Daily Archives: March 30, 2007

Yet Another Journalist in the Kremlin’s Crosshairs

The Moscow News reports:

The Committee to Protect Journalists is alarmed by the criminal prosecution of Viktor Shmakov (pictured, left), editor-in-chief of the opposition newspaper Provintsialnye Vesti (Provincial News) in the Russian republic of Bashkortostan, the watchdog said in a web release.

Prosecutors in the regional capital Ufa, 680 miles (1100 kilometers) east of Moscow, have charged Shmakov with “public calls for the realization of extremist activity using mass media” and “calls for insubordination to legal authorities,” according to local press reports. If convicted in the trial that began March 21, Shmakov faces up to five years in prison.

The charges against Shmakov stem from two articles published in an April 2006 edition of Provintsialnye Vesti that criticized corruption and human rights abuses in Bashkortostan. The articles also called for the resignation of the republic’s president, Murtaza Rakhimov, who has ruled the oil-rich and mostly Muslim republic since 1993, according to local press reports. Shmakov did not write the articles. Authorities have filed the same charges against the author, local opposition leader Airat Dilmukhametov. “The prosecution of our colleague Viktor Shmakov is another disturbing example of Russian authorities’ use of the full force of criminal law to stifle critical reporting and opinion,” said CPJ Executive Director Joel Simon. “Political criticism is not a crime. All charges against Viktor Shmakov must be dropped immediately.”

The persecution of Shmakov started on April 28, 2006, when Federal Security Service (FSB) agents arrested him for his paper’s critical reporting. He was sentenced to two months in jail, while the FSB and Interior Ministry said they were conducting a joint investigation into his alleged extremist activities. On May 16, 2006, the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan ruled that authorities did not have enough evidence to hold Shmakov, and ordered his release. However, authorities delayed implementing the court’s decision for 48 hours before releasing the journalist on May 19, 2006. Bashkortostan prosecutors had initially added the charge of “organizing mass unrest” to Shmakov’s indictments, a count that provides for up to 10 years in prison, but later reduced to the lesser charge of “calling for insubordination to legal authorities” in August 2006.

The CPJ press release states:

The persecution of Shmakov started on April 28, 2006, when Federal Security Service (FSB) agents arrested him for his paper’s critical reporting. He was sentenced to two months in jail, while the FSB and Interior Ministry said they were conducting a joint investigation into his alleged extremist activities. On May 16, 2006, the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan ruled that authorities did not have enough evidence to hold Shmakov, and ordered his release. However, authorities delayed implementing the court’s decision for 48 hours before releasing the journalist on May 19, 2006.

Yet Another Journalist in the Kremlin’s Crosshairs

The Moscow News reports:

The Committee to Protect Journalists is alarmed by the criminal prosecution of Viktor Shmakov (pictured, left), editor-in-chief of the opposition newspaper Provintsialnye Vesti (Provincial News) in the Russian republic of Bashkortostan, the watchdog said in a web release.

Prosecutors in the regional capital Ufa, 680 miles (1100 kilometers) east of Moscow, have charged Shmakov with “public calls for the realization of extremist activity using mass media” and “calls for insubordination to legal authorities,” according to local press reports. If convicted in the trial that began March 21, Shmakov faces up to five years in prison.

The charges against Shmakov stem from two articles published in an April 2006 edition of Provintsialnye Vesti that criticized corruption and human rights abuses in Bashkortostan. The articles also called for the resignation of the republic’s president, Murtaza Rakhimov, who has ruled the oil-rich and mostly Muslim republic since 1993, according to local press reports. Shmakov did not write the articles. Authorities have filed the same charges against the author, local opposition leader Airat Dilmukhametov. “The prosecution of our colleague Viktor Shmakov is another disturbing example of Russian authorities’ use of the full force of criminal law to stifle critical reporting and opinion,” said CPJ Executive Director Joel Simon. “Political criticism is not a crime. All charges against Viktor Shmakov must be dropped immediately.”

The persecution of Shmakov started on April 28, 2006, when Federal Security Service (FSB) agents arrested him for his paper’s critical reporting. He was sentenced to two months in jail, while the FSB and Interior Ministry said they were conducting a joint investigation into his alleged extremist activities. On May 16, 2006, the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan ruled that authorities did not have enough evidence to hold Shmakov, and ordered his release. However, authorities delayed implementing the court’s decision for 48 hours before releasing the journalist on May 19, 2006. Bashkortostan prosecutors had initially added the charge of “organizing mass unrest” to Shmakov’s indictments, a count that provides for up to 10 years in prison, but later reduced to the lesser charge of “calling for insubordination to legal authorities” in August 2006.

The CPJ press release states:

The persecution of Shmakov started on April 28, 2006, when Federal Security Service (FSB) agents arrested him for his paper’s critical reporting. He was sentenced to two months in jail, while the FSB and Interior Ministry said they were conducting a joint investigation into his alleged extremist activities. On May 16, 2006, the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan ruled that authorities did not have enough evidence to hold Shmakov, and ordered his release. However, authorities delayed implementing the court’s decision for 48 hours before releasing the journalist on May 19, 2006.

Yet Another Journalist in the Kremlin’s Crosshairs

The Moscow News reports:

The Committee to Protect Journalists is alarmed by the criminal prosecution of Viktor Shmakov (pictured, left), editor-in-chief of the opposition newspaper Provintsialnye Vesti (Provincial News) in the Russian republic of Bashkortostan, the watchdog said in a web release.

Prosecutors in the regional capital Ufa, 680 miles (1100 kilometers) east of Moscow, have charged Shmakov with “public calls for the realization of extremist activity using mass media” and “calls for insubordination to legal authorities,” according to local press reports. If convicted in the trial that began March 21, Shmakov faces up to five years in prison.

The charges against Shmakov stem from two articles published in an April 2006 edition of Provintsialnye Vesti that criticized corruption and human rights abuses in Bashkortostan. The articles also called for the resignation of the republic’s president, Murtaza Rakhimov, who has ruled the oil-rich and mostly Muslim republic since 1993, according to local press reports. Shmakov did not write the articles. Authorities have filed the same charges against the author, local opposition leader Airat Dilmukhametov. “The prosecution of our colleague Viktor Shmakov is another disturbing example of Russian authorities’ use of the full force of criminal law to stifle critical reporting and opinion,” said CPJ Executive Director Joel Simon. “Political criticism is not a crime. All charges against Viktor Shmakov must be dropped immediately.”

The persecution of Shmakov started on April 28, 2006, when Federal Security Service (FSB) agents arrested him for his paper’s critical reporting. He was sentenced to two months in jail, while the FSB and Interior Ministry said they were conducting a joint investigation into his alleged extremist activities. On May 16, 2006, the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan ruled that authorities did not have enough evidence to hold Shmakov, and ordered his release. However, authorities delayed implementing the court’s decision for 48 hours before releasing the journalist on May 19, 2006. Bashkortostan prosecutors had initially added the charge of “organizing mass unrest” to Shmakov’s indictments, a count that provides for up to 10 years in prison, but later reduced to the lesser charge of “calling for insubordination to legal authorities” in August 2006.

The CPJ press release states:

The persecution of Shmakov started on April 28, 2006, when Federal Security Service (FSB) agents arrested him for his paper’s critical reporting. He was sentenced to two months in jail, while the FSB and Interior Ministry said they were conducting a joint investigation into his alleged extremist activities. On May 16, 2006, the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan ruled that authorities did not have enough evidence to hold Shmakov, and ordered his release. However, authorities delayed implementing the court’s decision for 48 hours before releasing the journalist on May 19, 2006.

Yet Another Journalist in the Kremlin’s Crosshairs

The Moscow News reports:

The Committee to Protect Journalists is alarmed by the criminal prosecution of Viktor Shmakov (pictured, left), editor-in-chief of the opposition newspaper Provintsialnye Vesti (Provincial News) in the Russian republic of Bashkortostan, the watchdog said in a web release.

Prosecutors in the regional capital Ufa, 680 miles (1100 kilometers) east of Moscow, have charged Shmakov with “public calls for the realization of extremist activity using mass media” and “calls for insubordination to legal authorities,” according to local press reports. If convicted in the trial that began March 21, Shmakov faces up to five years in prison.

The charges against Shmakov stem from two articles published in an April 2006 edition of Provintsialnye Vesti that criticized corruption and human rights abuses in Bashkortostan. The articles also called for the resignation of the republic’s president, Murtaza Rakhimov, who has ruled the oil-rich and mostly Muslim republic since 1993, according to local press reports. Shmakov did not write the articles. Authorities have filed the same charges against the author, local opposition leader Airat Dilmukhametov. “The prosecution of our colleague Viktor Shmakov is another disturbing example of Russian authorities’ use of the full force of criminal law to stifle critical reporting and opinion,” said CPJ Executive Director Joel Simon. “Political criticism is not a crime. All charges against Viktor Shmakov must be dropped immediately.”

The persecution of Shmakov started on April 28, 2006, when Federal Security Service (FSB) agents arrested him for his paper’s critical reporting. He was sentenced to two months in jail, while the FSB and Interior Ministry said they were conducting a joint investigation into his alleged extremist activities. On May 16, 2006, the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan ruled that authorities did not have enough evidence to hold Shmakov, and ordered his release. However, authorities delayed implementing the court’s decision for 48 hours before releasing the journalist on May 19, 2006. Bashkortostan prosecutors had initially added the charge of “organizing mass unrest” to Shmakov’s indictments, a count that provides for up to 10 years in prison, but later reduced to the lesser charge of “calling for insubordination to legal authorities” in August 2006.

The CPJ press release states:

The persecution of Shmakov started on April 28, 2006, when Federal Security Service (FSB) agents arrested him for his paper’s critical reporting. He was sentenced to two months in jail, while the FSB and Interior Ministry said they were conducting a joint investigation into his alleged extremist activities. On May 16, 2006, the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan ruled that authorities did not have enough evidence to hold Shmakov, and ordered his release. However, authorities delayed implementing the court’s decision for 48 hours before releasing the journalist on May 19, 2006.

Yet Another Journalist in the Kremlin’s Crosshairs

The Moscow News reports:

The Committee to Protect Journalists is alarmed by the criminal prosecution of Viktor Shmakov (pictured, left), editor-in-chief of the opposition newspaper Provintsialnye Vesti (Provincial News) in the Russian republic of Bashkortostan, the watchdog said in a web release.

Prosecutors in the regional capital Ufa, 680 miles (1100 kilometers) east of Moscow, have charged Shmakov with “public calls for the realization of extremist activity using mass media” and “calls for insubordination to legal authorities,” according to local press reports. If convicted in the trial that began March 21, Shmakov faces up to five years in prison.

The charges against Shmakov stem from two articles published in an April 2006 edition of Provintsialnye Vesti that criticized corruption and human rights abuses in Bashkortostan. The articles also called for the resignation of the republic’s president, Murtaza Rakhimov, who has ruled the oil-rich and mostly Muslim republic since 1993, according to local press reports. Shmakov did not write the articles. Authorities have filed the same charges against the author, local opposition leader Airat Dilmukhametov. “The prosecution of our colleague Viktor Shmakov is another disturbing example of Russian authorities’ use of the full force of criminal law to stifle critical reporting and opinion,” said CPJ Executive Director Joel Simon. “Political criticism is not a crime. All charges against Viktor Shmakov must be dropped immediately.”

The persecution of Shmakov started on April 28, 2006, when Federal Security Service (FSB) agents arrested him for his paper’s critical reporting. He was sentenced to two months in jail, while the FSB and Interior Ministry said they were conducting a joint investigation into his alleged extremist activities. On May 16, 2006, the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan ruled that authorities did not have enough evidence to hold Shmakov, and ordered his release. However, authorities delayed implementing the court’s decision for 48 hours before releasing the journalist on May 19, 2006. Bashkortostan prosecutors had initially added the charge of “organizing mass unrest” to Shmakov’s indictments, a count that provides for up to 10 years in prison, but later reduced to the lesser charge of “calling for insubordination to legal authorities” in August 2006.

The CPJ press release states:

The persecution of Shmakov started on April 28, 2006, when Federal Security Service (FSB) agents arrested him for his paper’s critical reporting. He was sentenced to two months in jail, while the FSB and Interior Ministry said they were conducting a joint investigation into his alleged extremist activities. On May 16, 2006, the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan ruled that authorities did not have enough evidence to hold Shmakov, and ordered his release. However, authorities delayed implementing the court’s decision for 48 hours before releasing the journalist on May 19, 2006.

Kiselyov on Khodorkovsy

Writing in the Moscow Times, pundit Yevgeny Kiselyov (pictured) analyzes the proceedings in the Khodorkovsky retrial:

For over a week now I have been perplexed by the fact that those monitoring human rights in Russia have not come up with an answer for the following question: Why after four years of relentlessly prosecuting the Yukos case did Moscow’s Basmanny District Court decide in favor of former CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky on March 20?

Why has the court — the very name of which has become synonymous with selective application of the law, or simply lawlessness — suddenly granted the defense’s motion against hearing the latest charges against Khodorkovsky and his former business partner Platon Lebedev in a court in the remote Chita region?

There was another decision from the court, on Monday, that muddied the waters a bit but likely didn’t represent a change in the outcome. I will return to that later.

The fact remains that over the last four years the court has handed down dozens of rulings regarding Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and Yukos. The defense lawyers have, as a rule, challenged the actions by the Prosecutor General’s Office. The court, as a rule, has decided in favor of the prosecution. That’s why the latest decision was so surprising.

Those who prepared the proceedings moved the hearing to Chita, almost 6,000 kilometers away. This would have made it more difficult for the press, defense witnesses and defense lawyers to attend. It looked like a move to reduce publicity after the initial Moscow proceedings were accompanied by daily demonstrations and the presence of high-profile supporters.

Shifting the venue to Chita was against the law, which states that defendants should be tried either in their city of residence or where prosecutors claim a crime was committed. Nobody expected the court to allow an end run around this requirement.

Even less expected was its subsequent change of mind.

Some starry-eyed optimists might suggest the court has just decided that strict adherence to the law is paramount. But the shift is more likely linked to a comment by Yury Shmidt, Khodorkovsky’s lawyer. He said that when the court openly and repeatedly sides with the prosecution it helps the defense. The more Khodorkovsky’s rights are violated, the greater the chance he will win when he seeks redress from the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

The Strasbourg court will examine if the defendants had access to objective and impartial proceedings; whether the adversarial principal of justice was properly applied; if the defendants’ procedural rights were ignored; if the proceedings were open to the public and media; and how state-controlled media covered the proceedings.

There were clearly violations. Neither Khodorkovsky nor his lawyers was given sufficient time to become acquainted with the prosecution’s materials in the case. The defense was refused the right to introduce documents, reports by independent experts and other materials into the record of the court’s proceedings. And, as defense lawyers have often pointed out, the verdicts have been nearly verbatim repetitions — including grammatical errors — of the indictment.

It is not hard to imagine Khodorkovsky and Lebedev winning their case in Strasbourg.

Until recently, Russian authorities have maintained a very condescending attitude toward the Strasbourg court. It might have been unpleasant losing different cases in the court, but the decisions obtained on human rights violations there don’t have the power to overturn rulings from Russian courts. Telling the public that the problem is in the court’s anti-Russian bias, fanned by enemies who cannot bear to watch the country’s return to power and greatness, is also an integral part of the strategy.

But the authorities now seem to realize that decisions from Strasbourg have legal as well as political consequences. The legal consequences could roll over into financial penalties in the billions of dollars.

As a case in point, this year the European Court of Human Rights is expected to hear complaints connected with the Yukos case. A parallel process has been taking place quietly and unobtrusively. Yukos shareholders have filed a lawsuit against the Russian government demanding compensation for what was essentially the nationalization of the oil company. The amount they are suing for, $50 billion, is the largest in the history of legal arbitration.

Although the authorities are publicly silent about the case, they are taking it very seriously. They have spared no expense in hiring a major U.S. law firm, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, and bringing in top-notch Russian lawyers.

The first hearings at the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague will come at the end of the spring. The court could rule that the case is outside of its jurisdiction, which would end Russia’s problems. If it takes the case, the proceeding could stretch out for years. Imagine the difficulties for Moscow if the Strasbourg court ruled in Khodorkovsky’s favor while The Hague was still considering the unlawful nationalization complaint.

The Kremlin now has to deal with the possibility that future verdicts from Strasbourg will be used in arbitration lawsuits or criminal proceedings against the state or senior Russian officials.

This helps explain why President Vladimir Putin replaced Pavel Laptev, who ended his term in Strasbourg in disgrace, with Veronika Milinchuk, a close associate of Justice Minister Vladimir Ustinov, as representative to the human rights court. Her appointment came with the announcement that, henceforth, the country’s representative to Strasbourg will hold the post of deputy justice minister.

Ustinov has his own reasons for being concerned about the result of the proceedings in Strasbourg. After all, it was he who ran the Prosecutor General’s Office that brought criminal charges against Yukos executives, applied for warrants to conduct searches and arrests, and managed to obtain the strict verdicts it was seeking against the accused.

Taken together, all of this suggests that the looming hearings in Strasbourg might be behind the decision to transfer the trial back to Moscow.

If this is the case, we might even expect the new proceedings to be conducted in accordance with all proper procedures. Even if it adds a year to the duration of the hearings, it will be worth it. A facade of irreproachable punctiliousness will have to be maintained during the process of reaching the predetermined guilty verdict. Only then will the state have any hope of defending its actions in Strasbourg.

Monday’s decision on the legality of moving Khodorkovsky and Lebedev to Chita might introduce some confusion here. But, as a member of Khodorkovsky’s legal team explained to me, the ruling was of no real importance.

For the defense, what is important is that it has in hand a decision with greater legal bearing. This is the Basmanny District Court ruling that the investigation into the charges against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev can’t be carried out in Chita, and this ruling can only be overturned by a higher court. If the Moscow City Court upholds the decision, this supports my theory that there is a political consideration in relation to the Strasbourg Court in play. If the Moscow City Court does overturn the decision, I’m wrong, and the Basmanny District Court ruling was just a blip.

We probably won’t have to wait long to find out what the real case was.

Annals of the Neo-Soviet Robber Barons

The Economist explains how, after liquidating Mikhail Khodorkovsky as a political rival, the Kremlin then turned it’s attention to pilfering his assets.

There were no bids from mysterious bimbos, and the auctioneer was not wearing a bow tie. Although the sale on Tuesday March 27th of a 9.4% stake in Rosneft, a state-controlled Russian oil firm, lacked some of the quirks of previous Russian auctions, it did exhibit some traditional features. It lasted only a few minutes, and the goods went for a song to the expected winner—in this case, Rosneft itself.

This was the first in a series of auctions of the remaining assets belonging to Yukos, once Russia’s top oil company, which was forced into bankruptcy (wrongly, it says) last year by alleged tax arrears and penalties amounting to roughly $33 billion. Yukos’s stake in Rosneft was a leftover from the knock-down sale, in 2004, of most of its main subsidiary to a farcical front company, which was itself acquired by Rosneft soon afterwards. The price for this week’s lot, which included some lesser assets, of 197.8 billion roubles ($7.6 billion), represented a 10% discount on market value: nice business for Rosneft, though less good for the Russian state and people.

Other would-be buyers—including Gazprom and some foreign energy firms, possibly in collaboration with Russian ones—are likely to come forward. Most important for the future of the Russian oil industry will be the fate of Yukos’s two remaining production units and its network of refineries. Having just borrowed $22 billion from a clutch of foreign banks, Rosneft looks poised for more bargain buys. Since it is also Yukos’s second-biggest creditor, after the taxman, Rosneft should recoup much of its outlay swiftly.

The most interesting aspect of this week’s sale, which was held at Yukos’s now-sombre headquarters, was not the identity of the winner but that of the only other bidder: TNK-BP, an Anglo-Russian oil firm that British Petroleum (BP) bought into before the Kremlin circumscribed foreign participation in Russia’s energy sector. In a replay of Shell’s experience on Sakhalin island, TNK-BP is having trouble holding onto its investments, in particular the giant Kovykta gas field in Siberia that it controls. Ludicrous licensing requirements are helping Gazprom to muscle its way into that project—and perhaps into overall control of the company.

Lord Browne, BP’s chief executive, visited Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, last week. Speculation has it that TNK-BP’s participation in the auction was meant to confer legitimacy on the event (Russian law requires there to be at least two bidders), and thus to curry favour with the Kremlin—and perhaps also with Rosneft, who might be a more palatable partner than Gazprom. Though TNK-BP insisted that its interest in the auction was real, it seemed to wane pretty quickly. Meanwhile, more charges are being brought against Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Yukos’s former boss, who was arrested in 2003, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, Yukos’s auditor, has also been targeted by prosecutors. Those cases also seem designed to help justify the sell-offs. But larceny, even with a (relatively) respectable face, is still larceny.

You Say you want a Scientific Revolution?

The Associated Press reports on an encouraging sign of rebellion within Russia’s scientific intelligentsia:

Russia’s scientific elite, in a rare show of disobedience to the Kremlin, on Wednesday voted against a government-proposed charter that would have transferred control of the historically independent Academy of Sciences to the state. The academy has spearheaded fundamental research for nearly three centuries and enjoyed a high degree of autonomy even in Soviet times, when it refused to expel dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov. The Education Ministry had proposed creating a supervisory board consisting mostly of government representatives that would oversee the academy’s work, budget and property, including vast real estate assets. Instead, senior members of the academy voted unanimously for regulations that would allow it to keep its autonomy.

The vote was a rare statement of dissent against President Vladimir Putin’s government, which has established tight control over Russia’s political, economic and social life. First steps toward imposing greater government control began last year when parliament passed a law stipulating that the academy’s top executive must be approved by the president and its charter approved by the government. The Education Ministry proposed an academy charter that would create an advisory body made up of nine people, only three of whom would be scientists; the rest would be government ministers, lawmakers and Kremlin officials.

Under the ministry’s proposal, the advisory body would control research, decide which scientific projects to pursue and distribute state funding. “Whether people having no relation to science can make decisions about scientific work is a big question,” said academy spokeswoman Irina Presnyakova. “The scientific community has enjoyed specific freedoms and autonomy everywhere and at all times,” Zhores Alferov, a Nobel physics laureate and senior academy member, said on NTV television.

Founded by Peter the Great in 1724, the Academy of Sciences has cherished its autonomy. In the Soviet era, it refused to accept some senior Communist Party members whom it saw unqualified. The state-funded academy commands a budget of $1.2 billion, has 400 research institutes and some 200,000 scientists across the country. Critics say the government’s move is also aimed at gaining control over the academy’s lucrative real estate assets, including palaces and other sites in Moscow and St. Petersburg. “The Kremlin and the government have long been eyeing this tasty morsel and of course the academicians don’t want to see their financial and moral situation weakened,” said Yevgeny Volk, head of the Heritage Foundation’s Moscow office. Volk predicted a tough battle between the academy’s leaders and the government, saying that the authorities could offer additional perks to the academicians in exchange for control over the organization.

Dmitry Livanov, a deputy education minister, said that the ministry wouldn’t approve the academy’s version of its charter, but added that it was ready for a “constructive dialogue,” the ITAR-Tass news agency said. If the Education Ministry and the academy fail to reach a compromise, the government has the power to enforce its version of the charter. However, the Kremlin would likely try to avoid an open clash with the widely respected body that could erode the government’s prestige ahead of the parliamentary election this fall and the presidential vote in March 2008. Academy president Yuri Osipov predicted difficulties getting its version of the new charter approved by the government, even though he insisted it fully complied with Russian law, but he vowed to resist government moves for control. “We don’t take seriously anything that is made up by outside people having no relation to us,” he said on NTV.

Pining for Dictatorship

One of the more truly absurd bits of propaganda circulated about Russians is that the only reason they support Soviet policies is their poverty and cruel circumstances. Give Russians financial stability, they say, and they’ll favor democratic polices just as much as anyone.

HA! Check out this forum on Way to Russia where the participants wax nostaligic about the USSR despite the alleged booming Russian economy and rock-solid leadership of wildly popular Vladimir Putin. The dominant theme seems to be how superior Soviet culture was to what Russia has today. For instance, one poster writes:

Westerners often think that the Soviet Union was some Nazi-era state and that if the Germans had won WWII, the 3rd Reich would have looked something like the USSR. That’s completely opposite of the truth. Sure the Soviet economy wasn’t anything to boast about and most people were poor by western standards, but Soviet culture was IMENSELY superior to the culture today. Soviet culture was in more ways than not, an extension of traditional Russian culture, based on peace, love, and friendship. The Soviet Union may not have had a high standard of living, but it had it’s dignity. Why do you think the Middle East and Islam is so hateful of the west? Because they want to stand up for their cultural values which have intertwined their society for thousands of years. The only other option for them is to be turned into a cesspool like Russia has been.

It’s quite true, of course, that the highly stylish manner Stalin developed for sending folks off the the GULAG cannot ever be compared to the crude tactics of today’s Russian rulers. But can you imagine what people would say about a forum of Germans talking about the high points of Nazi culture? Why oh why won’t they say that about neo-Soviets? After all, the Soviet regime murdered far more Russians than the Nazis.

March 29, 2007 — Contents

THURSDAY MARCH 29 CONTENTS


(1) Annals of the Neo-Soviet Union: Human Rights into the Crapper

(2) What’s Next? A Fry Cook for President?

(3) It Takes One to Know One

(4) LR on DAN

(5) Annals of Shamapova: Misery in Miami