space.”

And such attitudes are to be found not only in Kyrgyzstan and in Tajikistan, Ivashov noted. “Not everything is peaceful in Russia itself.” There are problems in the Far East and in the North Caucasus, and consequently, this new direction in the weaponry of the ODKB could mean that its forces might someday be deployed in the Russian Federation.

3 responses to “Exposing Putin’s Plans to Violently Liquidate Opposition

  1. Opposition Legislators Say Russia’s Parliament Is No Parliament

    “The Duma is no longer a parliament, not even a forum for lobbying,” Pribylovsky says. “It has only one major function left: to demonstrate to the West that Russia has a parliament.”

    Pribylovsky says Duma sessions have been so poorly attended because legislators “don’t have anything to do there. It’s just a bore.” He says parliament serves as a kind of club for influential businessmen and others for whom membership is a reward for political loyalty. One of the benefits, Pribylovsky says, is a measure of immunity from the state’s voracious bureaucratic machine.

    “If you’re elected to the Duma, or rather essentially appointed, it means Fire Code inspectors won’t come to your business looking for bribes,” Pribylovsky says. “If you’re a committee chair, you’re probably also safe from tax inspectors, although not from the Federal Security Service.”

    Under such conditions, Yabloko leader Mitrokhin says the only avenue open to opposition parties is to offer alternatives to the authorities from outside the political system, not unlike Soviet-era dissident groups. “They had no power, not even legal status,” he says, “but they still managed to play an important role.”


  2. Duma well reflects the present situation in Russia with all its problems.
    Most Russians find it more or less balanced when they go to vote for “United Russia” party.

  3. Pingback: How to Get Free Money: Grab $1,700 from These Companies

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s