Chechnya is Burning

RTT News reports:

At least six policemen were killed in Russia’s volatile North Caucasus republic of Ingushetia when a bomb they were trying to defuse went off, said officials on Thursday. Local police authorities said that the incident happened near a cemetery on the edge of the village of Surkhakhi. They said the dead included local law enforcement chiefs and added that two of those injured in the blast were “in a serious condition”.

Ingushetia has seen frequent clashes between insurgents and Russian security forces ever since Chechnya’s post-Soviet independence movement was launched in 1994. Though the active phase of the Russian operations against Chechnya’s rebels are over, sporadic militant attacks occur in Chechnya and neighboring republics. Various human rights organizations claim that the violence in the Muslim-dominated Ingushetia has increased after the war in Chechnya ended, and say that at least 90 people have been killed there since August.

9 responses to “Chechnya is Burning

  1. It’s “burning” now, but in other way. Kadyrov men are arsoning the houses of rebels’ families in a methodical campaign of collective responsibility (after annoucing it first). The rebels retaliate by burning down the houses of police officers (they may even take over a village for a night, then go around torching police homes).

    It’s all unheard-off since the federals stopped blowing-up houses in reprisals several years ago (they blew-up at least dozens if not hundreds of houses and apartment blocks in revenge attacks), and of course it’s now Chechen-on-Chechen violence. The burning goes since last summer.

    The deadliest clash this year so far was in Nazran on Feb 19, when some 15-20 Murmansk OMON and FSB personnel and 3 rebels died (their safehouse exploded when the feds stormed it). (Officially only 4 OMON dead and 15 wounded.)

    The biggest last year was also in Ingushetia, on Oct 18, when Interior Troops convoy and a rescue mission were both ambushed and up to 50 soldiers killed in these and the third clash on that day.

  2. To Smother Rebels, Arson Campaign in Chechnya

    Counter-burning, for example:

    On August 6 Chechen guerrillas claimed responsibility for burning down the houses but stressed the murder of three civilians on the same night only took place after the guerrillas left the village. The authorities say they were the guerrillas who killed the civilians.

  3. First point,Ingushetia is not chechnya.And actually Chechnya is not burning.But in the coming weeks in spring the rebels will dramatically increase their attacks against Kadyrov´s forces. It will be hot.


    It’s not only burning but spreading. Those are Chechen flames in Ingushetia. Sometimes, the most dangerous conflagration is the one whose flames you do not see until they consume you.

  4. LR, you just don’t get it. It’s Ingush fighters, led by Ingush leaders (or sometimes even leaderless), in Ingushetia. They don’t even fight for Chechnya.

    Heck, some of them (the Imarate radicals) actually reject the concept of Chechen Republic as the Russian colonial creation (they’re all Vainakhs, and the radicals are fighting for a pan-Islamic state).

    The others (Ingush opposition) fight against the local authorities (after the corruption and brutality of Zyazikov regime totally alienated most of population and enraged the youths), and some just conduct clan vendetta attacks.

    Th biggest rebel group in Ingushetia is the Ingush Jamaat. Notice the word “Ingush” . Ingushetia now is like Northern Ireland during the peak of the Troubles (just MUCH more violent per capita and with the “dirty war” tactics by state agents).

    The “flames” of, say, Dagestan are also not “Chechen”. Example:

    “While Chechen rebels originally fought a secular campaign for independence, rebels in Dagestan are thought to have become increasingly radicalised and to be seeking a form of Islamic rule.

    Each region has its own unique ethnic problems, but recent violence shows there is a deepening network of religious extremists throughout the region, said Moscow-based security analyst Pavel Felgenhauer.”

  5. robert,you are influenced by russian propaganda,you write only things russian and stupid russian media write as well. It would be better for you,of you were more trusting into the chechen-caucasian rebel sources,who are much more trustful. By the way,forget Zakayev,he is a pro-Kadyrov traitor and his Chechen Republic of Ichkeria is gone.This dirty traitor-pig has no influence left in Chechnya,he is licking Kadyrov´s dick. Long live the Caucasus Emirate!!!

  6. Also I fail to understand how could he be a traitor (“dirty traitor-pig” even) to the Imarate, when he was always strongly against it. Maybe you meant rather the old Barayev?

  7. Also about the current situation in the post-Zyazikov Ingushetia (hint for LR: Ingushetia is also known as “Not Chechnya”, as even sascha28 pointed out – it’s like the outsider confusing Afghanistan with Pakistan):

    Yevkurov constantly emphasizes that he is a federal official who primarily views Ingushetia’s problems through the prism of Russia’s – and the Kremlin’s – interests. He never tires of repeating that does not want to set the landmine of Prigorodny District under the administrative and territorial division of the whole North Caucasus.

    For Yevkurov’s fellow countrymen, such statements are music to their ears. Unlike the Chechens, they have never even considered a divorce from Russia. The separatist themes that suddenly began to be heard during the last months of Murad Zyazikov’s presidency in the statements of opposition figures were a kind of rocket launcher. The opposition believed that the threat of separation would force the federal centre to pay attention to the republic’s sorry plight.

    On the website, one of Yevkurov’s critics ridiculed the President for his absurd appearance. The national skullcap worn in combination with a suit and tie was a demonstration of bad taste, the critic said, born out of a desire to please everyone. But in fact, to some extent Yevkurov’s appearance revealed his program of action.

    He is at once an Ingush and a government official. The combination of these roles does not cause him the slightest discomfort. In his desire to place reliance on the traditional informal structures of Ingush society, the new President in some ways reminds one of Dudayev. He constantly makes the rounds of the villages, where he meets with the elders, whose opinions in the vast majority of cases are weightier and more authoritative than the views of the government’s representatives. The Ingush People’s Congress, which has been criticized for falsification in the election of its delegates, is none the less essentially that same council of authoritative men, but on a scale that includes the whole of Ingushetia.

    The President reconciles blood enemies, he promises to exculpate men who have embezzled of state property if they give back what they have stolen. It goes without saying, of course, that none of these actions bear any relation to Russian law, and on certain points may even contradict it. It is absolutely obvious, however, that Yunus-Bek Yevkurov feels himself to be a man of the state, and will never make a break with the Russian legal system of the kind that his Chechen counterpart, Ramzan Kadyrov, has made.

    But it is not only traditional social structures that interest Yevkurov. He has long and detailed discussions with everyone. The new President has serious grievances about his compatriots. He believes that they are helping the armed underground. In his many statements on this subject one can detect the operational information that has been supplied by the law enforcement agencies, and indeed he does not conceal the fact that in his views on the mujahedeen he prefers to align himself with the security forces rather than the Ingush population. Against such aiding and abetting, and against the underground resistance itself, he intends to conduct a merciless war.

    The mujahedeen see no difference between Yevkurov and his predecessor. For them, both are representatives of the kafirs who have occupied the territory of the North Caucasus. It is said that this is more or less how Amir (Emir) Magas, aka Akhmed Yevloyev, aka the Military Amir of the Caucasus Imarat (Emirate), expressed himself at a secret meeting with Yevkurov. It is even asserted that Magas used much stronger expressions. The Ingushetian President has denied that the meeting ever took place, but people in the republic persist in claiming that it did, and that it took place in the village of Galashki in the house of kinsfolk of the so-called “Colonel Khuchbarov” who led the school seizure in Beslan.

    Whatever the truth may be, after nearly four months in office Yekurov has failed to achieve any visible progress in the fight against the underground. The number of attacks and acts of sabotage has not diminished and sometimes seems even to have increased. Neither governmental authority nor threats have been of any avail. I very frequently hear people ask whether the guerrillas are a real force. Look at what is happening in Ingushetia, I say. At least they are a force which a professional soldier and intelligence officer, a man with inside knowledge of the way in which Ingush society works, has been unable to budge one inch, over a period of four months. An extent of time that is certainly more than long enough to develop a front of military action.

    Sermons on moral purity, social equality, service to Allah, a heroic death for the sake of high ideals against a backdrop of moral decline, corruption, greed and selfishness find a keen response in the souls of these young men. On public transport, at markets, in all the places where people discuss pressing issues, one can hear them singing the praises of the mujahedeen and their heroic struggle. Their mobile phones show video clips of sermons or battle scenes. The names of the fighters are known by heart, using apt turns of phrase, the young men discuss events that have taken place in their daily lives, their experiences of combat. The underground is imbued with a romantic atmosphere. There is fullness of life, there are ideas and ideals.

    It is hard for me to tell how deep and substantial these sentiments are. They seem, however, to express the vague, not fully conscious sympathies of society at large. It is easy to see where the mujahedeen derive their support, and why Yevkurov is so harsh in his accusations against his fellow countrymen.

  8. Btw Dagestan (known as “Not Chechnya” too):

    Russia No Longer Controls the Situation in Dagestan

    “A vivid example of this looming scenario for Dagestan can be found in Ingushetia, where the authorities are no longer capable of controlling the situation”

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