September 26, 2007 — Contents

WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 26 CONTENTS

(1) DAN and MT on Nashi

(2) Annals of Neo-Soviet Dictatorship: Putin Crushes Local Government

(3) What’s up with Britain on Defamation?

(4) Another Award for Politkovskaya

(5) IHT Reader Blasts Sicko Schmemann

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

DAN and MT on NASHI’s Latest Outrage

Darkness at Noon comments on the story we reported yesterday regarding Putin’s deputization of Nashi fanatics to carry out police duties:

It takes a lot to bring me out of semi-retirement. Especially considering that I have far more important things to do, like writing a dissertation. (OK, in the big picture I realize that my dissertation isn’t all that important). It takes even more to get me to write about current Russian events, but when this story passed across my desk this morning it sent chills so far down my spine that I could not help noting it on the blog.

The story came from the September 24, 2007 edition of the Moscow Times and can be found (at least temporarily) here. The headline announces, “Nashi Brigades to Enforce Public Order.” I won’t get into the background and history of Nashi, as there are others who have already done that quite well.

The pro-Kremlin youth organization, Nashi (“Ours”), has recently begun organizing volunteer patrol brigades to help “enforce public order.” While some might argue that this is simply a large-scale form of the “neighborhood watch,” there is plenty of evidence to suggest that something more sinister is lurking below the surface. Or at least the potential for something sinister.

Consider the following choice quotes from Nashi activists which appeared in the Moscow Times article:

*”‘In December, volunteers will head out on their own to patrol the streets and help Moscow police to control the situation,’ Nashi said in a statement posted on its web site.”

*”We are taking a civic-minded position,” Lobkov said outside the library. “We don’t know what the opposition will plan, so we have to be ready.”

*[The opposition movement “Other Russia”] plans to hold a Dissenters’ March in central Moscow on Oct. 7 and hopes to attract 5,000. “It’s no secret” that the Nashi patrols will be mobilized for the opposition rally, Lobkov said. Asked separately what specific threats the patrols would head off, teenage Nashi activists Svetlana, Yegor and Anastasia gave identical answers. “The opposition wants to destabilize Russia,” each of them answered.

*A city law on the patrols allows volunteers to “take physical action” if a lawbreaker is “actively disobedient” or resists. The law allows force as a last resort and “within the boundaries of the right to necessary defense.” Lobkov, however, said Nashi activists would not use physical force, a position echoed by city police spokeswoman Alevtina Belousova.

*”We will carry out appropriate countermeasures should our opponents take to the streets” said television personality Ivan Demidov, a leader of Young Guard, the youth wing of the pro-Kremlin party United Russia.

Perhaps most disturbing about these quotes and the movement they represent is the fact that these activists view opposition – any opposition – as destabilizing. Opposition to the Kremlin, they believe, is a threat to the state and to Russia. Their desire is not to tolerate competition in the “marketplace of ideas” that is characteristic of a liberal democratic society, but rather to control the spread of ideas which contradict their own. In other words, they are engaging in a policy of containment. Opposition to the Kremlin is a threat which must be contained. The disturbing part of all of this, of course, is the fact that under a functioning democracy opposition is viewed as not only desirable but absolutely necessary. A democracy without opposition is not much of a democracy at all! That opposition should be viewed as an evil threat which must be contained speaks volumes of the Nashistis’ understanding of democracy and politics in general.

Disturbing as this might be, it has even greater implications for the future of Russia’s political development. One key characteristic of any democratic regime is the presence of multiple centers of political power. In other words, a variety of institutions, organizations, and structures that operate independently to exert political power. This might include the traditional “checks and balances” of the American system, but it extends to other realms outside the traditional three brances of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial). For example, civic organizations can influence the political process, as can political parties, regional and local leaders, the media, even business people. Like it or not, lobbyists too are independent centers that exert influence on the political system and thus weild some form of political power.

The point of all of this is that under democracy there is a plurality of actors who can affect the political process. One of the defining characteristics of Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, has been the gradual reduction in the number of politically influential spheres. One by one the independent centers of political power have had their wings clipped by a strengthening Kremlin. The president selects members of the Federation Council and governors. The elimination of single-member districts from the Duma electoral system make it literally impossible for independent politicians to serve in the Duma. The raising of the representation barrier in Duma elections from 5% to 7% has reduced the number of parties that are represented in the Duma. The marshalling of state resources for the benefit of United Russia has both weakened opposition parties while making the Duma itself a pliant extension of the Kremilin’s arm. Independent nationwide media has come under government control while big business and the oligarchs who run them have been taught a valuable lesson by the example of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. NGOs and civil society organizations have been burdened by complicated re-registration procedures while sometimes facing the threat of being branded an “extremist organization” subject to liquidation. In short, there are fewer and fewer actors that can exert any sort of political influence, let alone serve as a viable opposition.

As independent political centers are reduced, ordinary citizens are left with fewer and fewer means by which they can make their views known and influence the politics of their country. There comes a point at which their views can be expressed in the only place left open and unregulated: the streets. Thus, rallies, demonstrations, and protests are the last stand for those who wish to influence the politics of an authoritarianizing regime. It is no coincidence that as Putin’s Russia has become more autocratic we’ve seen an increase in the number, frequency, and intensity of political protests. Nothing else can capture the attention of the regime, and it is now clear that the Kremlin’s attention has been captured.

It is also clear now why Nashi and its Kremlin backers are so fearful of opposition and see the need to enforce order: public protests are the last means by which their power and control are threatened, and it is a threat which – like the Duma, the Federation Council, political parties, independent media, civic organizations, and oligarchs – must be contained. Russia’s leaders have stated on several occasions that an “Orange Revolution” will not take place in Russia. Nashi’s activists seem determined to make sure of it.

And so, come this fall, the Nashisti will take to the streets in massive numbers to “carry out appropriate countermeasures” against the fifth column of Russian society, the democratic opposition. What is frightening is the language Nashi is using – this is the language of battle, the language of warfare. Though they deny that they will use physical force, they are permitted by law to use force if an individual is actively disobedient. Thus, any refusal to comply with a Nashi activist’s instructions could be construed as active disobedience and worthy of physical force. While they may claim that no force will be used, this is hardly a credible claim from an organization that casts its mission on the streets in the language of violence. In the heat of “battle” do we really expect the Nashi brigades to maintain the discipline to refrain from using physical force? Certainly not. Nor can we expect oversight or justice for those who are injured at the hands of a Nashi activist “maintaining order.” Can one really imagine the police taking the word of an opposition protester over that of a Nashi patriot?

And so, we have many new sounds to look forward to this fall in Russia: the sounds of boots marching in step, the sounds of skulls cracking on pavement, and perhaps most troubling, the sound of the final nail being pounded into the coffin of public protest and democratic opposition.

The Moscow Times editorial board also weighs in on this subject:

Nashi, the youth group that is the bane of any foreign or Russian politician who has dared oppose the Kremlin, is becoming a militia of sorts. As reported by David Nowak in Monday’s issue, the group has struck an agreement with the Moscow police force to maintain public order with brigades of unarmed volunteers. But what kind of order could Nashi possibly offer? To help provide an idea, here’s a sampling of some of the group’s activities since it emerged in early 2005.

• February 2005: Holds initial training conference for 200 youths in the Moscow region. Beats up and throws out a Yabloko youth leader who snuck in.

• March: Declares itself to be a “healthy reaction” to the now-banned National Bolshevik youth group.

• April: Calls founding congress and vows to fight corrupt bureaucrats, liberal politicians including Vladimir Ryzhkov and Garry Kasparov, fascists, ultranationalists and U.S. influence. The same day the congress is held, a young man strikes Kasparov over the head with a chessboard. Kasparov and Yabloko blame Nashi for the attack.

• July: Holds its first annual summer camp, with lectures about elections, patriotism and the handling of weapons. President Vladimir Putin meets with delegates.

• August: Blamed for an attack on National Bolshevik Party activists by masked men wielding baseball bats and gas pistols.

• October: Accused by Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov of staging violent attacks on the opposition.

• July 2006: Disrupts conference held by The Other Russia opposition coalition, whose leaders include Kasparov, Mikhail Kasyanov and National Bolshevik founder Eduard Limonov.

• July-December: Pickets the British Embassy and hounds Ambassador Tony Brenton and his family after Brenton attends The Other Russia conference.

• May 2007: Storms a news conference called by Estonian Ambassador Marina Kaljurand to demand that Estonia apologize for its relocation of a Soviet monument in Tallinn. Camps out at the Estonia Embassy for seven days.

• September: Forms brigades to head off possible political unrest during State Duma elections in December.

Nashi is believed to be the brainchild of Kremlin deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov, who is also credited with creating United Russia and Rodina. Its financing is murky, although it denies accepting money from the state. The last thing Moscow needs is unrest during the election season. Nashi, however, lacks credibility when it comes to maintaining order. It’s clear that Nashi has been involved in violent activities. It’s clear that Nashi has its own agenda.

People charged with maintaining order should be impartial and responsible. Nashi isn’t.

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

DAN and MT on NASHI’s Latest Outrage

Darkness at Noon comments on the story we reported yesterday regarding Putin’s deputization of Nashi fanatics to carry out police duties:

It takes a lot to bring me out of semi-retirement. Especially considering that I have far more important things to do, like writing a dissertation. (OK, in the big picture I realize that my dissertation isn’t all that important). It takes even more to get me to write about current Russian events, but when this story passed across my desk this morning it sent chills so far down my spine that I could not help noting it on the blog.

The story came from the September 24, 2007 edition of the Moscow Times and can be found (at least temporarily) here. The headline announces, “Nashi Brigades to Enforce Public Order.” I won’t get into the background and history of Nashi, as there are others who have already done that quite well.

The pro-Kremlin youth organization, Nashi (“Ours”), has recently begun organizing volunteer patrol brigades to help “enforce public order.” While some might argue that this is simply a large-scale form of the “neighborhood watch,” there is plenty of evidence to suggest that something more sinister is lurking below the surface. Or at least the potential for something sinister.

Consider the following choice quotes from Nashi activists which appeared in the Moscow Times article:

*”‘In December, volunteers will head out on their own to patrol the streets and help Moscow police to control the situation,’ Nashi said in a statement posted on its web site.”

*”We are taking a civic-minded position,” Lobkov said outside the library. “We don’t know what the opposition will plan, so we have to be ready.”

*[The opposition movement “Other Russia”] plans to hold a Dissenters’ March in central Moscow on Oct. 7 and hopes to attract 5,000. “It’s no secret” that the Nashi patrols will be mobilized for the opposition rally, Lobkov said. Asked separately what specific threats the patrols would head off, teenage Nashi activists Svetlana, Yegor and Anastasia gave identical answers. “The opposition wants to destabilize Russia,” each of them answered.

*A city law on the patrols allows volunteers to “take physical action” if a lawbreaker is “actively disobedient” or resists. The law allows force as a last resort and “within the boundaries of the right to necessary defense.” Lobkov, however, said Nashi activists would not use physical force, a position echoed by city police spokeswoman Alevtina Belousova.

*”We will carry out appropriate countermeasures should our opponents take to the streets” said television personality Ivan Demidov, a leader of Young Guard, the youth wing of the pro-Kremlin party United Russia.

Perhaps most disturbing about these quotes and the movement they represent is the fact that these activists view opposition – any opposition – as destabilizing. Opposition to the Kremlin, they believe, is a threat to the state and to Russia. Their desire is not to tolerate competition in the “marketplace of ideas” that is characteristic of a liberal democratic society, but rather to control the spread of ideas which contradict their own. In other words, they are engaging in a policy of containment. Opposition to the Kremlin is a threat which must be contained. The disturbing part of all of this, of course, is the fact that under a functioning democracy opposition is viewed as not only desirable but absolutely necessary. A democracy without opposition is not much of a democracy at all! That opposition should be viewed as an evil threat which must be contained speaks volumes of the Nashistis’ understanding of democracy and politics in general.

Disturbing as this might be, it has even greater implications for the future of Russia’s political development. One key characteristic of any democratic regime is the presence of multiple centers of political power. In other words, a variety of institutions, organizations, and structures that operate independently to exert political power. This might include the traditional “checks and balances” of the American system, but it extends to other realms outside the traditional three brances of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial). For example, civic organizations can influence the political process, as can political parties, regional and local leaders, the media, even business people. Like it or not, lobbyists too are independent centers that exert influence on the political system and thus weild some form of political power.

The point of all of this is that under democracy there is a plurality of actors who can affect the political process. One of the defining characteristics of Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, has been the gradual reduction in the number of politically influential spheres. One by one the independent centers of political power have had their wings clipped by a strengthening Kremlin. The president selects members of the Federation Council and governors. The elimination of single-member districts from the Duma electoral system make it literally impossible for independent politicians to serve in the Duma. The raising of the representation barrier in Duma elections from 5% to 7% has reduced the number of parties that are represented in the Duma. The marshalling of state resources for the benefit of United Russia has both weakened opposition parties while making the Duma itself a pliant extension of the Kremilin’s arm. Independent nationwide media has come under government control while big business and the oligarchs who run them have been taught a valuable lesson by the example of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. NGOs and civil society organizations have been burdened by complicated re-registration procedures while sometimes facing the threat of being branded an “extremist organization” subject to liquidation. In short, there are fewer and fewer actors that can exert any sort of political influence, let alone serve as a viable opposition.

As independent political centers are reduced, ordinary citizens are left with fewer and fewer means by which they can make their views known and influence the politics of their country. There comes a point at which their views can be expressed in the only place left open and unregulated: the streets. Thus, rallies, demonstrations, and protests are the last stand for those who wish to influence the politics of an authoritarianizing regime. It is no coincidence that as Putin’s Russia has become more autocratic we’ve seen an increase in the number, frequency, and intensity of political protests. Nothing else can capture the attention of the regime, and it is now clear that the Kremlin’s attention has been captured.

It is also clear now why Nashi and its Kremlin backers are so fearful of opposition and see the need to enforce order: public protests are the last means by which their power and control are threatened, and it is a threat which – like the Duma, the Federation Council, political parties, independent media, civic organizations, and oligarchs – must be contained. Russia’s leaders have stated on several occasions that an “Orange Revolution” will not take place in Russia. Nashi’s activists seem determined to make sure of it.

And so, come this fall, the Nashisti will take to the streets in massive numbers to “carry out appropriate countermeasures” against the fifth column of Russian society, the democratic opposition. What is frightening is the language Nashi is using – this is the language of battle, the language of warfare. Though they deny that they will use physical force, they are permitted by law to use force if an individual is actively disobedient. Thus, any refusal to comply with a Nashi activist’s instructions could be construed as active disobedience and worthy of physical force. While they may claim that no force will be used, this is hardly a credible claim from an organization that casts its mission on the streets in the language of violence. In the heat of “battle” do we really expect the Nashi brigades to maintain the discipline to refrain from using physical force? Certainly not. Nor can we expect oversight or justice for those who are injured at the hands of a Nashi activist “maintaining order.” Can one really imagine the police taking the word of an opposition protester over that of a Nashi patriot?

And so, we have many new sounds to look forward to this fall in Russia: the sounds of boots marching in step, the sounds of skulls cracking on pavement, and perhaps most troubling, the sound of the final nail being pounded into the coffin of public protest and democratic opposition.

The Moscow Times editorial board also weighs in on this subject:

Nashi, the youth group that is the bane of any foreign or Russian politician who has dared oppose the Kremlin, is becoming a militia of sorts. As reported by David Nowak in Monday’s issue, the group has struck an agreement with the Moscow police force to maintain public order with brigades of unarmed volunteers. But what kind of order could Nashi possibly offer? To help provide an idea, here’s a sampling of some of the group’s activities since it emerged in early 2005.

• February 2005: Holds initial training conference for 200 youths in the Moscow region. Beats up and throws out a Yabloko youth leader who snuck in.

• March: Declares itself to be a “healthy reaction” to the now-banned National Bolshevik youth group.

• April: Calls founding congress and vows to fight corrupt bureaucrats, liberal politicians including Vladimir Ryzhkov and Garry Kasparov, fascists, ultranationalists and U.S. influence. The same day the congress is held, a young man strikes Kasparov over the head with a chessboard. Kasparov and Yabloko blame Nashi for the attack.

• July: Holds its first annual summer camp, with lectures about elections, patriotism and the handling of weapons. President Vladimir Putin meets with delegates.

• August: Blamed for an attack on National Bolshevik Party activists by masked men wielding baseball bats and gas pistols.

• October: Accused by Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov of staging violent attacks on the opposition.

• July 2006: Disrupts conference held by The Other Russia opposition coalition, whose leaders include Kasparov, Mikhail Kasyanov and National Bolshevik founder Eduard Limonov.

• July-December: Pickets the British Embassy and hounds Ambassador Tony Brenton and his family after Brenton attends The Other Russia conference.

• May 2007: Storms a news conference called by Estonian Ambassador Marina Kaljurand to demand that Estonia apologize for its relocation of a Soviet monument in Tallinn. Camps out at the Estonia Embassy for seven days.

• September: Forms brigades to head off possible political unrest during State Duma elections in December.

Nashi is believed to be the brainchild of Kremlin deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov, who is also credited with creating United Russia and Rodina. Its financing is murky, although it denies accepting money from the state. The last thing Moscow needs is unrest during the election season. Nashi, however, lacks credibility when it comes to maintaining order. It’s clear that Nashi has been involved in violent activities. It’s clear that Nashi has its own agenda.

People charged with maintaining order should be impartial and responsible. Nashi isn’t.

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

DAN and MT on NASHI’s Latest Outrage

Darkness at Noon comments on the story we reported yesterday regarding Putin’s deputization of Nashi fanatics to carry out police duties:

It takes a lot to bring me out of semi-retirement. Especially considering that I have far more important things to do, like writing a dissertation. (OK, in the big picture I realize that my dissertation isn’t all that important). It takes even more to get me to write about current Russian events, but when this story passed across my desk this morning it sent chills so far down my spine that I could not help noting it on the blog.

The story came from the September 24, 2007 edition of the Moscow Times and can be found (at least temporarily) here. The headline announces, “Nashi Brigades to Enforce Public Order.” I won’t get into the background and history of Nashi, as there are others who have already done that quite well.

The pro-Kremlin youth organization, Nashi (“Ours”), has recently begun organizing volunteer patrol brigades to help “enforce public order.” While some might argue that this is simply a large-scale form of the “neighborhood watch,” there is plenty of evidence to suggest that something more sinister is lurking below the surface. Or at least the potential for something sinister.

Consider the following choice quotes from Nashi activists which appeared in the Moscow Times article:

*”‘In December, volunteers will head out on their own to patrol the streets and help Moscow police to control the situation,’ Nashi said in a statement posted on its web site.”

*”We are taking a civic-minded position,” Lobkov said outside the library. “We don’t know what the opposition will plan, so we have to be ready.”

*[The opposition movement “Other Russia”] plans to hold a Dissenters’ March in central Moscow on Oct. 7 and hopes to attract 5,000. “It’s no secret” that the Nashi patrols will be mobilized for the opposition rally, Lobkov said. Asked separately what specific threats the patrols would head off, teenage Nashi activists Svetlana, Yegor and Anastasia gave identical answers. “The opposition wants to destabilize Russia,” each of them answered.

*A city law on the patrols allows volunteers to “take physical action” if a lawbreaker is “actively disobedient” or resists. The law allows force as a last resort and “within the boundaries of the right to necessary defense.” Lobkov, however, said Nashi activists would not use physical force, a position echoed by city police spokeswoman Alevtina Belousova.

*”We will carry out appropriate countermeasures should our opponents take to the streets” said television personality Ivan Demidov, a leader of Young Guard, the youth wing of the pro-Kremlin party United Russia.

Perhaps most disturbing about these quotes and the movement they represent is the fact that these activists view opposition – any opposition – as destabilizing. Opposition to the Kremlin, they believe, is a threat to the state and to Russia. Their desire is not to tolerate competition in the “marketplace of ideas” that is characteristic of a liberal democratic society, but rather to control the spread of ideas which contradict their own. In other words, they are engaging in a policy of containment. Opposition to the Kremlin is a threat which must be contained. The disturbing part of all of this, of course, is the fact that under a functioning democracy opposition is viewed as not only desirable but absolutely necessary. A democracy without opposition is not much of a democracy at all! That opposition should be viewed as an evil threat which must be contained speaks volumes of the Nashistis’ understanding of democracy and politics in general.

Disturbing as this might be, it has even greater implications for the future of Russia’s political development. One key characteristic of any democratic regime is the presence of multiple centers of political power. In other words, a variety of institutions, organizations, and structures that operate independently to exert political power. This might include the traditional “checks and balances” of the American system, but it extends to other realms outside the traditional three brances of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial). For example, civic organizations can influence the political process, as can political parties, regional and local leaders, the media, even business people. Like it or not, lobbyists too are independent centers that exert influence on the political system and thus weild some form of political power.

The point of all of this is that under democracy there is a plurality of actors who can affect the political process. One of the defining characteristics of Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, has been the gradual reduction in the number of politically influential spheres. One by one the independent centers of political power have had their wings clipped by a strengthening Kremlin. The president selects members of the Federation Council and governors. The elimination of single-member districts from the Duma electoral system make it literally impossible for independent politicians to serve in the Duma. The raising of the representation barrier in Duma elections from 5% to 7% has reduced the number of parties that are represented in the Duma. The marshalling of state resources for the benefit of United Russia has both weakened opposition parties while making the Duma itself a pliant extension of the Kremilin’s arm. Independent nationwide media has come under government control while big business and the oligarchs who run them have been taught a valuable lesson by the example of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. NGOs and civil society organizations have been burdened by complicated re-registration procedures while sometimes facing the threat of being branded an “extremist organization” subject to liquidation. In short, there are fewer and fewer actors that can exert any sort of political influence, let alone serve as a viable opposition.

As independent political centers are reduced, ordinary citizens are left with fewer and fewer means by which they can make their views known and influence the politics of their country. There comes a point at which their views can be expressed in the only place left open and unregulated: the streets. Thus, rallies, demonstrations, and protests are the last stand for those who wish to influence the politics of an authoritarianizing regime. It is no coincidence that as Putin’s Russia has become more autocratic we’ve seen an increase in the number, frequency, and intensity of political protests. Nothing else can capture the attention of the regime, and it is now clear that the Kremlin’s attention has been captured.

It is also clear now why Nashi and its Kremlin backers are so fearful of opposition and see the need to enforce order: public protests are the last means by which their power and control are threatened, and it is a threat which – like the Duma, the Federation Council, political parties, independent media, civic organizations, and oligarchs – must be contained. Russia’s leaders have stated on several occasions that an “Orange Revolution” will not take place in Russia. Nashi’s activists seem determined to make sure of it.

And so, come this fall, the Nashisti will take to the streets in massive numbers to “carry out appropriate countermeasures” against the fifth column of Russian society, the democratic opposition. What is frightening is the language Nashi is using – this is the language of battle, the language of warfare. Though they deny that they will use physical force, they are permitted by law to use force if an individual is actively disobedient. Thus, any refusal to comply with a Nashi activist’s instructions could be construed as active disobedience and worthy of physical force. While they may claim that no force will be used, this is hardly a credible claim from an organization that casts its mission on the streets in the language of violence. In the heat of “battle” do we really expect the Nashi brigades to maintain the discipline to refrain from using physical force? Certainly not. Nor can we expect oversight or justice for those who are injured at the hands of a Nashi activist “maintaining order.” Can one really imagine the police taking the word of an opposition protester over that of a Nashi patriot?

And so, we have many new sounds to look forward to this fall in Russia: the sounds of boots marching in step, the sounds of skulls cracking on pavement, and perhaps most troubling, the sound of the final nail being pounded into the coffin of public protest and democratic opposition.

The Moscow Times editorial board also weighs in on this subject:

Nashi, the youth group that is the bane of any foreign or Russian politician who has dared oppose the Kremlin, is becoming a militia of sorts. As reported by David Nowak in Monday’s issue, the group has struck an agreement with the Moscow police force to maintain public order with brigades of unarmed volunteers. But what kind of order could Nashi possibly offer? To help provide an idea, here’s a sampling of some of the group’s activities since it emerged in early 2005.

• February 2005: Holds initial training conference for 200 youths in the Moscow region. Beats up and throws out a Yabloko youth leader who snuck in.

• March: Declares itself to be a “healthy reaction” to the now-banned National Bolshevik youth group.

• April: Calls founding congress and vows to fight corrupt bureaucrats, liberal politicians including Vladimir Ryzhkov and Garry Kasparov, fascists, ultranationalists and U.S. influence. The same day the congress is held, a young man strikes Kasparov over the head with a chessboard. Kasparov and Yabloko blame Nashi for the attack.

• July: Holds its first annual summer camp, with lectures about elections, patriotism and the handling of weapons. President Vladimir Putin meets with delegates.

• August: Blamed for an attack on National Bolshevik Party activists by masked men wielding baseball bats and gas pistols.

• October: Accused by Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov of staging violent attacks on the opposition.

• July 2006: Disrupts conference held by The Other Russia opposition coalition, whose leaders include Kasparov, Mikhail Kasyanov and National Bolshevik founder Eduard Limonov.

• July-December: Pickets the British Embassy and hounds Ambassador Tony Brenton and his family after Brenton attends The Other Russia conference.

• May 2007: Storms a news conference called by Estonian Ambassador Marina Kaljurand to demand that Estonia apologize for its relocation of a Soviet monument in Tallinn. Camps out at the Estonia Embassy for seven days.

• September: Forms brigades to head off possible political unrest during State Duma elections in December.

Nashi is believed to be the brainchild of Kremlin deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov, who is also credited with creating United Russia and Rodina. Its financing is murky, although it denies accepting money from the state. The last thing Moscow needs is unrest during the election season. Nashi, however, lacks credibility when it comes to maintaining order. It’s clear that Nashi has been involved in violent activities. It’s clear that Nashi has its own agenda.

People charged with maintaining order should be impartial and responsible. Nashi isn’t.

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

DAN and MT on NASHI’s Latest Outrage

Darkness at Noon comments on the story we reported yesterday regarding Putin’s deputization of Nashi fanatics to carry out police duties:

It takes a lot to bring me out of semi-retirement. Especially considering that I have far more important things to do, like writing a dissertation. (OK, in the big picture I realize that my dissertation isn’t all that important). It takes even more to get me to write about current Russian events, but when this story passed across my desk this morning it sent chills so far down my spine that I could not help noting it on the blog.

The story came from the September 24, 2007 edition of the Moscow Times and can be found (at least temporarily) here. The headline announces, “Nashi Brigades to Enforce Public Order.” I won’t get into the background and history of Nashi, as there are others who have already done that quite well.

The pro-Kremlin youth organization, Nashi (“Ours”), has recently begun organizing volunteer patrol brigades to help “enforce public order.” While some might argue that this is simply a large-scale form of the “neighborhood watch,” there is plenty of evidence to suggest that something more sinister is lurking below the surface. Or at least the potential for something sinister.

Consider the following choice quotes from Nashi activists which appeared in the Moscow Times article:

*”‘In December, volunteers will head out on their own to patrol the streets and help Moscow police to control the situation,’ Nashi said in a statement posted on its web site.”

*”We are taking a civic-minded position,” Lobkov said outside the library. “We don’t know what the opposition will plan, so we have to be ready.”

*[The opposition movement “Other Russia”] plans to hold a Dissenters’ March in central Moscow on Oct. 7 and hopes to attract 5,000. “It’s no secret” that the Nashi patrols will be mobilized for the opposition rally, Lobkov said. Asked separately what specific threats the patrols would head off, teenage Nashi activists Svetlana, Yegor and Anastasia gave identical answers. “The opposition wants to destabilize Russia,” each of them answered.

*A city law on the patrols allows volunteers to “take physical action” if a lawbreaker is “actively disobedient” or resists. The law allows force as a last resort and “within the boundaries of the right to necessary defense.” Lobkov, however, said Nashi activists would not use physical force, a position echoed by city police spokeswoman Alevtina Belousova.

*”We will carry out appropriate countermeasures should our opponents take to the streets” said television personality Ivan Demidov, a leader of Young Guard, the youth wing of the pro-Kremlin party United Russia.

Perhaps most disturbing about these quotes and the movement they represent is the fact that these activists view opposition – any opposition – as destabilizing. Opposition to the Kremlin, they believe, is a threat to the state and to Russia. Their desire is not to tolerate competition in the “marketplace of ideas” that is characteristic of a liberal democratic society, but rather to control the spread of ideas which contradict their own. In other words, they are engaging in a policy of containment. Opposition to the Kremlin is a threat which must be contained. The disturbing part of all of this, of course, is the fact that under a functioning democracy opposition is viewed as not only desirable but absolutely necessary. A democracy without opposition is not much of a democracy at all! That opposition should be viewed as an evil threat which must be contained speaks volumes of the Nashistis’ understanding of democracy and politics in general.

Disturbing as this might be, it has even greater implications for the future of Russia’s political development. One key characteristic of any democratic regime is the presence of multiple centers of political power. In other words, a variety of institutions, organizations, and structures that operate independently to exert political power. This might include the traditional “checks and balances” of the American system, but it extends to other realms outside the traditional three brances of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial). For example, civic organizations can influence the political process, as can political parties, regional and local leaders, the media, even business people. Like it or not, lobbyists too are independent centers that exert influence on the political system and thus weild some form of political power.

The point of all of this is that under democracy there is a plurality of actors who can affect the political process. One of the defining characteristics of Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, has been the gradual reduction in the number of politically influential spheres. One by one the independent centers of political power have had their wings clipped by a strengthening Kremlin. The president selects members of the Federation Council and governors. The elimination of single-member districts from the Duma electoral system make it literally impossible for independent politicians to serve in the Duma. The raising of the representation barrier in Duma elections from 5% to 7% has reduced the number of parties that are represented in the Duma. The marshalling of state resources for the benefit of United Russia has both weakened opposition parties while making the Duma itself a pliant extension of the Kremilin’s arm. Independent nationwide media has come under government control while big business and the oligarchs who run them have been taught a valuable lesson by the example of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. NGOs and civil society organizations have been burdened by complicated re-registration procedures while sometimes facing the threat of being branded an “extremist organization” subject to liquidation. In short, there are fewer and fewer actors that can exert any sort of political influence, let alone serve as a viable opposition.

As independent political centers are reduced, ordinary citizens are left with fewer and fewer means by which they can make their views known and influence the politics of their country. There comes a point at which their views can be expressed in the only place left open and unregulated: the streets. Thus, rallies, demonstrations, and protests are the last stand for those who wish to influence the politics of an authoritarianizing regime. It is no coincidence that as Putin’s Russia has become more autocratic we’ve seen an increase in the number, frequency, and intensity of political protests. Nothing else can capture the attention of the regime, and it is now clear that the Kremlin’s attention has been captured.

It is also clear now why Nashi and its Kremlin backers are so fearful of opposition and see the need to enforce order: public protests are the last means by which their power and control are threatened, and it is a threat which – like the Duma, the Federation Council, political parties, independent media, civic organizations, and oligarchs – must be contained. Russia’s leaders have stated on several occasions that an “Orange Revolution” will not take place in Russia. Nashi’s activists seem determined to make sure of it.

And so, come this fall, the Nashisti will take to the streets in massive numbers to “carry out appropriate countermeasures” against the fifth column of Russian society, the democratic opposition. What is frightening is the language Nashi is using – this is the language of battle, the language of warfare. Though they deny that they will use physical force, they are permitted by law to use force if an individual is actively disobedient. Thus, any refusal to comply with a Nashi activist’s instructions could be construed as active disobedience and worthy of physical force. While they may claim that no force will be used, this is hardly a credible claim from an organization that casts its mission on the streets in the language of violence. In the heat of “battle” do we really expect the Nashi brigades to maintain the discipline to refrain from using physical force? Certainly not. Nor can we expect oversight or justice for those who are injured at the hands of a Nashi activist “maintaining order.” Can one really imagine the police taking the word of an opposition protester over that of a Nashi patriot?

And so, we have many new sounds to look forward to this fall in Russia: the sounds of boots marching in step, the sounds of skulls cracking on pavement, and perhaps most troubling, the sound of the final nail being pounded into the coffin of public protest and democratic opposition.

The Moscow Times editorial board also weighs in on this subject:

Nashi, the youth group that is the bane of any foreign or Russian politician who has dared oppose the Kremlin, is becoming a militia of sorts. As reported by David Nowak in Monday’s issue, the group has struck an agreement with the Moscow police force to maintain public order with brigades of unarmed volunteers. But what kind of order could Nashi possibly offer? To help provide an idea, here’s a sampling of some of the group’s activities since it emerged in early 2005.

• February 2005: Holds initial training conference for 200 youths in the Moscow region. Beats up and throws out a Yabloko youth leader who snuck in.

• March: Declares itself to be a “healthy reaction” to the now-banned National Bolshevik youth group.

• April: Calls founding congress and vows to fight corrupt bureaucrats, liberal politicians including Vladimir Ryzhkov and Garry Kasparov, fascists, ultranationalists and U.S. influence. The same day the congress is held, a young man strikes Kasparov over the head with a chessboard. Kasparov and Yabloko blame Nashi for the attack.

• July: Holds its first annual summer camp, with lectures about elections, patriotism and the handling of weapons. President Vladimir Putin meets with delegates.

• August: Blamed for an attack on National Bolshevik Party activists by masked men wielding baseball bats and gas pistols.

• October: Accused by Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov of staging violent attacks on the opposition.

• July 2006: Disrupts conference held by The Other Russia opposition coalition, whose leaders include Kasparov, Mikhail Kasyanov and National Bolshevik founder Eduard Limonov.

• July-December: Pickets the British Embassy and hounds Ambassador Tony Brenton and his family after Brenton attends The Other Russia conference.

• May 2007: Storms a news conference called by Estonian Ambassador Marina Kaljurand to demand that Estonia apologize for its relocation of a Soviet monument in Tallinn. Camps out at the Estonia Embassy for seven days.

• September: Forms brigades to head off possible political unrest during State Duma elections in December.

Nashi is believed to be the brainchild of Kremlin deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov, who is also credited with creating United Russia and Rodina. Its financing is murky, although it denies accepting money from the state. The last thing Moscow needs is unrest during the election season. Nashi, however, lacks credibility when it comes to maintaining order. It’s clear that Nashi has been involved in violent activities. It’s clear that Nashi has its own agenda.

People charged with maintaining order should be impartial and responsible. Nashi isn’t.

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

DAN and MT on NASHI’s Latest Outrage

Darkness at Noon comments on the story we reported yesterday regarding Putin’s deputization of Nashi fanatics to carry out police duties:

It takes a lot to bring me out of semi-retirement. Especially considering that I have far more important things to do, like writing a dissertation. (OK, in the big picture I realize that my dissertation isn’t all that important). It takes even more to get me to write about current Russian events, but when this story passed across my desk this morning it sent chills so far down my spine that I could not help noting it on the blog.

The story came from the September 24, 2007 edition of the Moscow Times and can be found (at least temporarily) here. The headline announces, “Nashi Brigades to Enforce Public Order.” I won’t get into the background and history of Nashi, as there are others who have already done that quite well.

The pro-Kremlin youth organization, Nashi (“Ours”), has recently begun organizing volunteer patrol brigades to help “enforce public order.” While some might argue that this is simply a large-scale form of the “neighborhood watch,” there is plenty of evidence to suggest that something more sinister is lurking below the surface. Or at least the potential for something sinister.

Consider the following choice quotes from Nashi activists which appeared in the Moscow Times article:

*”‘In December, volunteers will head out on their own to patrol the streets and help Moscow police to control the situation,’ Nashi said in a statement posted on its web site.”

*”We are taking a civic-minded position,” Lobkov said outside the library. “We don’t know what the opposition will plan, so we have to be ready.”

*[The opposition movement “Other Russia”] plans to hold a Dissenters’ March in central Moscow on Oct. 7 and hopes to attract 5,000. “It’s no secret” that the Nashi patrols will be mobilized for the opposition rally, Lobkov said. Asked separately what specific threats the patrols would head off, teenage Nashi activists Svetlana, Yegor and Anastasia gave identical answers. “The opposition wants to destabilize Russia,” each of them answered.

*A city law on the patrols allows volunteers to “take physical action” if a lawbreaker is “actively disobedient” or resists. The law allows force as a last resort and “within the boundaries of the right to necessary defense.” Lobkov, however, said Nashi activists would not use physical force, a position echoed by city police spokeswoman Alevtina Belousova.

*”We will carry out appropriate countermeasures should our opponents take to the streets” said television personality Ivan Demidov, a leader of Young Guard, the youth wing of the pro-Kremlin party United Russia.

Perhaps most disturbing about these quotes and the movement they represent is the fact that these activists view opposition – any opposition – as destabilizing. Opposition to the Kremlin, they believe, is a threat to the state and to Russia. Their desire is not to tolerate competition in the “marketplace of ideas” that is characteristic of a liberal democratic society, but rather to control the spread of ideas which contradict their own. In other words, they are engaging in a policy of containment. Opposition to the Kremlin is a threat which must be contained. The disturbing part of all of this, of course, is the fact that under a functioning democracy opposition is viewed as not only desirable but absolutely necessary. A democracy without opposition is not much of a democracy at all! That opposition should be viewed as an evil threat which must be contained speaks volumes of the Nashistis’ understanding of democracy and politics in general.

Disturbing as this might be, it has even greater implications for the future of Russia’s political development. One key characteristic of any democratic regime is the presence of multiple centers of political power. In other words, a variety of institutions, organizations, and structures that operate independently to exert political power. This might include the traditional “checks and balances” of the American system, but it extends to other realms outside the traditional three brances of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial). For example, civic organizations can influence the political process, as can political parties, regional and local leaders, the media, even business people. Like it or not, lobbyists too are independent centers that exert influence on the political system and thus weild some form of political power.

The point of all of this is that under democracy there is a plurality of actors who can affect the political process. One of the defining characteristics of Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, has been the gradual reduction in the number of politically influential spheres. One by one the independent centers of political power have had their wings clipped by a strengthening Kremlin. The president selects members of the Federation Council and governors. The elimination of single-member districts from the Duma electoral system make it literally impossible for independent politicians to serve in the Duma. The raising of the representation barrier in Duma elections from 5% to 7% has reduced the number of parties that are represented in the Duma. The marshalling of state resources for the benefit of United Russia has both weakened opposition parties while making the Duma itself a pliant extension of the Kremilin’s arm. Independent nationwide media has come under government control while big business and the oligarchs who run them have been taught a valuable lesson by the example of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. NGOs and civil society organizations have been burdened by complicated re-registration procedures while sometimes facing the threat of being branded an “extremist organization” subject to liquidation. In short, there are fewer and fewer actors that can exert any sort of political influence, let alone serve as a viable opposition.

As independent political centers are reduced, ordinary citizens are left with fewer and fewer means by which they can make their views known and influence the politics of their country. There comes a point at which their views can be expressed in the only place left open and unregulated: the streets. Thus, rallies, demonstrations, and protests are the last stand for those who wish to influence the politics of an authoritarianizing regime. It is no coincidence that as Putin’s Russia has become more autocratic we’ve seen an increase in the number, frequency, and intensity of political protests. Nothing else can capture the attention of the regime, and it is now clear that the Kremlin’s attention has been captured.

It is also clear now why Nashi and its Kremlin backers are so fearful of opposition and see the need to enforce order: public protests are the last means by which their power and control are threatened, and it is a threat which – like the Duma, the Federation Council, political parties, independent media, civic organizations, and oligarchs – must be contained. Russia’s leaders have stated on several occasions that an “Orange Revolution” will not take place in Russia. Nashi’s activists seem determined to make sure of it.

And so, come this fall, the Nashisti will take to the streets in massive numbers to “carry out appropriate countermeasures” against the fifth column of Russian society, the democratic opposition. What is frightening is the language Nashi is using – this is the language of battle, the language of warfare. Though they deny that they will use physical force, they are permitted by law to use force if an individual is actively disobedient. Thus, any refusal to comply with a Nashi activist’s instructions could be construed as active disobedience and worthy of physical force. While they may claim that no force will be used, this is hardly a credible claim from an organization that casts its mission on the streets in the language of violence. In the heat of “battle” do we really expect the Nashi brigades to maintain the discipline to refrain from using physical force? Certainly not. Nor can we expect oversight or justice for those who are injured at the hands of a Nashi activist “maintaining order.” Can one really imagine the police taking the word of an opposition protester over that of a Nashi patriot?

And so, we have many new sounds to look forward to this fall in Russia: the sounds of boots marching in step, the sounds of skulls cracking on pavement, and perhaps most troubling, the sound of the final nail being pounded into the coffin of public protest and democratic opposition.

The Moscow Times editorial board also weighs in on this subject:

Nashi, the youth group that is the bane of any foreign or Russian politician who has dared oppose the Kremlin, is becoming a militia of sorts. As reported by David Nowak in Monday’s issue, the group has struck an agreement with the Moscow police force to maintain public order with brigades of unarmed volunteers. But what kind of order could Nashi possibly offer? To help provide an idea, here’s a sampling of some of the group’s activities since it emerged in early 2005.

• February 2005: Holds initial training conference for 200 youths in the Moscow region. Beats up and throws out a Yabloko youth leader who snuck in.

• March: Declares itself to be a “healthy reaction” to the now-banned National Bolshevik youth group.

• April: Calls founding congress and vows to fight corrupt bureaucrats, liberal politicians including Vladimir Ryzhkov and Garry Kasparov, fascists, ultranationalists and U.S. influence. The same day the congress is held, a young man strikes Kasparov over the head with a chessboard. Kasparov and Yabloko blame Nashi for the attack.

• July: Holds its first annual summer camp, with lectures about elections, patriotism and the handling of weapons. President Vladimir Putin meets with delegates.

• August: Blamed for an attack on National Bolshevik Party activists by masked men wielding baseball bats and gas pistols.

• October: Accused by Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov of staging violent attacks on the opposition.

• July 2006: Disrupts conference held by The Other Russia opposition coalition, whose leaders include Kasparov, Mikhail Kasyanov and National Bolshevik founder Eduard Limonov.

• July-December: Pickets the British Embassy and hounds Ambassador Tony Brenton and his family after Brenton attends The Other Russia conference.

• May 2007: Storms a news conference called by Estonian Ambassador Marina Kaljurand to demand that Estonia apologize for its relocation of a Soviet monument in Tallinn. Camps out at the Estonia Embassy for seven days.

• September: Forms brigades to head off possible political unrest during State Duma elections in December.

Nashi is believed to be the brainchild of Kremlin deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov, who is also credited with creating United Russia and Rodina. Its financing is murky, although it denies accepting money from the state. The last thing Moscow needs is unrest during the election season. Nashi, however, lacks credibility when it comes to maintaining order. It’s clear that Nashi has been involved in violent activities. It’s clear that Nashi has its own agenda.

People charged with maintaining order should be impartial and responsible. Nashi isn’t.

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

Annals of Dictatorship: Putin Fashions a Centralized State

Writing in the Moscow Times, columnist Nikolai Petro explains how Putin is slowly centralized power in Russia, laying the groundwork for dictatorship. Even if you like Putin, there are no safeguards in place to prevent this power from being seized and abused by a maniac you don’t like. Remember how Stalin followed Lenin? Russians have learned nothing from their history and hence are doomed to repeat and be destroyed by it:

Over the seven years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, there has been a marked shift of power from the regions to state corporations. Before, the governors had a free hand to do what they wanted; now this has been granted to state-controlled companies. This power shift was demonstrated by the latest round of dismissals of governors.

Samara Governor Konstantin Titov last month was the third replacement of a regional head since the beginning of August. Earlier that month, Novgorod Governor Mikhail Prusak, a veteran politician and one of President Boris Yeltsin’s first appointments, was dismissed. The second to lose his job was Sakhalin Governor Ivan Malakhov.

These three successive gubernatorial dismissals come on the eve of State Duma elections, when the leadership would not normally switch horses midstream. On one hand, it is clear that the dismissals were connected to upcoming elections, particularly to the presidential vote. On the other hand, it is evident that the Kremlin has less need than ever for governors — especially those who cannot be used to pull in votes for United Russia.

It is important to note the backgrounds of those who will replace the dismissed regional heads. The new Sakhalin governor is connected to Rosneft, the Samara governor from state arms exporter Rosoboronexport and the Novgorod governor from the Agriculture Ministry.

These events underscore the break between Moscow and the governors. The pendulum of power between the regions and the center had been functioning properly for many years, but now it seems to have broken. Prior to the last elections, when there was no issue of a presidential successor, the Kremlin needed only a simple majority in the Duma and seemed to have little need for the governors’ support. During this time, the pendulum of power shifted in favor of the regions.

Soon after Putin’s re-election, however, the Kremlin began a new offensive against the governors that culminated in the 2004 decision to cancel gubernatorial elections and appoint regional heads from Moscow. It seems that the Kremlin is planning to tighten its grip even further on the regions.

Many of the regional political machines remain intact, despite Kremlin efforts toward centralization. Moscow will reappoint politicians who have kept an iron hold over their administrations — even if it means closing its eyes to occasional opposition to the Kremlin and violations of the law. This applies to Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiyev, Bashkortostan President Murtaza Rakhimov, Kemerovo Governor Aman Tuleyev, Mayor Yury Luzhkov and others. And by the same logic, governors whose political machines cannot generate either the necessary votes for their own re-elections or in support of Kremlin policy will probably be replaced — most likely by individuals with ties to state corporations.

The regional political power structures are an important instrument that helps leaders of a large country hold onto their authority. Under Stalin, when state control was at an all-time high, this was achieved by total control of the law enforcement agencies and the regular rotation of regional leaders and generals.

The Kremlin has cleared a place for large state corporations, which have powerful financial and administrative resources. These companies are equipped with their own media structures, analysts and political strategists. They are savvy political players, signing contracts with regional governors, participating directly in election campaigns and subsequently lobbying their interests in the Duma and regional legislatures through deputies with whom they are closely connected. Among the most influential of these corporate players are Gazprom, Russian Railways, Unified Energy System and Rosoboronexport.

A model of oligarchic state capitalism has thus arisen out of Russia’s weakened democratic institutions. Much can be said about the political deficiencies of this system. It is inherently unstable and epitomizes the predominance of corporate over national interests, just as the regional power structure epitomized the predominance of the interests of the regional elite. A corporatist, state-sponsored oligarchy is inherently undemocratic because its policies are formulated privately rather than publicly. Furthermore, it is created by the political elite to serve its own interests and does not reflect the needs or wishes of the people.

A news story in the Moscow Times continues the theme, explaining how Putin using the same claim of “attacking corruption” that was used by Stalin, reaching down to the lowest levels of government to completely destroy the identity of local polities and make all of Russia subservient slaves of Moscow. Writing in the MT, Russian analyst Fyodor Lukyanov stated: “There is no sense at this point in making forecasts about the the Kremlin’s future foreign policy because Putin’s style makes predictions impossible.” Indeed. And so it was with Stalin as well. Russians seem to be a crazed, foolish people, consigning their children to oblivion and horror.

Prosecutors in Khanty-Mansiisk are investigating Mayor Valery Sudeikin on suspicion of abuse of office, the latest in a series of crackdowns on mayors in recent months. Sudeikin is suspected of illegally procuring a new apartment for a female resident, a spokeswoman for the Khanty-Mansiisk regional branch of the Investigative Committee, Yelena Skobeleva, said by telephone Monday. In February 2005, Sudeikin resettled the woman in a municipal apartment building slated for demolition, Skobeleva said. He then ordered the building to be razed, meaning the woman received an apartment in a new building despite the fact that other residents were legally entitled to receive new apartments before she did, Skobeleva said. “Sudeikin did it knowingly, and thus he deliberately violated rights of other citizens who were waiting in line for new apartments,” she said. The investigation was opened Thursday, though Sudeikin has not been formally charged. If charged and convicted, he could face up to seven years in prison.

A woman who answered the phone at Sudeikin’s office refused to comment and referred all questions to the mayor’s spokeswoman, Elvira Chekhunina. Repeated calls to Chekhunina’s office went unanswered Monday afternoon. Sudeikin was first elected mayor of Khanty-Mansiisk, capital of the Khanty-Mansiisk autonomous district, in June 2001 and re-elected in October.

The investigation is the latest in a string of legal crackdowns on mayors of large cities, which some analysts say is an attempt by the Kremlin and governors to instill greater loyalty in city bosses.

• Arkhangelsk Mayor Alexander Donskoi is in custody awaiting trial on charges of illegal business activities.

• In June, former Volgograd Mayor Yevgeny Ishchenko was sentenced to one year in prison for illegal business activities and released, having served his time while in custody.

• Tolyatti Mayor Nikolai Utkin is awaiting trial on extortion charges.

Mayors’ legal difficulties largely stem from conflicts with their respective governors, said Rostislav Turovsky, an analyst with the Agency for Regional Information, a Moscow think tank. But the Kremlin could use the cases to justify canceling mayoral elections and appointing mayors instead, Turovsky said. The Kremlin canceled gubernatorial elections in late 2004, while mayors are still elected. Lawmakers from the pro-Kremlin United Russia party last year unsuccessfully attempted to pass a law effectively canceling popular elections of mayors. Khanty-Mansiisk regional prosecutors have been particularly zealous in their crackdown on mayors. On a single day in December, they opened 49 separate criminal cases against Vyacheslav Grigoryev, mayor of the town of Sovetsky. Grigoryev was sentenced to five years in April for fraud connected to distribution of city property.

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

What’s up With Britain on Defamation?

It seems Britain has a very serious problem protecting the freedom of the press, and seems entirely too willing to cave in to threats from those who are criticized. This stems from the fact that Britain doesn’t offer the same kind of protection to publishers that is available in the United States, where it is almost impossible for a so-called “public figure” to sue for libel. Unless Britain wants to have its legal system abused and manipulated by Russia, a nation with which it has just entered a new cold war, it needs to seriously reconsider its libel law protections and expand them in favor of the press. The Moscow Times reports:

Several high-profile political web sites, including that of a leading contender for London mayor, have been pulled from the Internet after Russian billionaire Alisher Usmanov threatened legal action. Web hosting company Fasthosts Internet last week took down the web site of Craig Murray, a former British ambassador to Uzbekistan, because of allegations made about Usmanov’s past. The company said unrelated sites, including one of Boris Johnson, a Conservative lawmaker and contender in next year’s London mayoral race, faced “possible downtime” for technical reasons because they were hosted on the same server. Fasthosts confirmed that it had shut down Murray’s site over “potentially defamatory material” after Usmanov’s London-based law firm, Schillings, demanded that the content be removed.

Murray’s site remained offline Monday, as did several others hosted by Fasthosts, including Johnson’s and the Bloggerheads web log.

Johnson, a well-known British member of Parliament who is the favorite to win the Conservative nomination for the mayoral race, said it was “unbelievable that a web site can be wiped out on the say-so of some tycoon.” Johnson’s site had no link to Murray’s allegations about Usmanov. “We live in a world where Internet communication is increasingly vital, and this is a serious erosion of free speech,” Johnson said in a statement.

Uzbek-born Usmanov is involved in mining, telecoms and natural gas in Russia and was ranked 278th in Forbes magazine’s list of the world’s richest people in 2006. Usmanov last week acquired a 21 percent stake in Arsenal, one of Britain’s richest and most popular football teams, through his company Red and White Holdings. Usmanov served several years in prison under the Soviet regime but was later pardoned. He says he was a political prisoner. Murray disputes this. Murray, who lost his ambassador’s job in 2004 after alleging human rights abuses by the Uzbek government, said he was seeking a new host for the site outside Britain. “I stand by the truth of what I said and have every intention of posting it back on the net again,” he said. “If Mr. Usmanov wants to take me to court, he is welcome to do so.”

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

What’s up With Britain on Defamation?

It seems Britain has a very serious problem protecting the freedom of the press, and seems entirely too willing to cave in to threats from those who are criticized. This stems from the fact that Britain doesn’t offer the same kind of protection to publishers that is available in the United States, where it is almost impossible for a so-called “public figure” to sue for libel. Unless Britain wants to have its legal system abused and manipulated by Russia, a nation with which it has just entered a new cold war, it needs to seriously reconsider its libel law protections and expand them in favor of the press. The Moscow Times reports:

Several high-profile political web sites, including that of a leading contender for London mayor, have been pulled from the Internet after Russian billionaire Alisher Usmanov threatened legal action. Web hosting company Fasthosts Internet last week took down the web site of Craig Murray, a former British ambassador to Uzbekistan, because of allegations made about Usmanov’s past. The company said unrelated sites, including one of Boris Johnson, a Conservative lawmaker and contender in next year’s London mayoral race, faced “possible downtime” for technical reasons because they were hosted on the same server. Fasthosts confirmed that it had shut down Murray’s site over “potentially defamatory material” after Usmanov’s London-based law firm, Schillings, demanded that the content be removed.

Murray’s site remained offline Monday, as did several others hosted by Fasthosts, including Johnson’s and the Bloggerheads web log.

Johnson, a well-known British member of Parliament who is the favorite to win the Conservative nomination for the mayoral race, said it was “unbelievable that a web site can be wiped out on the say-so of some tycoon.” Johnson’s site had no link to Murray’s allegations about Usmanov. “We live in a world where Internet communication is increasingly vital, and this is a serious erosion of free speech,” Johnson said in a statement.

Uzbek-born Usmanov is involved in mining, telecoms and natural gas in Russia and was ranked 278th in Forbes magazine’s list of the world’s richest people in 2006. Usmanov last week acquired a 21 percent stake in Arsenal, one of Britain’s richest and most popular football teams, through his company Red and White Holdings. Usmanov served several years in prison under the Soviet regime but was later pardoned. He says he was a political prisoner. Murray disputes this. Murray, who lost his ambassador’s job in 2004 after alleging human rights abuses by the Uzbek government, said he was seeking a new host for the site outside Britain. “I stand by the truth of what I said and have every intention of posting it back on the net again,” he said. “If Mr. Usmanov wants to take me to court, he is welcome to do so.”

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

What’s up With Britain on Defamation?

It seems Britain has a very serious problem protecting the freedom of the press, and seems entirely too willing to cave in to threats from those who are criticized. This stems from the fact that Britain doesn’t offer the same kind of protection to publishers that is available in the United States, where it is almost impossible for a so-called “public figure” to sue for libel. Unless Britain wants to have its legal system abused and manipulated by Russia, a nation with which it has just entered a new cold war, it needs to seriously reconsider its libel law protections and expand them in favor of the press. The Moscow Times reports:

Several high-profile political web sites, including that of a leading contender for London mayor, have been pulled from the Internet after Russian billionaire Alisher Usmanov threatened legal action. Web hosting company Fasthosts Internet last week took down the web site of Craig Murray, a former British ambassador to Uzbekistan, because of allegations made about Usmanov’s past. The company said unrelated sites, including one of Boris Johnson, a Conservative lawmaker and contender in next year’s London mayoral race, faced “possible downtime” for technical reasons because they were hosted on the same server. Fasthosts confirmed that it had shut down Murray’s site over “potentially defamatory material” after Usmanov’s London-based law firm, Schillings, demanded that the content be removed.

Murray’s site remained offline Monday, as did several others hosted by Fasthosts, including Johnson’s and the Bloggerheads web log.

Johnson, a well-known British member of Parliament who is the favorite to win the Conservative nomination for the mayoral race, said it was “unbelievable that a web site can be wiped out on the say-so of some tycoon.” Johnson’s site had no link to Murray’s allegations about Usmanov. “We live in a world where Internet communication is increasingly vital, and this is a serious erosion of free speech,” Johnson said in a statement.

Uzbek-born Usmanov is involved in mining, telecoms and natural gas in Russia and was ranked 278th in Forbes magazine’s list of the world’s richest people in 2006. Usmanov last week acquired a 21 percent stake in Arsenal, one of Britain’s richest and most popular football teams, through his company Red and White Holdings. Usmanov served several years in prison under the Soviet regime but was later pardoned. He says he was a political prisoner. Murray disputes this. Murray, who lost his ambassador’s job in 2004 after alleging human rights abuses by the Uzbek government, said he was seeking a new host for the site outside Britain. “I stand by the truth of what I said and have every intention of posting it back on the net again,” he said. “If Mr. Usmanov wants to take me to court, he is welcome to do so.”

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

What’s up With Britain on Defamation?

It seems Britain has a very serious problem protecting the freedom of the press, and seems entirely too willing to cave in to threats from those who are criticized. This stems from the fact that Britain doesn’t offer the same kind of protection to publishers that is available in the United States, where it is almost impossible for a so-called “public figure” to sue for libel. Unless Britain wants to have its legal system abused and manipulated by Russia, a nation with which it has just entered a new cold war, it needs to seriously reconsider its libel law protections and expand them in favor of the press. The Moscow Times reports:

Several high-profile political web sites, including that of a leading contender for London mayor, have been pulled from the Internet after Russian billionaire Alisher Usmanov threatened legal action. Web hosting company Fasthosts Internet last week took down the web site of Craig Murray, a former British ambassador to Uzbekistan, because of allegations made about Usmanov’s past. The company said unrelated sites, including one of Boris Johnson, a Conservative lawmaker and contender in next year’s London mayoral race, faced “possible downtime” for technical reasons because they were hosted on the same server. Fasthosts confirmed that it had shut down Murray’s site over “potentially defamatory material” after Usmanov’s London-based law firm, Schillings, demanded that the content be removed.

Murray’s site remained offline Monday, as did several others hosted by Fasthosts, including Johnson’s and the Bloggerheads web log.

Johnson, a well-known British member of Parliament who is the favorite to win the Conservative nomination for the mayoral race, said it was “unbelievable that a web site can be wiped out on the say-so of some tycoon.” Johnson’s site had no link to Murray’s allegations about Usmanov. “We live in a world where Internet communication is increasingly vital, and this is a serious erosion of free speech,” Johnson said in a statement.

Uzbek-born Usmanov is involved in mining, telecoms and natural gas in Russia and was ranked 278th in Forbes magazine’s list of the world’s richest people in 2006. Usmanov last week acquired a 21 percent stake in Arsenal, one of Britain’s richest and most popular football teams, through his company Red and White Holdings. Usmanov served several years in prison under the Soviet regime but was later pardoned. He says he was a political prisoner. Murray disputes this. Murray, who lost his ambassador’s job in 2004 after alleging human rights abuses by the Uzbek government, said he was seeking a new host for the site outside Britain. “I stand by the truth of what I said and have every intention of posting it back on the net again,” he said. “If Mr. Usmanov wants to take me to court, he is welcome to do so.”

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What’s up With Britain on Defamation?

It seems Britain has a very serious problem protecting the freedom of the press, and seems entirely too willing to cave in to threats from those who are criticized. This stems from the fact that Britain doesn’t offer the same kind of protection to publishers that is available in the United States, where it is almost impossible for a so-called “public figure” to sue for libel. Unless Britain wants to have its legal system abused and manipulated by Russia, a nation with which it has just entered a new cold war, it needs to seriously reconsider its libel law protections and expand them in favor of the press. The Moscow Times reports:

Several high-profile political web sites, including that of a leading contender for London mayor, have been pulled from the Internet after Russian billionaire Alisher Usmanov threatened legal action. Web hosting company Fasthosts Internet last week took down the web site of Craig Murray, a former British ambassador to Uzbekistan, because of allegations made about Usmanov’s past. The company said unrelated sites, including one of Boris Johnson, a Conservative lawmaker and contender in next year’s London mayoral race, faced “possible downtime” for technical reasons because they were hosted on the same server. Fasthosts confirmed that it had shut down Murray’s site over “potentially defamatory material” after Usmanov’s London-based law firm, Schillings, demanded that the content be removed.

Murray’s site remained offline Monday, as did several others hosted by Fasthosts, including Johnson’s and the Bloggerheads web log.

Johnson, a well-known British member of Parliament who is the favorite to win the Conservative nomination for the mayoral race, said it was “unbelievable that a web site can be wiped out on the say-so of some tycoon.” Johnson’s site had no link to Murray’s allegations about Usmanov. “We live in a world where Internet communication is increasingly vital, and this is a serious erosion of free speech,” Johnson said in a statement.

Uzbek-born Usmanov is involved in mining, telecoms and natural gas in Russia and was ranked 278th in Forbes magazine’s list of the world’s richest people in 2006. Usmanov last week acquired a 21 percent stake in Arsenal, one of Britain’s richest and most popular football teams, through his company Red and White Holdings. Usmanov served several years in prison under the Soviet regime but was later pardoned. He says he was a political prisoner. Murray disputes this. Murray, who lost his ambassador’s job in 2004 after alleging human rights abuses by the Uzbek government, said he was seeking a new host for the site outside Britain. “I stand by the truth of what I said and have every intention of posting it back on the net again,” he said. “If Mr. Usmanov wants to take me to court, he is welcome to do so.”

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

Another Award for Politkovskaya

Monsters and Critics reports that Anna Politkovskaya is under consideration for yet an other prestigious human rights award. One can’t help but ask, though, whether the world paid her enough attention and gave her enough protection while she was alive, and whether it is doing all it can to identify, nurture and protect her successors. We at LR don’t think so.

We take this opportunity to remind readers that we will devote the content of our blog on October 7th, the one-year anniversary of her killing, to material about this great Russian hero, and we are actively soliciting original submissions (of any length) from readers reflecting on her life, her murder and its aftermath. If you would like to contribute, send by e-mail to larussophobe[AT]yahoo[DOT]com.

A slain investigative reporter from Russia, a Sudanese lawyer and two Chinese dissidents have been shortlisted for the Sakharov Prize, the EU’s prestigious human rights award, officials said Tuesday. Anna Politkovskaya was an outspoken critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Chechen conflict. She was shot dead in the lift of her apartment building on October 7, 2006.

Two Italian liberal lawmakers have proposed naming the press room of the European Parliament after her. Salih Mahmoud Osman is a Sudanese human rights attorney who provides free legal representation for the victims of Sudan’s civil war and human rights abuses. Zeng Jinyan reports on human rights abuses in China through her daily internet blog. Her husband Hu Jia is an AIDS and environmental activist. Named after Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov, the yearly Sakharov Prize has been awarded by the European Parliament (EP) since 1988 ‘to individuals or organizations who have made an important contribution to the fight for human rights or democracy,’ organizers said. In addition to the title, the winner receives the sum of 50,000 euros (70,570 dollars). Past winners include Nelson Mandela, the first president of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, and the United Nations. The winner will be picked by the EP’s political group leaders on October 25. The award ceremony is scheduled to take place in Strasbourg on December 11.

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IHT Reader Blasts Sicko Schmemann

Last week we blasted Russophile scumbag Serge Schmemann’s ridiculous propaganda tirade in the International Herald Tribune hyping dictator Vladimir Putin. Now, an IHT reader takes him to task a well:

To the Editor:

Serge Schmemann’s article “A visit with Putin” (Views, Sept. 17) presents a view of Vladimir Putin that reflects the public image Putin strives to project, but it is not an accurate portrayal of the Russian presidency. According to Schmemann, the “enormously popular” Putin has led Russia “from bankruptcy and despair to enormous wealth and power.” Russians, he tells us, “are suddenly living better than they ever have.”

To be sure, the Russian president enjoys a popularity rating that any Western leader would envy. But polls reflect the constant barrage of pro-Putin propaganda in the Kremlin-controlled media and the traditional Russian craving for a strong state that assures stability, rather than an improvement in the lives of ordinary Russians. With the average hourly wage in Russia at around $3 an hour, only a tiny minority of Russians (many of whom are corrupt oligarchs favored by Putin) enjoy the fruits of Russia’s oil-based prosperity. Social welfare benefits, including health care, have been steadily eroding since Putin came to power, and the crime rate has been rising, with violent crime more than doubling between 1998 and 2006.

Although Schmemann acknowledges that Russians will not be able choose their political leader when (and if) Putin steps down, he seems to dismiss this as insignificant in view of the fact that “stores are overflowing” and that Russians enjoy unprecedented “personal freedoms.”

But what does personal freedom really mean, when people are denied the right to have democratic elections?

Surprisingly, given that Schmemann is himself a journalist, he ignores the tragedy that has befallen his profession in Russia, where the independent media are under constant siege by the Kremlin. Instead, he lauds Putin for bringing stability to Russia, despite the fact that more than 20 journalists have been murdered there since Putin came to power.

Amy Knight, Basel, Switzerland

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