Daily Archives: December 14, 2006

Litvinenko Witnesses Run for their Lives

The Times of London reports the latest horrifying developments in the Litvinenko atrocity:

Key witnesses in the Alexander Litvinenko investigation are missing, with their families claiming that they fear for their lives. The sudden disappearance of a number of leading figures linked to the affair will make it even harder for British detectives, whose inquiry has now spread across five countries.Interpol joined the hunt for the murderer yesterday, saying that it hoped to exchange information coming from Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Russia. Scotland Yard was struggling to gain access to vital witnesses with former associates of Litvinenko claiming that they are too scared to come forward. Evgeny Limarev, who told the former KGB officer that he was on a death list just hours before he was poisoned, was reported to have fled his home in the French Alps, where he was under police protection. Before his disappearance, he said that British detectives wanted to question him about the origins of a hitlist that included Litvinenko’s name among the targets being hunted by a team of former Russian agents working across Europe. He sent this list to the Italian security expert Mario Scaramella, who showed it to Litvinenko in a Piccadilly sushi bar on the day that he fell ill.

Mr Limarev, who used to work with Russia’s Federal Security Bureau (FSB) before he fled Moscow, did not expect to be identified publicly. “Now my name has been linked to this case I really fear something might happen to me,” he said last week. He claims that sources in Russia who passed him the hitlist are being hunted by the FSB and have had to go to ground after armed agents searched their homes and other locations. In Moscow, nine detectives from Scotland Yard’s counter-terror squad are seeking a further interview with the two Russian businessmen who met Litvinenko in a London hotel where police now believe that he was poisoned. Both men are still being kept at a clinic run by the Federal Medico-Biological Agency of Russia, which is sealed off.

Russian authorities describe Dmitri Kovtun as a target for the assassin who killed Litvinenko. British police still call him a significant witness, while prosecutors in Hamburg say they are investigating him for allegedly illegally handling the radioactive polonium-210, which they believe was smuggled from Russia through Germany to Britain. Mr Kovtun denies any role in the assassination. His business partner and a former KGB bodyguard, Andrei Lugovoy, refused to divulge details of his questioning by Russian and British investigators, saying that Russian officials had made him sign a gagging order. Doctors say that the results of medical tests on whether the two men are contaminated will be revealed on Friday.

With police forces from five countries now involved, Russian prosecutors made clear yesterday that they intend to use their visit to London later this week to raise the issue of a number of the Kremlin’s enemies who have been given asylum in Britain, as well as the Litvinenko affair. Russian officials have suggested that the poisoning may have been an attempt to discredit Moscow and have thrown suspicion on the London-based dissidents Boris Berezovsky, a wealthy businessman, and Akhmed Zakayev, a spokesman for the rebel government in Chechnya. Both men were close friends of Litvinenko and have denied any role in his murder. They have accused the Kremlin of orchestrating the killing.

An unnamed Russian businessman who flew from Moscow to Hamburg on October 28 with Mr Kovtun is also being sought. Police believe this flight was used to transport polonium-210 into Europe.

Kasparov Speaks, Neo-Soviet Crackdown Continues Apace

The Moscow News reports that even though Garry Kasparov has been as quiet as a churchmouse in the aftermath of the recent spate of assasinations, the Kremlin has still launched another attack against him:

Russian police have seized propaganda materials from the office of the United People’s Front opposition group to check them for extremist content, the Interior Ministry said in a statement Tuesday. Ekho Moskvy radio said the materials are linked to the group’s plan to hold an unauthorized protest march December 16.

Former world chess champion Garry Kasparov, the leader of the United People’s Front, pointed out in comments for Ekho Moskvy that the search was conducted on Russian Constitution Day, December 12.

Denis Bilunov, executive director of the group, told RIA Novosti that policemen “seized several newspapers and other materials for inspection.”

Kasparov told Ekho Moskvy that his office had been raided by armed police officers on suspicion of “extremist activity”. About 20 agents, both from police ranks and the Federal Security Service (FSB), a KGB successor organization, arrived at the Moscow headquarters of Kasparov’s movement Tuesday afternoon, the youngest-ever World Chess Champion told Ekho Moskvy.

The officers demanded staffers turn off computers and mobile phones and took part of the party newspaper’s print run, according to a statement on Kasparov’s website, DPA reports. The search of Kasparov’s office ended after about 2 1/2 hours, the website statement said. It was unclear which court labelled Kasparov’s political activity extremist, or why.

Kasparov, world-famous as the reigning World Chess Champion from 1985 until his retirement in 2005, is one of the organizers of the banned March of the Unwilling. The event was to unite opposition groups, including that of former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov. After banning the march, which had been scheduled for Saturday, Moscow authorities Tuesday gave its organizers permission to hold a stationary demonstration.

Co-organizer Eduard Limonov said he, Kasparov and Kasyanov vowed to hold the march nonetheless. Another march, planned to honour murdered journalists on Sunday, was also banned by Moscow authorities Tuesday, Ekho Moskvy reported.

Moscow City Hall told that march organizers that the event would “violate the constitutional right of non-participants” by taking up space on the street, the prominent liberal broadcaster said. The city instead suggested organizers hold a stationary vigil. The march had been planned for a worldwide day of memory for killed journalists. Russian investigative reporter Anna Politkovskaya was murdered in her apartment building in October; it is still unclear who her killers were.

According to Kasparov’s website, police officers arrived at his offices shortly after a United People’s Front member encouraged others at a party congress to meet at Kasparov’s headquarters. Police showed an order to search the offices in connection with “extremist activity,” Kasparov said.

An outspoken critic of the Russian government, Kasparov has faced physical attacks since retiring from chess, including being beaten over the head with a chess board during a demonstration last year.

The Moscow News also reports an even greater outrage — the Kremlin has banned a public memorial procession for Anna Politkovskaya:

Moscow city hall denied permission to hold a march to commemorate journalists killed in Russia over the past years. The event was to take place next Sunday, the radio station Ekho Moskvy reports.

City officials said the action would disrupt car traffic and hinder access to certain locations in the city center for ordinary residents who will not participate in the procession, thus violating their constitutional rights.

The organizers of the march — a group of Moscow-based journalists — told Ekho the action was planned a civil action to pay tribute to journalists killed while doing their job or expressing their opinion.

The recent killing of Anna Politkovskaya in October encouraged them to hold the action, the organizers said. They planned to walk peacefully through central Moscow next Sunday, Ekho said.

Anna Politkovskaya, who reported for Novaya Gazeta on human rights abuses in Chechnya and criticized President Vladimir Putin for building an authoritarian political system, was shot dead in her block of flats in central Moscow on Oct. 7. She was the latest investigative reporter to be killed in Russia. These are some of the murders of other reporters in recent years:

July 9, 2004: Paul Klebnikov, the U.S.-born editor of the Russian edition of Forbes who had been investigating the murky business world in Russia, is gunned down as he leaves his Moscow office.

April 29, 2002: Valery Ivanov, editor of the newspaper Tolyatinskoye Oborzreniye in the southern city Russian city of Togliatti, is shot dead outside his home. The newspaper was well-known for its reports on local organized crime, drug trafficking and official corruption.

June 7, 1998: Larisa Yudina, editor of the opposition newspaper Sovetskaya Kalmykia in the southern Russian region of Kalmykia, is stabbed to death and her body dumped in a pond on the outskirts of the regional capital, Elista.

March 1, 1995: Vladislav Listyev, executive director of the newly formed public television station ORT, is shot dead as he enters his apartment block. Listyev was one of Russia’s best-known TV journalists.

Oct. 17, 1994: Dmitry Kholodov, an investigative reporter for the Moscow newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets, is killed in a bomb blast at the newspaper’s office. Kholodov, who had been investigating mafia connections with the military, was killed when he opened a briefcase he believed contained secret documents.

Russia’s Oil Illusion (one of many)

Supporters of the Russian Communist party wait to lay flowers at the Lenin mausoleum
to mark the 89th anniversary of the October revolution.

The Guardian‘s former Russia correspondent bursts the bubble of Russia’s oil wealth illusion with the following brilliant analysis:

RUSSIAN OIL: A SLIPPERY SUBSTANCE
Moscow’s thin coating of petrodollar wealth may wash off all too easily, warns Mark Rice-Oxley

“You won’t recognise Moscow,” they said. “It’s changed so much. It’s nothing like the bad old days.” Sceptically, I got on a plane and returned for the first time in six years to the city I lived in for much of the 1990s.

OK, so some things have changed: there is more money and more restaurants, bars, shops, nightclubs, supermarkets and malls; more neon, more cars and insufferable gridlock. (Here, surely, is a city crying out for congestion charging or road pricing.)

But more remarkable than the things that have changed are the things that have not. Moscow is still abundantly recognisable to anyone who has visited within the last decade. Off the main thoroughfares are the same gritty blocks of flats, separated by derelict patches of mud and ooze, that pass for courtyards. Away from the bright lights of Mayor Luzhkov’s regenerated downtown, the suburbs still fan out like a concrete sneeze, largely devoid of colour (especially green). Retailers still huddle in kiosks.

On the positive side, the metro is still marvellous, and the architecture fabulous. The people have not lost that wicked sense of irony that is so close to our own. Moscow is hard to like but impossible not to love.

Even the inside of the central bastion of power, the Kremlin, appears little altered, with its miles of dimly lit corridors, all fitted out in that heavy-duty vermilion carpeting so beloved of Soviet interior designers. It’s eerily depopulated as well. You could shoot a sequel to The Shining here.

Not that Dmitry Peskov is all that scary. Yes, he does, for some inexplicable reason, have a spiked wooden mace on his office desk. But even when he brandishes it, he’s no Jack Nicholson; when he pops his head outside his office door to greet us, no one screams. Vladimir Putin’s spokesman on foreign affairs is urbane, charming and affable, a chain-smoking apparatchik with a good sense of humour.

That is, until you dissect what he has to say, which is not always so affable. The British press, he says, is “hysterical” about the Litvinenko affair; Russia, Russians and the president himself, Vladimir Putin, are deeply offended at the suggestion of any linkage between the dark goings-on in W1 and this redbrick fortress. About Litvinenko’s death, he asks: “A crime? You know it was a crime?” And as for the polonium, well, it can’t be Russian, because they know exactly where all their polonium is. (My tea is rapidly losing its appeal.)

Well, the Kremlin, in my experience, always was capable of being tetchy. But in the 1990s it was never this brazen and confident. This is certainly something that has changed in the Putin years. During my last visit to the Kremlin, in 1999, I watched poor old Boris Yeltsin, teetering tsar of a bankrupt kingdom, desperately trying to hold it together during a bilateral with Bill Clinton. The carpets were the same, the leadership totally different.

As one Russian telecoms CEO told me: “Russia is up from its knees and is trying to assert its position in the world, both politically and economically. This giant is waking, and he is trying to get up. Not everyone can accept that.”

Of course, it’s the oil money as much as the KGB man that has roused the sleeping giant. Inside the Kremlin, the reasoning is that, with all those lovely petrodollars, Russia can pretty much do what it wants. It no longer needs partnerships, allies, foreign investors or western joint venture partners. Now Russian capital is looking to reverse two decades of investment flow. It wants to take on the world, to buy assets overseas.

Peskov was unashamed about the hazards western investors such as BP, Shell and, more recently, Peter Hambro have been experiencing. “In 2006, we don’t any more need to attract western companies to come here and explore our gas and oil,” he said. “We have lots and lots of money and we don’t know what to do with it.” (You could start with some new carpets.)

That’s all very well. But here’s the $64,000 question for Russia: what happens when oil prices are no longer $64, but $40 or even $25? It’s an irony not lost on Russians that the biggest thing to have changed in the country in six years actually happened thousands of miles away, on international energy markets.

When I was last here, oil prices scudded listlessly around the $10 mark. The state was weak and the exchequer went bankrupt – just as it did, more or less, in the late 1980s, ruining Gorbachev’s perestroika experiment. So what happens when oil prices fall again, as sooner or later they inevitably will? What happens when the Kremlin once again finds it needs a bit of love and affection – not to mention cash – from western investors.

Alexander Reebok doesn’t even want to think about it. As a developer of one of the snappiest malls in all Moscow, where lunch costs £200 and a shirt sells for triple that, he has done better than most out of the Russian boom. “If oil prices fell to $15,” he shudders, “then we would definitely feel it.”

Russia’s Oil Illusion (one of many)

Supporters of the Russian Communist party wait to lay flowers at the Lenin mausoleum
to mark the 89th anniversary of the October revolution.

The Guardian‘s former Russia correspondent bursts the bubble of Russia’s oil wealth illusion with the following brilliant analysis:

RUSSIAN OIL: A SLIPPERY SUBSTANCE
Moscow’s thin coating of petrodollar wealth may wash off all too easily, warns Mark Rice-Oxley

“You won’t recognise Moscow,” they said. “It’s changed so much. It’s nothing like the bad old days.” Sceptically, I got on a plane and returned for the first time in six years to the city I lived in for much of the 1990s.

OK, so some things have changed: there is more money and more restaurants, bars, shops, nightclubs, supermarkets and malls; more neon, more cars and insufferable gridlock. (Here, surely, is a city crying out for congestion charging or road pricing.)

But more remarkable than the things that have changed are the things that have not. Moscow is still abundantly recognisable to anyone who has visited within the last decade. Off the main thoroughfares are the same gritty blocks of flats, separated by derelict patches of mud and ooze, that pass for courtyards. Away from the bright lights of Mayor Luzhkov’s regenerated downtown, the suburbs still fan out like a concrete sneeze, largely devoid of colour (especially green). Retailers still huddle in kiosks.

On the positive side, the metro is still marvellous, and the architecture fabulous. The people have not lost that wicked sense of irony that is so close to our own. Moscow is hard to like but impossible not to love.

Even the inside of the central bastion of power, the Kremlin, appears little altered, with its miles of dimly lit corridors, all fitted out in that heavy-duty vermilion carpeting so beloved of Soviet interior designers. It’s eerily depopulated as well. You could shoot a sequel to The Shining here.

Not that Dmitry Peskov is all that scary. Yes, he does, for some inexplicable reason, have a spiked wooden mace on his office desk. But even when he brandishes it, he’s no Jack Nicholson; when he pops his head outside his office door to greet us, no one screams. Vladimir Putin’s spokesman on foreign affairs is urbane, charming and affable, a chain-smoking apparatchik with a good sense of humour.

That is, until you dissect what he has to say, which is not always so affable. The British press, he says, is “hysterical” about the Litvinenko affair; Russia, Russians and the president himself, Vladimir Putin, are deeply offended at the suggestion of any linkage between the dark goings-on in W1 and this redbrick fortress. About Litvinenko’s death, he asks: “A crime? You know it was a crime?” And as for the polonium, well, it can’t be Russian, because they know exactly where all their polonium is. (My tea is rapidly losing its appeal.)

Well, the Kremlin, in my experience, always was capable of being tetchy. But in the 1990s it was never this brazen and confident. This is certainly something that has changed in the Putin years. During my last visit to the Kremlin, in 1999, I watched poor old Boris Yeltsin, teetering tsar of a bankrupt kingdom, desperately trying to hold it together during a bilateral with Bill Clinton. The carpets were the same, the leadership totally different.

As one Russian telecoms CEO told me: “Russia is up from its knees and is trying to assert its position in the world, both politically and economically. This giant is waking, and he is trying to get up. Not everyone can accept that.”

Of course, it’s the oil money as much as the KGB man that has roused the sleeping giant. Inside the Kremlin, the reasoning is that, with all those lovely petrodollars, Russia can pretty much do what it wants. It no longer needs partnerships, allies, foreign investors or western joint venture partners. Now Russian capital is looking to reverse two decades of investment flow. It wants to take on the world, to buy assets overseas.

Peskov was unashamed about the hazards western investors such as BP, Shell and, more recently, Peter Hambro have been experiencing. “In 2006, we don’t any more need to attract western companies to come here and explore our gas and oil,” he said. “We have lots and lots of money and we don’t know what to do with it.” (You could start with some new carpets.)

That’s all very well. But here’s the $64,000 question for Russia: what happens when oil prices are no longer $64, but $40 or even $25? It’s an irony not lost on Russians that the biggest thing to have changed in the country in six years actually happened thousands of miles away, on international energy markets.

When I was last here, oil prices scudded listlessly around the $10 mark. The state was weak and the exchequer went bankrupt – just as it did, more or less, in the late 1980s, ruining Gorbachev’s perestroika experiment. So what happens when oil prices fall again, as sooner or later they inevitably will? What happens when the Kremlin once again finds it needs a bit of love and affection – not to mention cash – from western investors.

Alexander Reebok doesn’t even want to think about it. As a developer of one of the snappiest malls in all Moscow, where lunch costs £200 and a shirt sells for triple that, he has done better than most out of the Russian boom. “If oil prices fell to $15,” he shudders, “then we would definitely feel it.”

Russia’s Oil Illusion (one of many)

Supporters of the Russian Communist party wait to lay flowers at the Lenin mausoleum
to mark the 89th anniversary of the October revolution.

The Guardian‘s former Russia correspondent bursts the bubble of Russia’s oil wealth illusion with the following brilliant analysis:

RUSSIAN OIL: A SLIPPERY SUBSTANCE
Moscow’s thin coating of petrodollar wealth may wash off all too easily, warns Mark Rice-Oxley

“You won’t recognise Moscow,” they said. “It’s changed so much. It’s nothing like the bad old days.” Sceptically, I got on a plane and returned for the first time in six years to the city I lived in for much of the 1990s.

OK, so some things have changed: there is more money and more restaurants, bars, shops, nightclubs, supermarkets and malls; more neon, more cars and insufferable gridlock. (Here, surely, is a city crying out for congestion charging or road pricing.)

But more remarkable than the things that have changed are the things that have not. Moscow is still abundantly recognisable to anyone who has visited within the last decade. Off the main thoroughfares are the same gritty blocks of flats, separated by derelict patches of mud and ooze, that pass for courtyards. Away from the bright lights of Mayor Luzhkov’s regenerated downtown, the suburbs still fan out like a concrete sneeze, largely devoid of colour (especially green). Retailers still huddle in kiosks.

On the positive side, the metro is still marvellous, and the architecture fabulous. The people have not lost that wicked sense of irony that is so close to our own. Moscow is hard to like but impossible not to love.

Even the inside of the central bastion of power, the Kremlin, appears little altered, with its miles of dimly lit corridors, all fitted out in that heavy-duty vermilion carpeting so beloved of Soviet interior designers. It’s eerily depopulated as well. You could shoot a sequel to The Shining here.

Not that Dmitry Peskov is all that scary. Yes, he does, for some inexplicable reason, have a spiked wooden mace on his office desk. But even when he brandishes it, he’s no Jack Nicholson; when he pops his head outside his office door to greet us, no one screams. Vladimir Putin’s spokesman on foreign affairs is urbane, charming and affable, a chain-smoking apparatchik with a good sense of humour.

That is, until you dissect what he has to say, which is not always so affable. The British press, he says, is “hysterical” about the Litvinenko affair; Russia, Russians and the president himself, Vladimir Putin, are deeply offended at the suggestion of any linkage between the dark goings-on in W1 and this redbrick fortress. About Litvinenko’s death, he asks: “A crime? You know it was a crime?” And as for the polonium, well, it can’t be Russian, because they know exactly where all their polonium is. (My tea is rapidly losing its appeal.)

Well, the Kremlin, in my experience, always was capable of being tetchy. But in the 1990s it was never this brazen and confident. This is certainly something that has changed in the Putin years. During my last visit to the Kremlin, in 1999, I watched poor old Boris Yeltsin, teetering tsar of a bankrupt kingdom, desperately trying to hold it together during a bilateral with Bill Clinton. The carpets were the same, the leadership totally different.

As one Russian telecoms CEO told me: “Russia is up from its knees and is trying to assert its position in the world, both politically and economically. This giant is waking, and he is trying to get up. Not everyone can accept that.”

Of course, it’s the oil money as much as the KGB man that has roused the sleeping giant. Inside the Kremlin, the reasoning is that, with all those lovely petrodollars, Russia can pretty much do what it wants. It no longer needs partnerships, allies, foreign investors or western joint venture partners. Now Russian capital is looking to reverse two decades of investment flow. It wants to take on the world, to buy assets overseas.

Peskov was unashamed about the hazards western investors such as BP, Shell and, more recently, Peter Hambro have been experiencing. “In 2006, we don’t any more need to attract western companies to come here and explore our gas and oil,” he said. “We have lots and lots of money and we don’t know what to do with it.” (You could start with some new carpets.)

That’s all very well. But here’s the $64,000 question for Russia: what happens when oil prices are no longer $64, but $40 or even $25? It’s an irony not lost on Russians that the biggest thing to have changed in the country in six years actually happened thousands of miles away, on international energy markets.

When I was last here, oil prices scudded listlessly around the $10 mark. The state was weak and the exchequer went bankrupt – just as it did, more or less, in the late 1980s, ruining Gorbachev’s perestroika experiment. So what happens when oil prices fall again, as sooner or later they inevitably will? What happens when the Kremlin once again finds it needs a bit of love and affection – not to mention cash – from western investors.

Alexander Reebok doesn’t even want to think about it. As a developer of one of the snappiest malls in all Moscow, where lunch costs £200 and a shirt sells for triple that, he has done better than most out of the Russian boom. “If oil prices fell to $15,” he shudders, “then we would definitely feel it.”

Russia’s Oil Illusion (one of many)

Supporters of the Russian Communist party wait to lay flowers at the Lenin mausoleum
to mark the 89th anniversary of the October revolution.

The Guardian‘s former Russia correspondent bursts the bubble of Russia’s oil wealth illusion with the following brilliant analysis:

RUSSIAN OIL: A SLIPPERY SUBSTANCE
Moscow’s thin coating of petrodollar wealth may wash off all too easily, warns Mark Rice-Oxley

“You won’t recognise Moscow,” they said. “It’s changed so much. It’s nothing like the bad old days.” Sceptically, I got on a plane and returned for the first time in six years to the city I lived in for much of the 1990s.

OK, so some things have changed: there is more money and more restaurants, bars, shops, nightclubs, supermarkets and malls; more neon, more cars and insufferable gridlock. (Here, surely, is a city crying out for congestion charging or road pricing.)

But more remarkable than the things that have changed are the things that have not. Moscow is still abundantly recognisable to anyone who has visited within the last decade. Off the main thoroughfares are the same gritty blocks of flats, separated by derelict patches of mud and ooze, that pass for courtyards. Away from the bright lights of Mayor Luzhkov’s regenerated downtown, the suburbs still fan out like a concrete sneeze, largely devoid of colour (especially green). Retailers still huddle in kiosks.

On the positive side, the metro is still marvellous, and the architecture fabulous. The people have not lost that wicked sense of irony that is so close to our own. Moscow is hard to like but impossible not to love.

Even the inside of the central bastion of power, the Kremlin, appears little altered, with its miles of dimly lit corridors, all fitted out in that heavy-duty vermilion carpeting so beloved of Soviet interior designers. It’s eerily depopulated as well. You could shoot a sequel to The Shining here.

Not that Dmitry Peskov is all that scary. Yes, he does, for some inexplicable reason, have a spiked wooden mace on his office desk. But even when he brandishes it, he’s no Jack Nicholson; when he pops his head outside his office door to greet us, no one screams. Vladimir Putin’s spokesman on foreign affairs is urbane, charming and affable, a chain-smoking apparatchik with a good sense of humour.

That is, until you dissect what he has to say, which is not always so affable. The British press, he says, is “hysterical” about the Litvinenko affair; Russia, Russians and the president himself, Vladimir Putin, are deeply offended at the suggestion of any linkage between the dark goings-on in W1 and this redbrick fortress. About Litvinenko’s death, he asks: “A crime? You know it was a crime?” And as for the polonium, well, it can’t be Russian, because they know exactly where all their polonium is. (My tea is rapidly losing its appeal.)

Well, the Kremlin, in my experience, always was capable of being tetchy. But in the 1990s it was never this brazen and confident. This is certainly something that has changed in the Putin years. During my last visit to the Kremlin, in 1999, I watched poor old Boris Yeltsin, teetering tsar of a bankrupt kingdom, desperately trying to hold it together during a bilateral with Bill Clinton. The carpets were the same, the leadership totally different.

As one Russian telecoms CEO told me: “Russia is up from its knees and is trying to assert its position in the world, both politically and economically. This giant is waking, and he is trying to get up. Not everyone can accept that.”

Of course, it’s the oil money as much as the KGB man that has roused the sleeping giant. Inside the Kremlin, the reasoning is that, with all those lovely petrodollars, Russia can pretty much do what it wants. It no longer needs partnerships, allies, foreign investors or western joint venture partners. Now Russian capital is looking to reverse two decades of investment flow. It wants to take on the world, to buy assets overseas.

Peskov was unashamed about the hazards western investors such as BP, Shell and, more recently, Peter Hambro have been experiencing. “In 2006, we don’t any more need to attract western companies to come here and explore our gas and oil,” he said. “We have lots and lots of money and we don’t know what to do with it.” (You could start with some new carpets.)

That’s all very well. But here’s the $64,000 question for Russia: what happens when oil prices are no longer $64, but $40 or even $25? It’s an irony not lost on Russians that the biggest thing to have changed in the country in six years actually happened thousands of miles away, on international energy markets.

When I was last here, oil prices scudded listlessly around the $10 mark. The state was weak and the exchequer went bankrupt – just as it did, more or less, in the late 1980s, ruining Gorbachev’s perestroika experiment. So what happens when oil prices fall again, as sooner or later they inevitably will? What happens when the Kremlin once again finds it needs a bit of love and affection – not to mention cash – from western investors.

Alexander Reebok doesn’t even want to think about it. As a developer of one of the snappiest malls in all Moscow, where lunch costs £200 and a shirt sells for triple that, he has done better than most out of the Russian boom. “If oil prices fell to $15,” he shudders, “then we would definitely feel it.”

Russia’s Oil Illusion (one of many)

Supporters of the Russian Communist party wait to lay flowers at the Lenin mausoleum
to mark the 89th anniversary of the October revolution.

The Guardian‘s former Russia correspondent bursts the bubble of Russia’s oil wealth illusion with the following brilliant analysis:

RUSSIAN OIL: A SLIPPERY SUBSTANCE
Moscow’s thin coating of petrodollar wealth may wash off all too easily, warns Mark Rice-Oxley

“You won’t recognise Moscow,” they said. “It’s changed so much. It’s nothing like the bad old days.” Sceptically, I got on a plane and returned for the first time in six years to the city I lived in for much of the 1990s.

OK, so some things have changed: there is more money and more restaurants, bars, shops, nightclubs, supermarkets and malls; more neon, more cars and insufferable gridlock. (Here, surely, is a city crying out for congestion charging or road pricing.)

But more remarkable than the things that have changed are the things that have not. Moscow is still abundantly recognisable to anyone who has visited within the last decade. Off the main thoroughfares are the same gritty blocks of flats, separated by derelict patches of mud and ooze, that pass for courtyards. Away from the bright lights of Mayor Luzhkov’s regenerated downtown, the suburbs still fan out like a concrete sneeze, largely devoid of colour (especially green). Retailers still huddle in kiosks.

On the positive side, the metro is still marvellous, and the architecture fabulous. The people have not lost that wicked sense of irony that is so close to our own. Moscow is hard to like but impossible not to love.

Even the inside of the central bastion of power, the Kremlin, appears little altered, with its miles of dimly lit corridors, all fitted out in that heavy-duty vermilion carpeting so beloved of Soviet interior designers. It’s eerily depopulated as well. You could shoot a sequel to The Shining here.

Not that Dmitry Peskov is all that scary. Yes, he does, for some inexplicable reason, have a spiked wooden mace on his office desk. But even when he brandishes it, he’s no Jack Nicholson; when he pops his head outside his office door to greet us, no one screams. Vladimir Putin’s spokesman on foreign affairs is urbane, charming and affable, a chain-smoking apparatchik with a good sense of humour.

That is, until you dissect what he has to say, which is not always so affable. The British press, he says, is “hysterical” about the Litvinenko affair; Russia, Russians and the president himself, Vladimir Putin, are deeply offended at the suggestion of any linkage between the dark goings-on in W1 and this redbrick fortress. About Litvinenko’s death, he asks: “A crime? You know it was a crime?” And as for the polonium, well, it can’t be Russian, because they know exactly where all their polonium is. (My tea is rapidly losing its appeal.)

Well, the Kremlin, in my experience, always was capable of being tetchy. But in the 1990s it was never this brazen and confident. This is certainly something that has changed in the Putin years. During my last visit to the Kremlin, in 1999, I watched poor old Boris Yeltsin, teetering tsar of a bankrupt kingdom, desperately trying to hold it together during a bilateral with Bill Clinton. The carpets were the same, the leadership totally different.

As one Russian telecoms CEO told me: “Russia is up from its knees and is trying to assert its position in the world, both politically and economically. This giant is waking, and he is trying to get up. Not everyone can accept that.”

Of course, it’s the oil money as much as the KGB man that has roused the sleeping giant. Inside the Kremlin, the reasoning is that, with all those lovely petrodollars, Russia can pretty much do what it wants. It no longer needs partnerships, allies, foreign investors or western joint venture partners. Now Russian capital is looking to reverse two decades of investment flow. It wants to take on the world, to buy assets overseas.

Peskov was unashamed about the hazards western investors such as BP, Shell and, more recently, Peter Hambro have been experiencing. “In 2006, we don’t any more need to attract western companies to come here and explore our gas and oil,” he said. “We have lots and lots of money and we don’t know what to do with it.” (You could start with some new carpets.)

That’s all very well. But here’s the $64,000 question for Russia: what happens when oil prices are no longer $64, but $40 or even $25? It’s an irony not lost on Russians that the biggest thing to have changed in the country in six years actually happened thousands of miles away, on international energy markets.

When I was last here, oil prices scudded listlessly around the $10 mark. The state was weak and the exchequer went bankrupt – just as it did, more or less, in the late 1980s, ruining Gorbachev’s perestroika experiment. So what happens when oil prices fall again, as sooner or later they inevitably will? What happens when the Kremlin once again finds it needs a bit of love and affection – not to mention cash – from western investors.

Alexander Reebok doesn’t even want to think about it. As a developer of one of the snappiest malls in all Moscow, where lunch costs £200 and a shirt sells for triple that, he has done better than most out of the Russian boom. “If oil prices fell to $15,” he shudders, “then we would definitely feel it.”

The Story of Barbaric Bearish Russia and the Cowardly Lion of the West

Writing in Time magazine, correspondent Yuri Zarakchovich explains why it wasn’t the least bit irrational for Vladimir Putin to have ordered the killing of Alexander Litvinenko and Anna Politkovskaya: Just look at the West’s response — nothing at all. Following, you will find Time‘s detailed report on the Litvinenko killing. La Russophobe has been warning about the need to “keep Russia’s deadly politics at home” for months now, long before this spate of killings began. At last, the world seems to be listening, yet it is still slow to act, just as it was when the Bolsheviks came to power.

Keeping Russia’s Deadly Politics at Home

Viewpoint: The murder of Alexender Litvinenko demonstrates, once again, how murder has become an accepted part of Russian power struggles. But the West can’t — or won’t — do much about it

Murder is a firmly established tradition in Russian battles over money and power. So, the suspicion in Moscow is that the recent murders of journalist Anna Politkovskaya and former KGB operative Alexander Litvinenko — as well as the alleged attempt on former prime minister and economic-reform mastermind Yegor Gaidar — result from domestic clan warfare. Russians are quite accustomed to seeing assassination used as an instrument to silence an opponent or redistribute assets, and over a dozen major energy-corporation and banking executives have been killed in the past couple of months alone. What is different about the Litvinenko and Gaidar cases is that they happened beyond Russian borders.

The Litvinenko murder investigation, in fact, may have a profound effect on the image of President Vladimir Putin in the West — much like the Chechen war of 1999 did, or the dismembering the oil company Yukos and the imprisonment of its CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, or the Beslan terror tragedy. Each time, Putin chose a course of action that benefited his regime in short term, but deeply hurt his country’s interests in the long term.

Britain, horrified that a foe of the Kremlin could be murdered with a radioactive isotope that has left traces all over London, has vowed to pursue the Litvinenko investigation wherever “the police take it,” regardless of diplomatic sensitivities. However, once the men from Scotland Yard landed in Moscow, Russian prosecutor-general Yuri Chaika bluntly spelled out the limits of the British inquiry: It’s the Russians who ask questions — the British just sit tight and watch. And should any Russians be discovered to have been involved, he said, they would not be extradited.

Then, on Thursday, Chaika’s office announced that it had launched its own criminal probe into this “death of a Russian citizen,” and that a Russian investigative team would be sent to London, where they expected “understanding and cooperation” from their British counterparts. This appeared to be something of a stunt designed to counteract growing Western indignation over Moscow’s lack of enthusiasm for cooperating with the British investigation.

Still, there isn’t much the West can or will do about it. Relations between Moscow and the West have rarely hinged on single, or even systematic, human rights abuses. It was not expedient for the democracies to admit the existence of Stalin’s Gulag when the priority was working together to defeat Hitler. It may be no more expedient to focus on human rights issues in Putin’s Russia as long as Moscow must be kept as an ally in the war on terror, and persuaded to back sanctions against Iran.

“Realpolitik” dictated, for example, that the Soviets’ downing of a Korean airliner in September 1983, killing 269 people, was not allowed to significantly interfere with business as usual. And “realpolitik” eventually paid off — at least for the West — as the Soviet Union disappeared a few years later without a shot being fired. Today, “realpolitik” has given way to “realeconomics” — who cares if Moscow bumps off its citizens in Chechnya or elsewhere as long as the oil and natural gas are flowing from Russia? The West reacts most loudly when its investments in Russia are endangered.

This Western attitude is sensible, and probably the only one possible. If the Russian people accept this murderous political culture, no outsiders can convince them to do otherwise. It can expire only when the Russians themselves grow sufficiently resolved to abolish it — if ever. The West may, however, have an urgent interest in ensuring that Russia’s deadly political games are at least played on home turf, and don’t spill over Russia’s borders — lest the killers, believing they can get away with anything, anywhere, establish precedents of nuclear or any other terrorism on foreign soil.

Russians may have come to adopt barbaric ways of settling their political and business scores, and it will be up to Russians to find a better way or else be submerged in a bloodbath of their own making. All that other countries can do, in the meantime, is try to protect themselves from the flying debris.

Time Magazine’s Magnum Opus on Litvinenko and Russia’s Future

Time Magazine‘s most recent issue contains a powerful, lengthy indictment of neo-Soviet Russia based on the Litvinenko murder and coverup:

Alexander Litvinenko was buried as he had lived, in a storm. There was rain, hail and a tornado near Highgate Cemetery in north London on the day his lead-lined coffin was lowered into a plot a few yards from that of another dissident who had sought refuge in Britain, Karl Marx. Before the burial, there was a memorial service at a mosque. Several close friends said Litvinenko had converted to Islam a few days before he died, in a kind of atonement for atrocities Russia (and perhaps Litvinenko himself) had committed in Chechnya, although another doubted any conversion had taken place. Litvinenko’s widow Marina had requested a nondenominational service at the graveside, but an imam interrupted the proceedings to perform Islamic rites. Litvinenko, a former Moscow anticorruption detective turned furious critic of the Russian government, had a talent for controversy.

The dead man in the Highgate Cemetery started feeling ill on Nov. 1. The London doctors who attended Litvinenko’s bedside quickly suspected that some kind of radioactive agent was causing his decline. His hair was falling out, his athlete’s body was shriveling, his bone marrow was failing, just as if he had been one of the firemen called to the burning reactor at Chernobyl. But gamma spectrometers found nothing unusual in his blood or urine. As doctors ruled out a slew of increasingly obscure toxins and bugs, the patient’s condition worsened. In desperation, the police sent his urine to Britain’s Atomic Weapons Establishment, which has equipment beyond the reach of any hospital. There, experts discovered Litvinenko’s urine was teeming with radiation–not the gamma rays they had been looking for, which are the usual culprits in radiation poisoning because they can penetrate steel and concrete, but alpha particles, which can be blocked by a single sheet of paper or a layer of human skin. If they get into your bloodstream, though, alpha particles will destroy everything they touch. The Chernobyl occurs inside. This is not a nice way to die.

It was Litvinenko’s fate. On Nov. 23, a few hours after the scientists isolated what was causing his body to disintegrate, he succumbed. His was not the quiet, inexplicable demise that a poisoner usually seeks. Instead, those alpha particles, which were shown to come from the rare isotope polonium 210, opened a box of mysteries that have grabbed the world’s attention for weeks and turned a gruesome death into the center of a global manhunt and a potential row between Russia and the rest of the world.

The victim had no doubt where the search for his killer would lead: on his deathbed, he said his death had been ordered by Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia. Russian officials have denied that as a malicious provocation. Not surprisingly, Britain is being punctilious about amassing sufficient evidence before it points a finger in any direction. But if some shadowy figures close to the Kremlin turn out to be responsible for Litvinenko’s death, it would be the most astonishing indictment of just how ruthless the modern Russian state can be.

All that, as yet, remains unproved. Meanwhile, a slew of whodunit theories are jostling for prominence. Following an autopsy that spurred the police to treat Litvinenko’s death as a murder, Scotland Yard antiterrorism officers have been combing sites all over London, while colleagues traveled to Moscow. “This continues to be an extremely complex investigation, and detectives are pursuing many lines of inquiry,” said a police spokeswoman. Litvinenko’s excruciating and sinister death and the swirl of international politics around it make this a case worthy of John le Carré, but as the police insist, the classic questions of any murder inquiry still apply: Scotland Yard, in short, is looking for motive, means and opportunity.

Who had a motive?

WHY WOULD ANYONE WANT ALEXANDER Litvinenko dead? To answer that question, investigators are having to immerse themselves in the intrigues of postcommunist Russia and their echoes in London, the favored home away from home for Russian exiles, where Litvinenko sought asylum in 2001. (He became a British citizen two months ago.)

Litvinenko had spent the 1990s as an officer in the élite organized crime unit of the Federal Security Service (FSB), which was tasked with penetrating organized-crime gangs in the murky post-Soviet world of big money and official corruption. Like anyone else who touched that cesspit, he had collected some powerful enemies–and at least one ally. That was Boris Berezovsky, one of Russia’s first billionaires, who made his money in cars and oil partly by using his excellent connections with Boris Yeltsin to buy state assets for much less than they turned out to be worth. In 1994, as his Mercedes was pulling out of his headquarters, a huge car bomb decapitated Berezovsky’s chauffeur but left Berezovsky unharmed. Litvinenko was assigned to the case, and over time the two men became friendly. In 1995 hit men gunned down Vladislav Listyev, a popular TV personality who also ran Berezovsky’s ORT-TV network. Officers from a rival organized-crime squad came to Berezovsky’s headquarters to arrest him and search for documents. But in the doorway, with his pistol drawn, Litvinenko held off eight of them armed with Kalashnikovs, while Berezovsky furiously phoned allies at the Kremlin. Berezovsky said he and Litvinenko became “like brothers” that night.

Litvinenko claimed to have saved Berezovsky’s life a second time. In 1998 he said he had refused an order “to kill the Jew who has stolen half of this country”–by which his superiors meant Berezovsky. As a result, Litvinenko believed, an unsuccessful attempt was made on his life. Those claims were made at a surreal press conference at which Litvinenko appeared with six other disgruntled FSB officers. Some wore ski masks, but Litvinenko, his face uncovered, calmly stated that bosses at the FSB were using the organization “for their private ends to liquidate those who bothered them” and line their own pockets.

Was Litvinenko telling the truth, and if so, was that his sole motivation for grabbing the limelight? Later, two of the officers in the episode claimed the stunt was bought and paid for by Berezovsky, which probably only heightened the rage of the man who had become the FSB’s chief–Vladimir Putin. To Putin, a former KGB officer, what Litvinenko had done “was a major act of treason,” says former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin, now an exile in the U.S. after having written about Russia’s tilt toward authoritarianism. In his book The Lubyanka Gang, Litvinenko, for his part, said he had gone to Putin before the press conference with proof showing which top FSB officers and high state officials were corrupt. Putin, he wrote, promised to take action–but had Litvinenko tailed instead and hired some of those accused of corruption to work for him. FSB officers arrested Litvinenko on corruption charges in 1999, and he was jailed for eight months. At trial, he was acquitted, then rearrested and jailed for an additional seven months on the same charges (which were quashed), then arrested again. He was eventually released on the condition that he did not leave Moscow.

Litvinenko broke that promise. With Putin having succeeded Yeltsin as President, Litvinenko and his family fled to London in October 2000–shortly after Berezovsky, who was later charged in Russia with fraud, had left for Britain. Litvinenko went to work for the billionaire and lived in a house owned by him. Both agitated against Putin, Berezovsky by financing human-rights and opposition groups and Litvinenko by producing two books furiously critical of the new President. Litvinenko, it is fair to say, didn’t like Putin. Last summer he claimed in a letter posted on the Internet that the President was a habitual pedophile. Litvinenko also contended that Putin had been on the take from Mafia groups for years and that to advance his presidential ambitions, he had directed FSB officers to blow up apartment buildings in Moscow in 1999, killing more than 300 people–then pinning the outrage on Chechen rebels. (Putin has vehemently denied any involvement; Russian courts found a group of Chechens guilty of the crimes.) Litvinenko helped make a French film about the apartment bombings and was contributing to a documentary being made in London when he was murdered. This fall Litvinenko had been on the trail of the murderer of Anna Politkovskaya, a persistent critic of Putin’s war in Chechnya and human-rights abuses in Russia. Politkovskaya was killed in the doorway of her Moscow apartment in October. Litvinenko was sure the order had come from the Kremlin.

Putin, says Alexei Kondaurov, a former KGB general who is now a maverick Duma deputy, is known for keeping score and for a long memory. So the idea that he would want an infuriating gadfly like Litvinenko to disappear is not beyond reason. But the President’s defenders scoff at the idea that he might have been involved in Litvinenko’s death. Putin, they say, had no need to get rid of Litvinenko; the exile was an irrelevant crank. Milton Bearden, a former CIA spy in Moscow, as well as other experienced intelligence hands, agrees it would be nuts for Putin–who has had good relations with British Prime Minister Tony Blair–to order an assassination on British soil of a British citizen who was no more than a pest. Says Bearden: “Take a deep breath and take a look at Putin and say, ‘Is he stupid or insane?'”

If not Putin, who might want Litvinenko dead? Plenty. Russian Mafia bosses whose networks he was still prying into, for example, or rogue FSB officers who had been paid to rub him out by those who wanted to hurt Berezovsky. Perhaps the culprit was someone who wanted to frame Putin, or a member of the many factions maneuvering to succeed him when his term expires in 2008. One particularly dark theory making the rounds in Moscow was that Litvinenko organized his own death in a bizarre politically motivated suicide. Julia Svetlichnaja, a Russian postgraduate student who met with Litvinenko several times over the past year, last week described an erratic man who said he was going to blackmail at least one famous Russian oligarch with the many secrets he was collecting–or sell them to newspapers. Yegor Gaidar, a Prime Minister in the early 1990s and now an occasional critic of Putin’s, came to the President’s assistance last week when describing how he had fallen violently ill from an apparent poisoning in Dublin on the day Litvinenko died. Writing in the Financial Times, Gaidar concluded “that some obvious or hidden adversaries of the Russian authorities stand behind the scenes of this event, those who are interested in further radical deterioration of relations between Russia and the West.” His implication was that those same or similar adversaries killed Litvinenko.

Who had the means?

THE POLICE ARE TAKING ALL SUCH CLAIMS with a grain of salt–and turning their attention, rather, to the grains of polonium 210 that are at the center of the case. This is no garden-variety poison: polonium needs a nuclear reactor to cook it up and extremely careful handling. At first, the discovery of the element seemed to hang responsibility on the Kremlin. Russia is a big producer of polonium (although its annual output, less than a hundred grams a year, shows just how rare it is). The element is hard to procure. In the U.S., it takes a government license to buy more than minute quantities, and according to the website of United Nuclear, which sells isotopes for use in research labs, it would take about $1 million, 15,000 purchases of the largest unlicensed amount and some fancy lab work to scrape together a lethal dose. (The British Health Protection Agency says the dose that killed Litvinenko was at least 10 times as high as that needed to kill.)

Polonium 210 has some prosaic applications; it is used, for example, in antistatic devices found in photo shops and fabric mills. It would be very difficult, but for less than $1,000, just a few such gizmos could theoretically be disassembled and the contents reworked in a laboratory to produce a lethal dose. To be usable as a poison, Michael Clark, a spokesman for Britain’s Health Protection Agency, said last week, the polonium would then have to be mixed in solution, probably with a gelling agent. “If it was some sort of liquid, it could have been–as in James Bond–a little magic capsule,” Clark said. All this implies considerable sophistication and resources. A rich, ambitious criminal syndicate might have been able to pull it off; nevertheless, normally it is governments that work on this scale. And obscure poisons have long been a specialty of Russia’s secret police, going back to a “toxicological office” that reported to Lenin personally. In the past, the Russians were known to have developed a gun delivering a burst of cyanide gas causing death easy to misidentify as a heart attack, and tiny pellets smeared with the poison ricin, which has no antidote.

In retrospect, it would have been a lot less trouble for someone to push Litvinenko under a bus than to feed him polonium. But it’s likely his poisoners did not anticipate the brouhaha his death would cause. “I believe this was a botched operation,” says Litvinenko’s friend Alexander Goldfarb, who helped him escape from Russia and runs the Berezovsky-funded International Foundation for Civil Liberties in New York City. Without the intervention of Britain’s nuclear-bomb lab, the cause of death would have remained shrouded. Boris Zhuykov, chief of the radioisotope laboratory at the Nuclear Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, says the discovery that polonium was the cause was “an act of scientific heroism. The murderers obviously did not expect that the polonium would be found. They failed because of the excellence of the English gamma spectrometer and the persistence of the research.” (Zhuykov says that when he was making these points to Moscow’s pro-government NTV network last week, the interview was terminated.)

Who had the opportunity?

SCOTLAND YARD HAS HAD ONE BIG BREAK IN the case: polonium, once released, is like a persistent, invisible dye that marks whatever it touches. Someone who ingests even small amounts will leave an unmistakable trail through sweat and even fingerprints. London’s gumshoes have spent the past two weeks following such spores all over town–and beyond.

Litvinenko got sick the evening of Nov. 1, when alpha particles were destroying the lining of his gut. As he began to suspect poison, he focused on two meetings he had earlier that day. One was at a sushi bar in central London with Mario Scaramella, 36, an Italian lawyer and, like Litvinenko, a man drawn to the world of secret information and conspiracy theories. The second meeting was in the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel, near the U.S. embassy, with a group of Russian businessmen with whom Litvinenko was apparently hatching business ventures in Britain. “Alexander said both [meetings] were suspicious, and one was probably innocent,” says Goldfarb.

For a time, attention focused on Scaramella, but by the end of last week his level of poisoning and other evidence exculpated him of any suspicion. Instead, the trail of polonium was entangling the group of Russians at the Pine Bar. All seven bartenders on duty that day tested positive for the substance, at levels approaching those found in members of Litvinenko’s family, implying they had inhaled it soon after its release–possibly from the vapor given off by a drink into which it had been slipped. The Russians who met Litvinenko in the bar included Andrei Lugovoy, a former KGB bodyguard who had met Litvinenko in the 1990s when serving as Berezovsky’s security chief at ORT; Dmitry Kovtun, a former Soviet army officer who has lived in Germany for many years and has known Lugovoy since they were 12; and Vyacheslav Sokolenko, a graduate of the same military school as Lugovoy and Kovtun. Sokolenko says he had never met Litvinenko before their brief encounter in London, and that his only interest that day was to attend a soccer match and do some sightseeing. Both Lugovoy and Kovtun have polonium in their bodies, and so far the main focus is on them; both men (and Sokolenko) deny any wrongdoing.

When Lugovoy learned that British authorities were investigating Litvinenko’s poisoning, he volunteered for an interview at the British embassy in Moscow. Polonium was later found in the embassy room, and in lots of other places Lugovoy had visited: on planes he had flown between Moscow and London in October; in five rooms at the Sheraton Park Lane hotel, where he had stayed; and in a fourth-floor room at the Millennium Hotel he is said to have used on the day Litvinenko was poisoned. Finding polonium in a hotel Lugovoy had used on a previous trip to London prompted British authorities to wonder if there might have been an earlier, failed murder attempt. A senior British security official thought the sprawl of radioactive markers throughout London and beyond implied an amateur operation, not up to the FSB’s usual standard. But another official disagreed. “This is such an extraordinary material to be using as a weapon,” he said, “I’m not sure if any standard operating procedures would exist for handling it.” Lugovoy’s explanation for the traces that seem to track his progress around London was straightforward. “Someone is trying to set me up,” he said to the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper. “But I can’t understand who. Or why.”

Nine Scotland Yard detectives were in Moscow last week, trying to talk to Lugovoy. But the interview kept getting postponed for “technical reasons.” Cooperation between the Londoners and the Russian authorities has been frosty. Russian prosecutors insisted that they conduct all the interviews, with the British merely suggesting questions. Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika said no Russian citizens would ever be extradited to Britain in connection with the case, while his office suggested that Russia would open its own criminal investigation in London. Lugovoy and Kovtun were said to be in the hospital with radiation poisoning, but there was no independent confirmation of that. After his interview with the British detectives, Kovtun was reported by the usually reliable Interfax news agency to have lapsed into a coma, but his lawyer quickly denied it. Hamburg police found alpha radiation in the apartment of Kovtun’s ex-wife and in the home of his ex-mother-in-law, but were not able to say whether the source was polonium 210. For their part, British officials were hoping further tests might let them pinpoint the origins of the polonium, since reactors usually leave signatures in their output. The forensic trail so far points decisively to Russia. But Scotland Yard knows that pursuing Litvinenko’s murder back to those who set it in motion, whether official, private or some combination of the two, may never be possible unless someone confesses.

Meanwhile, there is the light–uncomfortably glaring–that the case sheds on modern Russia. Vladimir Ryzhkov, one of the few independent liberals left in the Duma, says, “The point is not whether Putin is responsible for these concrete murders. The point is that he is responsible for having created a system that is ruled by fear and violence.” Ryzhkov claims that the armed forces, Interior Ministry, FSB and those who have retired from them to join private security services “are running this country, own its economy and use violence and murder as habitual management techniques.” A U.S. businessman in Moscow seconds the argument. “While you in the press are obsessed by Politkovskaya and Litvinenko, you’ve missed that half a dozen major oil executives and another half-dozen major bankers have been murdered in the last few months.” Unlike Litvinenko’s sickness, Russia’s may not be fatal. But like his, it starts from inside. From his lead-lined coffin, a shadowy figure has illuminated that much.

Time Magazine’s Magnum Opus on Litvinenko and Russia’s Future

Time Magazine‘s most recent issue contains a powerful, lengthy indictment of neo-Soviet Russia based on the Litvinenko murder and coverup:

Alexander Litvinenko was buried as he had lived, in a storm. There was rain, hail and a tornado near Highgate Cemetery in north London on the day his lead-lined coffin was lowered into a plot a few yards from that of another dissident who had sought refuge in Britain, Karl Marx. Before the burial, there was a memorial service at a mosque. Several close friends said Litvinenko had converted to Islam a few days before he died, in a kind of atonement for atrocities Russia (and perhaps Litvinenko himself) had committed in Chechnya, although another doubted any conversion had taken place. Litvinenko’s widow Marina had requested a nondenominational service at the graveside, but an imam interrupted the proceedings to perform Islamic rites. Litvinenko, a former Moscow anticorruption detective turned furious critic of the Russian government, had a talent for controversy.

The dead man in the Highgate Cemetery started feeling ill on Nov. 1. The London doctors who attended Litvinenko’s bedside quickly suspected that some kind of radioactive agent was causing his decline. His hair was falling out, his athlete’s body was shriveling, his bone marrow was failing, just as if he had been one of the firemen called to the burning reactor at Chernobyl. But gamma spectrometers found nothing unusual in his blood or urine. As doctors ruled out a slew of increasingly obscure toxins and bugs, the patient’s condition worsened. In desperation, the police sent his urine to Britain’s Atomic Weapons Establishment, which has equipment beyond the reach of any hospital. There, experts discovered Litvinenko’s urine was teeming with radiation–not the gamma rays they had been looking for, which are the usual culprits in radiation poisoning because they can penetrate steel and concrete, but alpha particles, which can be blocked by a single sheet of paper or a layer of human skin. If they get into your bloodstream, though, alpha particles will destroy everything they touch. The Chernobyl occurs inside. This is not a nice way to die.

It was Litvinenko’s fate. On Nov. 23, a few hours after the scientists isolated what was causing his body to disintegrate, he succumbed. His was not the quiet, inexplicable demise that a poisoner usually seeks. Instead, those alpha particles, which were shown to come from the rare isotope polonium 210, opened a box of mysteries that have grabbed the world’s attention for weeks and turned a gruesome death into the center of a global manhunt and a potential row between Russia and the rest of the world.

The victim had no doubt where the search for his killer would lead: on his deathbed, he said his death had been ordered by Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia. Russian officials have denied that as a malicious provocation. Not surprisingly, Britain is being punctilious about amassing sufficient evidence before it points a finger in any direction. But if some shadowy figures close to the Kremlin turn out to be responsible for Litvinenko’s death, it would be the most astonishing indictment of just how ruthless the modern Russian state can be.

All that, as yet, remains unproved. Meanwhile, a slew of whodunit theories are jostling for prominence. Following an autopsy that spurred the police to treat Litvinenko’s death as a murder, Scotland Yard antiterrorism officers have been combing sites all over London, while colleagues traveled to Moscow. “This continues to be an extremely complex investigation, and detectives are pursuing many lines of inquiry,” said a police spokeswoman. Litvinenko’s excruciating and sinister death and the swirl of international politics around it make this a case worthy of John le Carré, but as the police insist, the classic questions of any murder inquiry still apply: Scotland Yard, in short, is looking for motive, means and opportunity.

Who had a motive?

WHY WOULD ANYONE WANT ALEXANDER Litvinenko dead? To answer that question, investigators are having to immerse themselves in the intrigues of postcommunist Russia and their echoes in London, the favored home away from home for Russian exiles, where Litvinenko sought asylum in 2001. (He became a British citizen two months ago.)

Litvinenko had spent the 1990s as an officer in the élite organized crime unit of the Federal Security Service (FSB), which was tasked with penetrating organized-crime gangs in the murky post-Soviet world of big money and official corruption. Like anyone else who touched that cesspit, he had collected some powerful enemies–and at least one ally. That was Boris Berezovsky, one of Russia’s first billionaires, who made his money in cars and oil partly by using his excellent connections with Boris Yeltsin to buy state assets for much less than they turned out to be worth. In 1994, as his Mercedes was pulling out of his headquarters, a huge car bomb decapitated Berezovsky’s chauffeur but left Berezovsky unharmed. Litvinenko was assigned to the case, and over time the two men became friendly. In 1995 hit men gunned down Vladislav Listyev, a popular TV personality who also ran Berezovsky’s ORT-TV network. Officers from a rival organized-crime squad came to Berezovsky’s headquarters to arrest him and search for documents. But in the doorway, with his pistol drawn, Litvinenko held off eight of them armed with Kalashnikovs, while Berezovsky furiously phoned allies at the Kremlin. Berezovsky said he and Litvinenko became “like brothers” that night.

Litvinenko claimed to have saved Berezovsky’s life a second time. In 1998 he said he had refused an order “to kill the Jew who has stolen half of this country”–by which his superiors meant Berezovsky. As a result, Litvinenko believed, an unsuccessful attempt was made on his life. Those claims were made at a surreal press conference at which Litvinenko appeared with six other disgruntled FSB officers. Some wore ski masks, but Litvinenko, his face uncovered, calmly stated that bosses at the FSB were using the organization “for their private ends to liquidate those who bothered them” and line their own pockets.

Was Litvinenko telling the truth, and if so, was that his sole motivation for grabbing the limelight? Later, two of the officers in the episode claimed the stunt was bought and paid for by Berezovsky, which probably only heightened the rage of the man who had become the FSB’s chief–Vladimir Putin. To Putin, a former KGB officer, what Litvinenko had done “was a major act of treason,” says former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin, now an exile in the U.S. after having written about Russia’s tilt toward authoritarianism. In his book The Lubyanka Gang, Litvinenko, for his part, said he had gone to Putin before the press conference with proof showing which top FSB officers and high state officials were corrupt. Putin, he wrote, promised to take action–but had Litvinenko tailed instead and hired some of those accused of corruption to work for him. FSB officers arrested Litvinenko on corruption charges in 1999, and he was jailed for eight months. At trial, he was acquitted, then rearrested and jailed for an additional seven months on the same charges (which were quashed), then arrested again. He was eventually released on the condition that he did not leave Moscow.

Litvinenko broke that promise. With Putin having succeeded Yeltsin as President, Litvinenko and his family fled to London in October 2000–shortly after Berezovsky, who was later charged in Russia with fraud, had left for Britain. Litvinenko went to work for the billionaire and lived in a house owned by him. Both agitated against Putin, Berezovsky by financing human-rights and opposition groups and Litvinenko by producing two books furiously critical of the new President. Litvinenko, it is fair to say, didn’t like Putin. Last summer he claimed in a letter posted on the Internet that the President was a habitual pedophile. Litvinenko also contended that Putin had been on the take from Mafia groups for years and that to advance his presidential ambitions, he had directed FSB officers to blow up apartment buildings in Moscow in 1999, killing more than 300 people–then pinning the outrage on Chechen rebels. (Putin has vehemently denied any involvement; Russian courts found a group of Chechens guilty of the crimes.) Litvinenko helped make a French film about the apartment bombings and was contributing to a documentary being made in London when he was murdered. This fall Litvinenko had been on the trail of the murderer of Anna Politkovskaya, a persistent critic of Putin’s war in Chechnya and human-rights abuses in Russia. Politkovskaya was killed in the doorway of her Moscow apartment in October. Litvinenko was sure the order had come from the Kremlin.

Putin, says Alexei Kondaurov, a former KGB general who is now a maverick Duma deputy, is known for keeping score and for a long memory. So the idea that he would want an infuriating gadfly like Litvinenko to disappear is not beyond reason. But the President’s defenders scoff at the idea that he might have been involved in Litvinenko’s death. Putin, they say, had no need to get rid of Litvinenko; the exile was an irrelevant crank. Milton Bearden, a former CIA spy in Moscow, as well as other experienced intelligence hands, agrees it would be nuts for Putin–who has had good relations with British Prime Minister Tony Blair–to order an assassination on British soil of a British citizen who was no more than a pest. Says Bearden: “Take a deep breath and take a look at Putin and say, ‘Is he stupid or insane?'”

If not Putin, who might want Litvinenko dead? Plenty. Russian Mafia bosses whose networks he was still prying into, for example, or rogue FSB officers who had been paid to rub him out by those who wanted to hurt Berezovsky. Perhaps the culprit was someone who wanted to frame Putin, or a member of the many factions maneuvering to succeed him when his term expires in 2008. One particularly dark theory making the rounds in Moscow was that Litvinenko organized his own death in a bizarre politically motivated suicide. Julia Svetlichnaja, a Russian postgraduate student who met with Litvinenko several times over the past year, last week described an erratic man who said he was going to blackmail at least one famous Russian oligarch with the many secrets he was collecting–or sell them to newspapers. Yegor Gaidar, a Prime Minister in the early 1990s and now an occasional critic of Putin’s, came to the President’s assistance last week when describing how he had fallen violently ill from an apparent poisoning in Dublin on the day Litvinenko died. Writing in the Financial Times, Gaidar concluded “that some obvious or hidden adversaries of the Russian authorities stand behind the scenes of this event, those who are interested in further radical deterioration of relations between Russia and the West.” His implication was that those same or similar adversaries killed Litvinenko.

Who had the means?

THE POLICE ARE TAKING ALL SUCH CLAIMS with a grain of salt–and turning their attention, rather, to the grains of polonium 210 that are at the center of the case. This is no garden-variety poison: polonium needs a nuclear reactor to cook it up and extremely careful handling. At first, the discovery of the element seemed to hang responsibility on the Kremlin. Russia is a big producer of polonium (although its annual output, less than a hundred grams a year, shows just how rare it is). The element is hard to procure. In the U.S., it takes a government license to buy more than minute quantities, and according to the website of United Nuclear, which sells isotopes for use in research labs, it would take about $1 million, 15,000 purchases of the largest unlicensed amount and some fancy lab work to scrape together a lethal dose. (The British Health Protection Agency says the dose that killed Litvinenko was at least 10 times as high as that needed to kill.)

Polonium 210 has some prosaic applications; it is used, for example, in antistatic devices found in photo shops and fabric mills. It would be very difficult, but for less than $1,000, just a few such gizmos could theoretically be disassembled and the contents reworked in a laboratory to produce a lethal dose. To be usable as a poison, Michael Clark, a spokesman for Britain’s Health Protection Agency, said last week, the polonium would then have to be mixed in solution, probably with a gelling agent. “If it was some sort of liquid, it could have been–as in James Bond–a little magic capsule,” Clark said. All this implies considerable sophistication and resources. A rich, ambitious criminal syndicate might have been able to pull it off; nevertheless, normally it is governments that work on this scale. And obscure poisons have long been a specialty of Russia’s secret police, going back to a “toxicological office” that reported to Lenin personally. In the past, the Russians were known to have developed a gun delivering a burst of cyanide gas causing death easy to misidentify as a heart attack, and tiny pellets smeared with the poison ricin, which has no antidote.

In retrospect, it would have been a lot less trouble for someone to push Litvinenko under a bus than to feed him polonium. But it’s likely his poisoners did not anticipate the brouhaha his death would cause. “I believe this was a botched operation,” says Litvinenko’s friend Alexander Goldfarb, who helped him escape from Russia and runs the Berezovsky-funded International Foundation for Civil Liberties in New York City. Without the intervention of Britain’s nuclear-bomb lab, the cause of death would have remained shrouded. Boris Zhuykov, chief of the radioisotope laboratory at the Nuclear Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, says the discovery that polonium was the cause was “an act of scientific heroism. The murderers obviously did not expect that the polonium would be found. They failed because of the excellence of the English gamma spectrometer and the persistence of the research.” (Zhuykov says that when he was making these points to Moscow’s pro-government NTV network last week, the interview was terminated.)

Who had the opportunity?

SCOTLAND YARD HAS HAD ONE BIG BREAK IN the case: polonium, once released, is like a persistent, invisible dye that marks whatever it touches. Someone who ingests even small amounts will leave an unmistakable trail through sweat and even fingerprints. London’s gumshoes have spent the past two weeks following such spores all over town–and beyond.

Litvinenko got sick the evening of Nov. 1, when alpha particles were destroying the lining of his gut. As he began to suspect poison, he focused on two meetings he had earlier that day. One was at a sushi bar in central London with Mario Scaramella, 36, an Italian lawyer and, like Litvinenko, a man drawn to the world of secret information and conspiracy theories. The second meeting was in the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel, near the U.S. embassy, with a group of Russian businessmen with whom Litvinenko was apparently hatching business ventures in Britain. “Alexander said both [meetings] were suspicious, and one was probably innocent,” says Goldfarb.

For a time, attention focused on Scaramella, but by the end of last week his level of poisoning and other evidence exculpated him of any suspicion. Instead, the trail of polonium was entangling the group of Russians at the Pine Bar. All seven bartenders on duty that day tested positive for the substance, at levels approaching those found in members of Litvinenko’s family, implying they had inhaled it soon after its release–possibly from the vapor given off by a drink into which it had been slipped. The Russians who met Litvinenko in the bar included Andrei Lugovoy, a former KGB bodyguard who had met Litvinenko in the 1990s when serving as Berezovsky’s security chief at ORT; Dmitry Kovtun, a former Soviet army officer who has lived in Germany for many years and has known Lugovoy since they were 12; and Vyacheslav Sokolenko, a graduate of the same military school as Lugovoy and Kovtun. Sokolenko says he had never met Litvinenko before their brief encounter in London, and that his only interest that day was to attend a soccer match and do some sightseeing. Both Lugovoy and Kovtun have polonium in their bodies, and so far the main focus is on them; both men (and Sokolenko) deny any wrongdoing.

When Lugovoy learned that British authorities were investigating Litvinenko’s poisoning, he volunteered for an interview at the British embassy in Moscow. Polonium was later found in the embassy room, and in lots of other places Lugovoy had visited: on planes he had flown between Moscow and London in October; in five rooms at the Sheraton Park Lane hotel, where he had stayed; and in a fourth-floor room at the Millennium Hotel he is said to have used on the day Litvinenko was poisoned. Finding polonium in a hotel Lugovoy had used on a previous trip to London prompted British authorities to wonder if there might have been an earlier, failed murder attempt. A senior British security official thought the sprawl of radioactive markers throughout London and beyond implied an amateur operation, not up to the FSB’s usual standard. But another official disagreed. “This is such an extraordinary material to be using as a weapon,” he said, “I’m not sure if any standard operating procedures would exist for handling it.” Lugovoy’s explanation for the traces that seem to track his progress around London was straightforward. “Someone is trying to set me up,” he said to the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper. “But I can’t understand who. Or why.”

Nine Scotland Yard detectives were in Moscow last week, trying to talk to Lugovoy. But the interview kept getting postponed for “technical reasons.” Cooperation between the Londoners and the Russian authorities has been frosty. Russian prosecutors insisted that they conduct all the interviews, with the British merely suggesting questions. Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika said no Russian citizens would ever be extradited to Britain in connection with the case, while his office suggested that Russia would open its own criminal investigation in London. Lugovoy and Kovtun were said to be in the hospital with radiation poisoning, but there was no independent confirmation of that. After his interview with the British detectives, Kovtun was reported by the usually reliable Interfax news agency to have lapsed into a coma, but his lawyer quickly denied it. Hamburg police found alpha radiation in the apartment of Kovtun’s ex-wife and in the home of his ex-mother-in-law, but were not able to say whether the source was polonium 210. For their part, British officials were hoping further tests might let them pinpoint the origins of the polonium, since reactors usually leave signatures in their output. The forensic trail so far points decisively to Russia. But Scotland Yard knows that pursuing Litvinenko’s murder back to those who set it in motion, whether official, private or some combination of the two, may never be possible unless someone confesses.

Meanwhile, there is the light–uncomfortably glaring–that the case sheds on modern Russia. Vladimir Ryzhkov, one of the few independent liberals left in the Duma, says, “The point is not whether Putin is responsible for these concrete murders. The point is that he is responsible for having created a system that is ruled by fear and violence.” Ryzhkov claims that the armed forces, Interior Ministry, FSB and those who have retired from them to join private security services “are running this country, own its economy and use violence and murder as habitual management techniques.” A U.S. businessman in Moscow seconds the argument. “While you in the press are obsessed by Politkovskaya and Litvinenko, you’ve missed that half a dozen major oil executives and another half-dozen major bankers have been murdered in the last few months.” Unlike Litvinenko’s sickness, Russia’s may not be fatal. But like his, it starts from inside. From his lead-lined coffin, a shadowy figure has illuminated that much.

Time Magazine’s Magnum Opus on Litvinenko and Russia’s Future

Time Magazine‘s most recent issue contains a powerful, lengthy indictment of neo-Soviet Russia based on the Litvinenko murder and coverup:

Alexander Litvinenko was buried as he had lived, in a storm. There was rain, hail and a tornado near Highgate Cemetery in north London on the day his lead-lined coffin was lowered into a plot a few yards from that of another dissident who had sought refuge in Britain, Karl Marx. Before the burial, there was a memorial service at a mosque. Several close friends said Litvinenko had converted to Islam a few days before he died, in a kind of atonement for atrocities Russia (and perhaps Litvinenko himself) had committed in Chechnya, although another doubted any conversion had taken place. Litvinenko’s widow Marina had requested a nondenominational service at the graveside, but an imam interrupted the proceedings to perform Islamic rites. Litvinenko, a former Moscow anticorruption detective turned furious critic of the Russian government, had a talent for controversy.

The dead man in the Highgate Cemetery started feeling ill on Nov. 1. The London doctors who attended Litvinenko’s bedside quickly suspected that some kind of radioactive agent was causing his decline. His hair was falling out, his athlete’s body was shriveling, his bone marrow was failing, just as if he had been one of the firemen called to the burning reactor at Chernobyl. But gamma spectrometers found nothing unusual in his blood or urine. As doctors ruled out a slew of increasingly obscure toxins and bugs, the patient’s condition worsened. In desperation, the police sent his urine to Britain’s Atomic Weapons Establishment, which has equipment beyond the reach of any hospital. There, experts discovered Litvinenko’s urine was teeming with radiation–not the gamma rays they had been looking for, which are the usual culprits in radiation poisoning because they can penetrate steel and concrete, but alpha particles, which can be blocked by a single sheet of paper or a layer of human skin. If they get into your bloodstream, though, alpha particles will destroy everything they touch. The Chernobyl occurs inside. This is not a nice way to die.

It was Litvinenko’s fate. On Nov. 23, a few hours after the scientists isolated what was causing his body to disintegrate, he succumbed. His was not the quiet, inexplicable demise that a poisoner usually seeks. Instead, those alpha particles, which were shown to come from the rare isotope polonium 210, opened a box of mysteries that have grabbed the world’s attention for weeks and turned a gruesome death into the center of a global manhunt and a potential row between Russia and the rest of the world.

The victim had no doubt where the search for his killer would lead: on his deathbed, he said his death had been ordered by Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia. Russian officials have denied that as a malicious provocation. Not surprisingly, Britain is being punctilious about amassing sufficient evidence before it points a finger in any direction. But if some shadowy figures close to the Kremlin turn out to be responsible for Litvinenko’s death, it would be the most astonishing indictment of just how ruthless the modern Russian state can be.

All that, as yet, remains unproved. Meanwhile, a slew of whodunit theories are jostling for prominence. Following an autopsy that spurred the police to treat Litvinenko’s death as a murder, Scotland Yard antiterrorism officers have been combing sites all over London, while colleagues traveled to Moscow. “This continues to be an extremely complex investigation, and detectives are pursuing many lines of inquiry,” said a police spokeswoman. Litvinenko’s excruciating and sinister death and the swirl of international politics around it make this a case worthy of John le Carré, but as the police insist, the classic questions of any murder inquiry still apply: Scotland Yard, in short, is looking for motive, means and opportunity.

Who had a motive?

WHY WOULD ANYONE WANT ALEXANDER Litvinenko dead? To answer that question, investigators are having to immerse themselves in the intrigues of postcommunist Russia and their echoes in London, the favored home away from home for Russian exiles, where Litvinenko sought asylum in 2001. (He became a British citizen two months ago.)

Litvinenko had spent the 1990s as an officer in the élite organized crime unit of the Federal Security Service (FSB), which was tasked with penetrating organized-crime gangs in the murky post-Soviet world of big money and official corruption. Like anyone else who touched that cesspit, he had collected some powerful enemies–and at least one ally. That was Boris Berezovsky, one of Russia’s first billionaires, who made his money in cars and oil partly by using his excellent connections with Boris Yeltsin to buy state assets for much less than they turned out to be worth. In 1994, as his Mercedes was pulling out of his headquarters, a huge car bomb decapitated Berezovsky’s chauffeur but left Berezovsky unharmed. Litvinenko was assigned to the case, and over time the two men became friendly. In 1995 hit men gunned down Vladislav Listyev, a popular TV personality who also ran Berezovsky’s ORT-TV network. Officers from a rival organized-crime squad came to Berezovsky’s headquarters to arrest him and search for documents. But in the doorway, with his pistol drawn, Litvinenko held off eight of them armed with Kalashnikovs, while Berezovsky furiously phoned allies at the Kremlin. Berezovsky said he and Litvinenko became “like brothers” that night.

Litvinenko claimed to have saved Berezovsky’s life a second time. In 1998 he said he had refused an order “to kill the Jew who has stolen half of this country”–by which his superiors meant Berezovsky. As a result, Litvinenko believed, an unsuccessful attempt was made on his life. Those claims were made at a surreal press conference at which Litvinenko appeared with six other disgruntled FSB officers. Some wore ski masks, but Litvinenko, his face uncovered, calmly stated that bosses at the FSB were using the organization “for their private ends to liquidate those who bothered them” and line their own pockets.

Was Litvinenko telling the truth, and if so, was that his sole motivation for grabbing the limelight? Later, two of the officers in the episode claimed the stunt was bought and paid for by Berezovsky, which probably only heightened the rage of the man who had become the FSB’s chief–Vladimir Putin. To Putin, a former KGB officer, what Litvinenko had done “was a major act of treason,” says former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin, now an exile in the U.S. after having written about Russia’s tilt toward authoritarianism. In his book The Lubyanka Gang, Litvinenko, for his part, said he had gone to Putin before the press conference with proof showing which top FSB officers and high state officials were corrupt. Putin, he wrote, promised to take action–but had Litvinenko tailed instead and hired some of those accused of corruption to work for him. FSB officers arrested Litvinenko on corruption charges in 1999, and he was jailed for eight months. At trial, he was acquitted, then rearrested and jailed for an additional seven months on the same charges (which were quashed), then arrested again. He was eventually released on the condition that he did not leave Moscow.

Litvinenko broke that promise. With Putin having succeeded Yeltsin as President, Litvinenko and his family fled to London in October 2000–shortly after Berezovsky, who was later charged in Russia with fraud, had left for Britain. Litvinenko went to work for the billionaire and lived in a house owned by him. Both agitated against Putin, Berezovsky by financing human-rights and opposition groups and Litvinenko by producing two books furiously critical of the new President. Litvinenko, it is fair to say, didn’t like Putin. Last summer he claimed in a letter posted on the Internet that the President was a habitual pedophile. Litvinenko also contended that Putin had been on the take from Mafia groups for years and that to advance his presidential ambitions, he had directed FSB officers to blow up apartment buildings in Moscow in 1999, killing more than 300 people–then pinning the outrage on Chechen rebels. (Putin has vehemently denied any involvement; Russian courts found a group of Chechens guilty of the crimes.) Litvinenko helped make a French film about the apartment bombings and was contributing to a documentary being made in London when he was murdered. This fall Litvinenko had been on the trail of the murderer of Anna Politkovskaya, a persistent critic of Putin’s war in Chechnya and human-rights abuses in Russia. Politkovskaya was killed in the doorway of her Moscow apartment in October. Litvinenko was sure the order had come from the Kremlin.

Putin, says Alexei Kondaurov, a former KGB general who is now a maverick Duma deputy, is known for keeping score and for a long memory. So the idea that he would want an infuriating gadfly like Litvinenko to disappear is not beyond reason. But the President’s defenders scoff at the idea that he might have been involved in Litvinenko’s death. Putin, they say, had no need to get rid of Litvinenko; the exile was an irrelevant crank. Milton Bearden, a former CIA spy in Moscow, as well as other experienced intelligence hands, agrees it would be nuts for Putin–who has had good relations with British Prime Minister Tony Blair–to order an assassination on British soil of a British citizen who was no more than a pest. Says Bearden: “Take a deep breath and take a look at Putin and say, ‘Is he stupid or insane?'”

If not Putin, who might want Litvinenko dead? Plenty. Russian Mafia bosses whose networks he was still prying into, for example, or rogue FSB officers who had been paid to rub him out by those who wanted to hurt Berezovsky. Perhaps the culprit was someone who wanted to frame Putin, or a member of the many factions maneuvering to succeed him when his term expires in 2008. One particularly dark theory making the rounds in Moscow was that Litvinenko organized his own death in a bizarre politically motivated suicide. Julia Svetlichnaja, a Russian postgraduate student who met with Litvinenko several times over the past year, last week described an erratic man who said he was going to blackmail at least one famous Russian oligarch with the many secrets he was collecting–or sell them to newspapers. Yegor Gaidar, a Prime Minister in the early 1990s and now an occasional critic of Putin’s, came to the President’s assistance last week when describing how he had fallen violently ill from an apparent poisoning in Dublin on the day Litvinenko died. Writing in the Financial Times, Gaidar concluded “that some obvious or hidden adversaries of the Russian authorities stand behind the scenes of this event, those who are interested in further radical deterioration of relations between Russia and the West.” His implication was that those same or similar adversaries killed Litvinenko.

Who had the means?

THE POLICE ARE TAKING ALL SUCH CLAIMS with a grain of salt–and turning their attention, rather, to the grains of polonium 210 that are at the center of the case. This is no garden-variety poison: polonium needs a nuclear reactor to cook it up and extremely careful handling. At first, the discovery of the element seemed to hang responsibility on the Kremlin. Russia is a big producer of polonium (although its annual output, less than a hundred grams a year, shows just how rare it is). The element is hard to procure. In the U.S., it takes a government license to buy more than minute quantities, and according to the website of United Nuclear, which sells isotopes for use in research labs, it would take about $1 million, 15,000 purchases of the largest unlicensed amount and some fancy lab work to scrape together a lethal dose. (The British Health Protection Agency says the dose that killed Litvinenko was at least 10 times as high as that needed to kill.)

Polonium 210 has some prosaic applications; it is used, for example, in antistatic devices found in photo shops and fabric mills. It would be very difficult, but for less than $1,000, just a few such gizmos could theoretically be disassembled and the contents reworked in a laboratory to produce a lethal dose. To be usable as a poison, Michael Clark, a spokesman for Britain’s Health Protection Agency, said last week, the polonium would then have to be mixed in solution, probably with a gelling agent. “If it was some sort of liquid, it could have been–as in James Bond–a little magic capsule,” Clark said. All this implies considerable sophistication and resources. A rich, ambitious criminal syndicate might have been able to pull it off; nevertheless, normally it is governments that work on this scale. And obscure poisons have long been a specialty of Russia’s secret police, going back to a “toxicological office” that reported to Lenin personally. In the past, the Russians were known to have developed a gun delivering a burst of cyanide gas causing death easy to misidentify as a heart attack, and tiny pellets smeared with the poison ricin, which has no antidote.

In retrospect, it would have been a lot less trouble for someone to push Litvinenko under a bus than to feed him polonium. But it’s likely his poisoners did not anticipate the brouhaha his death would cause. “I believe this was a botched operation,” says Litvinenko’s friend Alexander Goldfarb, who helped him escape from Russia and runs the Berezovsky-funded International Foundation for Civil Liberties in New York City. Without the intervention of Britain’s nuclear-bomb lab, the cause of death would have remained shrouded. Boris Zhuykov, chief of the radioisotope laboratory at the Nuclear Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, says the discovery that polonium was the cause was “an act of scientific heroism. The murderers obviously did not expect that the polonium would be found. They failed because of the excellence of the English gamma spectrometer and the persistence of the research.” (Zhuykov says that when he was making these points to Moscow’s pro-government NTV network last week, the interview was terminated.)

Who had the opportunity?

SCOTLAND YARD HAS HAD ONE BIG BREAK IN the case: polonium, once released, is like a persistent, invisible dye that marks whatever it touches. Someone who ingests even small amounts will leave an unmistakable trail through sweat and even fingerprints. London’s gumshoes have spent the past two weeks following such spores all over town–and beyond.

Litvinenko got sick the evening of Nov. 1, when alpha particles were destroying the lining of his gut. As he began to suspect poison, he focused on two meetings he had earlier that day. One was at a sushi bar in central London with Mario Scaramella, 36, an Italian lawyer and, like Litvinenko, a man drawn to the world of secret information and conspiracy theories. The second meeting was in the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel, near the U.S. embassy, with a group of Russian businessmen with whom Litvinenko was apparently hatching business ventures in Britain. “Alexander said both [meetings] were suspicious, and one was probably innocent,” says Goldfarb.

For a time, attention focused on Scaramella, but by the end of last week his level of poisoning and other evidence exculpated him of any suspicion. Instead, the trail of polonium was entangling the group of Russians at the Pine Bar. All seven bartenders on duty that day tested positive for the substance, at levels approaching those found in members of Litvinenko’s family, implying they had inhaled it soon after its release–possibly from the vapor given off by a drink into which it had been slipped. The Russians who met Litvinenko in the bar included Andrei Lugovoy, a former KGB bodyguard who had met Litvinenko in the 1990s when serving as Berezovsky’s security chief at ORT; Dmitry Kovtun, a former Soviet army officer who has lived in Germany for many years and has known Lugovoy since they were 12; and Vyacheslav Sokolenko, a graduate of the same military school as Lugovoy and Kovtun. Sokolenko says he had never met Litvinenko before their brief encounter in London, and that his only interest that day was to attend a soccer match and do some sightseeing. Both Lugovoy and Kovtun have polonium in their bodies, and so far the main focus is on them; both men (and Sokolenko) deny any wrongdoing.

When Lugovoy learned that British authorities were investigating Litvinenko’s poisoning, he volunteered for an interview at the British embassy in Moscow. Polonium was later found in the embassy room, and in lots of other places Lugovoy had visited: on planes he had flown between Moscow and London in October; in five rooms at the Sheraton Park Lane hotel, where he had stayed; and in a fourth-floor room at the Millennium Hotel he is said to have used on the day Litvinenko was poisoned. Finding polonium in a hotel Lugovoy had used on a previous trip to London prompted British authorities to wonder if there might have been an earlier, failed murder attempt. A senior British security official thought the sprawl of radioactive markers throughout London and beyond implied an amateur operation, not up to the FSB’s usual standard. But another official disagreed. “This is such an extraordinary material to be using as a weapon,” he said, “I’m not sure if any standard operating procedures would exist for handling it.” Lugovoy’s explanation for the traces that seem to track his progress around London was straightforward. “Someone is trying to set me up,” he said to the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper. “But I can’t understand who. Or why.”

Nine Scotland Yard detectives were in Moscow last week, trying to talk to Lugovoy. But the interview kept getting postponed for “technical reasons.” Cooperation between the Londoners and the Russian authorities has been frosty. Russian prosecutors insisted that they conduct all the interviews, with the British merely suggesting questions. Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika said no Russian citizens would ever be extradited to Britain in connection with the case, while his office suggested that Russia would open its own criminal investigation in London. Lugovoy and Kovtun were said to be in the hospital with radiation poisoning, but there was no independent confirmation of that. After his interview with the British detectives, Kovtun was reported by the usually reliable Interfax news agency to have lapsed into a coma, but his lawyer quickly denied it. Hamburg police found alpha radiation in the apartment of Kovtun’s ex-wife and in the home of his ex-mother-in-law, but were not able to say whether the source was polonium 210. For their part, British officials were hoping further tests might let them pinpoint the origins of the polonium, since reactors usually leave signatures in their output. The forensic trail so far points decisively to Russia. But Scotland Yard knows that pursuing Litvinenko’s murder back to those who set it in motion, whether official, private or some combination of the two, may never be possible unless someone confesses.

Meanwhile, there is the light–uncomfortably glaring–that the case sheds on modern Russia. Vladimir Ryzhkov, one of the few independent liberals left in the Duma, says, “The point is not whether Putin is responsible for these concrete murders. The point is that he is responsible for having created a system that is ruled by fear and violence.” Ryzhkov claims that the armed forces, Interior Ministry, FSB and those who have retired from them to join private security services “are running this country, own its economy and use violence and murder as habitual management techniques.” A U.S. businessman in Moscow seconds the argument. “While you in the press are obsessed by Politkovskaya and Litvinenko, you’ve missed that half a dozen major oil executives and another half-dozen major bankers have been murdered in the last few months.” Unlike Litvinenko’s sickness, Russia’s may not be fatal. But like his, it starts from inside. From his lead-lined coffin, a shadowy figure has illuminated that much.

Time Magazine’s Magnum Opus on Litvinenko and Russia’s Future

Time Magazine‘s most recent issue contains a powerful, lengthy indictment of neo-Soviet Russia based on the Litvinenko murder and coverup:

Alexander Litvinenko was buried as he had lived, in a storm. There was rain, hail and a tornado near Highgate Cemetery in north London on the day his lead-lined coffin was lowered into a plot a few yards from that of another dissident who had sought refuge in Britain, Karl Marx. Before the burial, there was a memorial service at a mosque. Several close friends said Litvinenko had converted to Islam a few days before he died, in a kind of atonement for atrocities Russia (and perhaps Litvinenko himself) had committed in Chechnya, although another doubted any conversion had taken place. Litvinenko’s widow Marina had requested a nondenominational service at the graveside, but an imam interrupted the proceedings to perform Islamic rites. Litvinenko, a former Moscow anticorruption detective turned furious critic of the Russian government, had a talent for controversy.

The dead man in the Highgate Cemetery started feeling ill on Nov. 1. The London doctors who attended Litvinenko’s bedside quickly suspected that some kind of radioactive agent was causing his decline. His hair was falling out, his athlete’s body was shriveling, his bone marrow was failing, just as if he had been one of the firemen called to the burning reactor at Chernobyl. But gamma spectrometers found nothing unusual in his blood or urine. As doctors ruled out a slew of increasingly obscure toxins and bugs, the patient’s condition worsened. In desperation, the police sent his urine to Britain’s Atomic Weapons Establishment, which has equipment beyond the reach of any hospital. There, experts discovered Litvinenko’s urine was teeming with radiation–not the gamma rays they had been looking for, which are the usual culprits in radiation poisoning because they can penetrate steel and concrete, but alpha particles, which can be blocked by a single sheet of paper or a layer of human skin. If they get into your bloodstream, though, alpha particles will destroy everything they touch. The Chernobyl occurs inside. This is not a nice way to die.

It was Litvinenko’s fate. On Nov. 23, a few hours after the scientists isolated what was causing his body to disintegrate, he succumbed. His was not the quiet, inexplicable demise that a poisoner usually seeks. Instead, those alpha particles, which were shown to come from the rare isotope polonium 210, opened a box of mysteries that have grabbed the world’s attention for weeks and turned a gruesome death into the center of a global manhunt and a potential row between Russia and the rest of the world.

The victim had no doubt where the search for his killer would lead: on his deathbed, he said his death had been ordered by Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia. Russian officials have denied that as a malicious provocation. Not surprisingly, Britain is being punctilious about amassing sufficient evidence before it points a finger in any direction. But if some shadowy figures close to the Kremlin turn out to be responsible for Litvinenko’s death, it would be the most astonishing indictment of just how ruthless the modern Russian state can be.

All that, as yet, remains unproved. Meanwhile, a slew of whodunit theories are jostling for prominence. Following an autopsy that spurred the police to treat Litvinenko’s death as a murder, Scotland Yard antiterrorism officers have been combing sites all over London, while colleagues traveled to Moscow. “This continues to be an extremely complex investigation, and detectives are pursuing many lines of inquiry,” said a police spokeswoman. Litvinenko’s excruciating and sinister death and the swirl of international politics around it make this a case worthy of John le Carré, but as the police insist, the classic questions of any murder inquiry still apply: Scotland Yard, in short, is looking for motive, means and opportunity.

Who had a motive?

WHY WOULD ANYONE WANT ALEXANDER Litvinenko dead? To answer that question, investigators are having to immerse themselves in the intrigues of postcommunist Russia and their echoes in London, the favored home away from home for Russian exiles, where Litvinenko sought asylum in 2001. (He became a British citizen two months ago.)

Litvinenko had spent the 1990s as an officer in the élite organized crime unit of the Federal Security Service (FSB), which was tasked with penetrating organized-crime gangs in the murky post-Soviet world of big money and official corruption. Like anyone else who touched that cesspit, he had collected some powerful enemies–and at least one ally. That was Boris Berezovsky, one of Russia’s first billionaires, who made his money in cars and oil partly by using his excellent connections with Boris Yeltsin to buy state assets for much less than they turned out to be worth. In 1994, as his Mercedes was pulling out of his headquarters, a huge car bomb decapitated Berezovsky’s chauffeur but left Berezovsky unharmed. Litvinenko was assigned to the case, and over time the two men became friendly. In 1995 hit men gunned down Vladislav Listyev, a popular TV personality who also ran Berezovsky’s ORT-TV network. Officers from a rival organized-crime squad came to Berezovsky’s headquarters to arrest him and search for documents. But in the doorway, with his pistol drawn, Litvinenko held off eight of them armed with Kalashnikovs, while Berezovsky furiously phoned allies at the Kremlin. Berezovsky said he and Litvinenko became “like brothers” that night.

Litvinenko claimed to have saved Berezovsky’s life a second time. In 1998 he said he had refused an order “to kill the Jew who has stolen half of this country”–by which his superiors meant Berezovsky. As a result, Litvinenko believed, an unsuccessful attempt was made on his life. Those claims were made at a surreal press conference at which Litvinenko appeared with six other disgruntled FSB officers. Some wore ski masks, but Litvinenko, his face uncovered, calmly stated that bosses at the FSB were using the organization “for their private ends to liquidate those who bothered them” and line their own pockets.

Was Litvinenko telling the truth, and if so, was that his sole motivation for grabbing the limelight? Later, two of the officers in the episode claimed the stunt was bought and paid for by Berezovsky, which probably only heightened the rage of the man who had become the FSB’s chief–Vladimir Putin. To Putin, a former KGB officer, what Litvinenko had done “was a major act of treason,” says former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin, now an exile in the U.S. after having written about Russia’s tilt toward authoritarianism. In his book The Lubyanka Gang, Litvinenko, for his part, said he had gone to Putin before the press conference with proof showing which top FSB officers and high state officials were corrupt. Putin, he wrote, promised to take action–but had Litvinenko tailed instead and hired some of those accused of corruption to work for him. FSB officers arrested Litvinenko on corruption charges in 1999, and he was jailed for eight months. At trial, he was acquitted, then rearrested and jailed for an additional seven months on the same charges (which were quashed), then arrested again. He was eventually released on the condition that he did not leave Moscow.

Litvinenko broke that promise. With Putin having succeeded Yeltsin as President, Litvinenko and his family fled to London in October 2000–shortly after Berezovsky, who was later charged in Russia with fraud, had left for Britain. Litvinenko went to work for the billionaire and lived in a house owned by him. Both agitated against Putin, Berezovsky by financing human-rights and opposition groups and Litvinenko by producing two books furiously critical of the new President. Litvinenko, it is fair to say, didn’t like Putin. Last summer he claimed in a letter posted on the Internet that the President was a habitual pedophile. Litvinenko also contended that Putin had been on the take from Mafia groups for years and that to advance his presidential ambitions, he had directed FSB officers to blow up apartment buildings in Moscow in 1999, killing more than 300 people–then pinning the outrage on Chechen rebels. (Putin has vehemently denied any involvement; Russian courts found a group of Chechens guilty of the crimes.) Litvinenko helped make a French film about the apartment bombings and was contributing to a documentary being made in London when he was murdered. This fall Litvinenko had been on the trail of the murderer of Anna Politkovskaya, a persistent critic of Putin’s war in Chechnya and human-rights abuses in Russia. Politkovskaya was killed in the doorway of her Moscow apartment in October. Litvinenko was sure the order had come from the Kremlin.

Putin, says Alexei Kondaurov, a former KGB general who is now a maverick Duma deputy, is known for keeping score and for a long memory. So the idea that he would want an infuriating gadfly like Litvinenko to disappear is not beyond reason. But the President’s defenders scoff at the idea that he might have been involved in Litvinenko’s death. Putin, they say, had no need to get rid of Litvinenko; the exile was an irrelevant crank. Milton Bearden, a former CIA spy in Moscow, as well as other experienced intelligence hands, agrees it would be nuts for Putin–who has had good relations with British Prime Minister Tony Blair–to order an assassination on British soil of a British citizen who was no more than a pest. Says Bearden: “Take a deep breath and take a look at Putin and say, ‘Is he stupid or insane?'”

If not Putin, who might want Litvinenko dead? Plenty. Russian Mafia bosses whose networks he was still prying into, for example, or rogue FSB officers who had been paid to rub him out by those who wanted to hurt Berezovsky. Perhaps the culprit was someone who wanted to frame Putin, or a member of the many factions maneuvering to succeed him when his term expires in 2008. One particularly dark theory making the rounds in Moscow was that Litvinenko organized his own death in a bizarre politically motivated suicide. Julia Svetlichnaja, a Russian postgraduate student who met with Litvinenko several times over the past year, last week described an erratic man who said he was going to blackmail at least one famous Russian oligarch with the many secrets he was collecting–or sell them to newspapers. Yegor Gaidar, a Prime Minister in the early 1990s and now an occasional critic of Putin’s, came to the President’s assistance last week when describing how he had fallen violently ill from an apparent poisoning in Dublin on the day Litvinenko died. Writing in the Financial Times, Gaidar concluded “that some obvious or hidden adversaries of the Russian authorities stand behind the scenes of this event, those who are interested in further radical deterioration of relations between Russia and the West.” His implication was that those same or similar adversaries killed Litvinenko.

Who had the means?

THE POLICE ARE TAKING ALL SUCH CLAIMS with a grain of salt–and turning their attention, rather, to the grains of polonium 210 that are at the center of the case. This is no garden-variety poison: polonium needs a nuclear reactor to cook it up and extremely careful handling. At first, the discovery of the element seemed to hang responsibility on the Kremlin. Russia is a big producer of polonium (although its annual output, less than a hundred grams a year, shows just how rare it is). The element is hard to procure. In the U.S., it takes a government license to buy more than minute quantities, and according to the website of United Nuclear, which sells isotopes for use in research labs, it would take about $1 million, 15,000 purchases of the largest unlicensed amount and some fancy lab work to scrape together a lethal dose. (The British Health Protection Agency says the dose that killed Litvinenko was at least 10 times as high as that needed to kill.)

Polonium 210 has some prosaic applications; it is used, for example, in antistatic devices found in photo shops and fabric mills. It would be very difficult, but for less than $1,000, just a few such gizmos could theoretically be disassembled and the contents reworked in a laboratory to produce a lethal dose. To be usable as a poison, Michael Clark, a spokesman for Britain’s Health Protection Agency, said last week, the polonium would then have to be mixed in solution, probably with a gelling agent. “If it was some sort of liquid, it could have been–as in James Bond–a little magic capsule,” Clark said. All this implies considerable sophistication and resources. A rich, ambitious criminal syndicate might have been able to pull it off; nevertheless, normally it is governments that work on this scale. And obscure poisons have long been a specialty of Russia’s secret police, going back to a “toxicological office” that reported to Lenin personally. In the past, the Russians were known to have developed a gun delivering a burst of cyanide gas causing death easy to misidentify as a heart attack, and tiny pellets smeared with the poison ricin, which has no antidote.

In retrospect, it would have been a lot less trouble for someone to push Litvinenko under a bus than to feed him polonium. But it’s likely his poisoners did not anticipate the brouhaha his death would cause. “I believe this was a botched operation,” says Litvinenko’s friend Alexander Goldfarb, who helped him escape from Russia and runs the Berezovsky-funded International Foundation for Civil Liberties in New York City. Without the intervention of Britain’s nuclear-bomb lab, the cause of death would have remained shrouded. Boris Zhuykov, chief of the radioisotope laboratory at the Nuclear Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, says the discovery that polonium was the cause was “an act of scientific heroism. The murderers obviously did not expect that the polonium would be found. They failed because of the excellence of the English gamma spectrometer and the persistence of the research.” (Zhuykov says that when he was making these points to Moscow’s pro-government NTV network last week, the interview was terminated.)

Who had the opportunity?

SCOTLAND YARD HAS HAD ONE BIG BREAK IN the case: polonium, once released, is like a persistent, invisible dye that marks whatever it touches. Someone who ingests even small amounts will leave an unmistakable trail through sweat and even fingerprints. London’s gumshoes have spent the past two weeks following such spores all over town–and beyond.

Litvinenko got sick the evening of Nov. 1, when alpha particles were destroying the lining of his gut. As he began to suspect poison, he focused on two meetings he had earlier that day. One was at a sushi bar in central London with Mario Scaramella, 36, an Italian lawyer and, like Litvinenko, a man drawn to the world of secret information and conspiracy theories. The second meeting was in the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel, near the U.S. embassy, with a group of Russian businessmen with whom Litvinenko was apparently hatching business ventures in Britain. “Alexander said both [meetings] were suspicious, and one was probably innocent,” says Goldfarb.

For a time, attention focused on Scaramella, but by the end of last week his level of poisoning and other evidence exculpated him of any suspicion. Instead, the trail of polonium was entangling the group of Russians at the Pine Bar. All seven bartenders on duty that day tested positive for the substance, at levels approaching those found in members of Litvinenko’s family, implying they had inhaled it soon after its release–possibly from the vapor given off by a drink into which it had been slipped. The Russians who met Litvinenko in the bar included Andrei Lugovoy, a former KGB bodyguard who had met Litvinenko in the 1990s when serving as Berezovsky’s security chief at ORT; Dmitry Kovtun, a former Soviet army officer who has lived in Germany for many years and has known Lugovoy since they were 12; and Vyacheslav Sokolenko, a graduate of the same military school as Lugovoy and Kovtun. Sokolenko says he had never met Litvinenko before their brief encounter in London, and that his only interest that day was to attend a soccer match and do some sightseeing. Both Lugovoy and Kovtun have polonium in their bodies, and so far the main focus is on them; both men (and Sokolenko) deny any wrongdoing.

When Lugovoy learned that British authorities were investigating Litvinenko’s poisoning, he volunteered for an interview at the British embassy in Moscow. Polonium was later found in the embassy room, and in lots of other places Lugovoy had visited: on planes he had flown between Moscow and London in October; in five rooms at the Sheraton Park Lane hotel, where he had stayed; and in a fourth-floor room at the Millennium Hotel he is said to have used on the day Litvinenko was poisoned. Finding polonium in a hotel Lugovoy had used on a previous trip to London prompted British authorities to wonder if there might have been an earlier, failed murder attempt. A senior British security official thought the sprawl of radioactive markers throughout London and beyond implied an amateur operation, not up to the FSB’s usual standard. But another official disagreed. “This is such an extraordinary material to be using as a weapon,” he said, “I’m not sure if any standard operating procedures would exist for handling it.” Lugovoy’s explanation for the traces that seem to track his progress around London was straightforward. “Someone is trying to set me up,” he said to the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper. “But I can’t understand who. Or why.”

Nine Scotland Yard detectives were in Moscow last week, trying to talk to Lugovoy. But the interview kept getting postponed for “technical reasons.” Cooperation between the Londoners and the Russian authorities has been frosty. Russian prosecutors insisted that they conduct all the interviews, with the British merely suggesting questions. Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika said no Russian citizens would ever be extradited to Britain in connection with the case, while his office suggested that Russia would open its own criminal investigation in London. Lugovoy and Kovtun were said to be in the hospital with radiation poisoning, but there was no independent confirmation of that. After his interview with the British detectives, Kovtun was reported by the usually reliable Interfax news agency to have lapsed into a coma, but his lawyer quickly denied it. Hamburg police found alpha radiation in the apartment of Kovtun’s ex-wife and in the home of his ex-mother-in-law, but were not able to say whether the source was polonium 210. For their part, British officials were hoping further tests might let them pinpoint the origins of the polonium, since reactors usually leave signatures in their output. The forensic trail so far points decisively to Russia. But Scotland Yard knows that pursuing Litvinenko’s murder back to those who set it in motion, whether official, private or some combination of the two, may never be possible unless someone confesses.

Meanwhile, there is the light–uncomfortably glaring–that the case sheds on modern Russia. Vladimir Ryzhkov, one of the few independent liberals left in the Duma, says, “The point is not whether Putin is responsible for these concrete murders. The point is that he is responsible for having created a system that is ruled by fear and violence.” Ryzhkov claims that the armed forces, Interior Ministry, FSB and those who have retired from them to join private security services “are running this country, own its economy and use violence and murder as habitual management techniques.” A U.S. businessman in Moscow seconds the argument. “While you in the press are obsessed by Politkovskaya and Litvinenko, you’ve missed that half a dozen major oil executives and another half-dozen major bankers have been murdered in the last few months.” Unlike Litvinenko’s sickness, Russia’s may not be fatal. But like his, it starts from inside. From his lead-lined coffin, a shadowy figure has illuminated that much.

Time Magazine’s Magnum Opus on Litvinenko and Russia’s Future

Time Magazine‘s most recent issue contains a powerful, lengthy indictment of neo-Soviet Russia based on the Litvinenko murder and coverup:

Alexander Litvinenko was buried as he had lived, in a storm. There was rain, hail and a tornado near Highgate Cemetery in north London on the day his lead-lined coffin was lowered into a plot a few yards from that of another dissident who had sought refuge in Britain, Karl Marx. Before the burial, there was a memorial service at a mosque. Several close friends said Litvinenko had converted to Islam a few days before he died, in a kind of atonement for atrocities Russia (and perhaps Litvinenko himself) had committed in Chechnya, although another doubted any conversion had taken place. Litvinenko’s widow Marina had requested a nondenominational service at the graveside, but an imam interrupted the proceedings to perform Islamic rites. Litvinenko, a former Moscow anticorruption detective turned furious critic of the Russian government, had a talent for controversy.

The dead man in the Highgate Cemetery started feeling ill on Nov. 1. The London doctors who attended Litvinenko’s bedside quickly suspected that some kind of radioactive agent was causing his decline. His hair was falling out, his athlete’s body was shriveling, his bone marrow was failing, just as if he had been one of the firemen called to the burning reactor at Chernobyl. But gamma spectrometers found nothing unusual in his blood or urine. As doctors ruled out a slew of increasingly obscure toxins and bugs, the patient’s condition worsened. In desperation, the police sent his urine to Britain’s Atomic Weapons Establishment, which has equipment beyond the reach of any hospital. There, experts discovered Litvinenko’s urine was teeming with radiation–not the gamma rays they had been looking for, which are the usual culprits in radiation poisoning because they can penetrate steel and concrete, but alpha particles, which can be blocked by a single sheet of paper or a layer of human skin. If they get into your bloodstream, though, alpha particles will destroy everything they touch. The Chernobyl occurs inside. This is not a nice way to die.

It was Litvinenko’s fate. On Nov. 23, a few hours after the scientists isolated what was causing his body to disintegrate, he succumbed. His was not the quiet, inexplicable demise that a poisoner usually seeks. Instead, those alpha particles, which were shown to come from the rare isotope polonium 210, opened a box of mysteries that have grabbed the world’s attention for weeks and turned a gruesome death into the center of a global manhunt and a potential row between Russia and the rest of the world.

The victim had no doubt where the search for his killer would lead: on his deathbed, he said his death had been ordered by Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia. Russian officials have denied that as a malicious provocation. Not surprisingly, Britain is being punctilious about amassing sufficient evidence before it points a finger in any direction. But if some shadowy figures close to the Kremlin turn out to be responsible for Litvinenko’s death, it would be the most astonishing indictment of just how ruthless the modern Russian state can be.

All that, as yet, remains unproved. Meanwhile, a slew of whodunit theories are jostling for prominence. Following an autopsy that spurred the police to treat Litvinenko’s death as a murder, Scotland Yard antiterrorism officers have been combing sites all over London, while colleagues traveled to Moscow. “This continues to be an extremely complex investigation, and detectives are pursuing many lines of inquiry,” said a police spokeswoman. Litvinenko’s excruciating and sinister death and the swirl of international politics around it make this a case worthy of John le Carré, but as the police insist, the classic questions of any murder inquiry still apply: Scotland Yard, in short, is looking for motive, means and opportunity.

Who had a motive?

WHY WOULD ANYONE WANT ALEXANDER Litvinenko dead? To answer that question, investigators are having to immerse themselves in the intrigues of postcommunist Russia and their echoes in London, the favored home away from home for Russian exiles, where Litvinenko sought asylum in 2001. (He became a British citizen two months ago.)

Litvinenko had spent the 1990s as an officer in the élite organized crime unit of the Federal Security Service (FSB), which was tasked with penetrating organized-crime gangs in the murky post-Soviet world of big money and official corruption. Like anyone else who touched that cesspit, he had collected some powerful enemies–and at least one ally. That was Boris Berezovsky, one of Russia’s first billionaires, who made his money in cars and oil partly by using his excellent connections with Boris Yeltsin to buy state assets for much less than they turned out to be worth. In 1994, as his Mercedes was pulling out of his headquarters, a huge car bomb decapitated Berezovsky’s chauffeur but left Berezovsky unharmed. Litvinenko was assigned to the case, and over time the two men became friendly. In 1995 hit men gunned down Vladislav Listyev, a popular TV personality who also ran Berezovsky’s ORT-TV network. Officers from a rival organized-crime squad came to Berezovsky’s headquarters to arrest him and search for documents. But in the doorway, with his pistol drawn, Litvinenko held off eight of them armed with Kalashnikovs, while Berezovsky furiously phoned allies at the Kremlin. Berezovsky said he and Litvinenko became “like brothers” that night.

Litvinenko claimed to have saved Berezovsky’s life a second time. In 1998 he said he had refused an order “to kill the Jew who has stolen half of this country”–by which his superiors meant Berezovsky. As a result, Litvinenko believed, an unsuccessful attempt was made on his life. Those claims were made at a surreal press conference at which Litvinenko appeared with six other disgruntled FSB officers. Some wore ski masks, but Litvinenko, his face uncovered, calmly stated that bosses at the FSB were using the organization “for their private ends to liquidate those who bothered them” and line their own pockets.

Was Litvinenko telling the truth, and if so, was that his sole motivation for grabbing the limelight? Later, two of the officers in the episode claimed the stunt was bought and paid for by Berezovsky, which probably only heightened the rage of the man who had become the FSB’s chief–Vladimir Putin. To Putin, a former KGB officer, what Litvinenko had done “was a major act of treason,” says former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin, now an exile in the U.S. after having written about Russia’s tilt toward authoritarianism. In his book The Lubyanka Gang, Litvinenko, for his part, said he had gone to Putin before the press conference with proof showing which top FSB officers and high state officials were corrupt. Putin, he wrote, promised to take action–but had Litvinenko tailed instead and hired some of those accused of corruption to work for him. FSB officers arrested Litvinenko on corruption charges in 1999, and he was jailed for eight months. At trial, he was acquitted, then rearrested and jailed for an additional seven months on the same charges (which were quashed), then arrested again. He was eventually released on the condition that he did not leave Moscow.

Litvinenko broke that promise. With Putin having succeeded Yeltsin as President, Litvinenko and his family fled to London in October 2000–shortly after Berezovsky, who was later charged in Russia with fraud, had left for Britain. Litvinenko went to work for the billionaire and lived in a house owned by him. Both agitated against Putin, Berezovsky by financing human-rights and opposition groups and Litvinenko by producing two books furiously critical of the new President. Litvinenko, it is fair to say, didn’t like Putin. Last summer he claimed in a letter posted on the Internet that the President was a habitual pedophile. Litvinenko also contended that Putin had been on the take from Mafia groups for years and that to advance his presidential ambitions, he had directed FSB officers to blow up apartment buildings in Moscow in 1999, killing more than 300 people–then pinning the outrage on Chechen rebels. (Putin has vehemently denied any involvement; Russian courts found a group of Chechens guilty of the crimes.) Litvinenko helped make a French film about the apartment bombings and was contributing to a documentary being made in London when he was murdered. This fall Litvinenko had been on the trail of the murderer of Anna Politkovskaya, a persistent critic of Putin’s war in Chechnya and human-rights abuses in Russia. Politkovskaya was killed in the doorway of her Moscow apartment in October. Litvinenko was sure the order had come from the Kremlin.

Putin, says Alexei Kondaurov, a former KGB general who is now a maverick Duma deputy, is known for keeping score and for a long memory. So the idea that he would want an infuriating gadfly like Litvinenko to disappear is not beyond reason. But the President’s defenders scoff at the idea that he might have been involved in Litvinenko’s death. Putin, they say, had no need to get rid of Litvinenko; the exile was an irrelevant crank. Milton Bearden, a former CIA spy in Moscow, as well as other experienced intelligence hands, agrees it would be nuts for Putin–who has had good relations with British Prime Minister Tony Blair–to order an assassination on British soil of a British citizen who was no more than a pest. Says Bearden: “Take a deep breath and take a look at Putin and say, ‘Is he stupid or insane?'”

If not Putin, who might want Litvinenko dead? Plenty. Russian Mafia bosses whose networks he was still prying into, for example, or rogue FSB officers who had been paid to rub him out by those who wanted to hurt Berezovsky. Perhaps the culprit was someone who wanted to frame Putin, or a member of the many factions maneuvering to succeed him when his term expires in 2008. One particularly dark theory making the rounds in Moscow was that Litvinenko organized his own death in a bizarre politically motivated suicide. Julia Svetlichnaja, a Russian postgraduate student who met with Litvinenko several times over the past year, last week described an erratic man who said he was going to blackmail at least one famous Russian oligarch with the many secrets he was collecting–or sell them to newspapers. Yegor Gaidar, a Prime Minister in the early 1990s and now an occasional critic of Putin’s, came to the President’s assistance last week when describing how he had fallen violently ill from an apparent poisoning in Dublin on the day Litvinenko died. Writing in the Financial Times, Gaidar concluded “that some obvious or hidden adversaries of the Russian authorities stand behind the scenes of this event, those who are interested in further radical deterioration of relations between Russia and the West.” His implication was that those same or similar adversaries killed Litvinenko.

Who had the means?

THE POLICE ARE TAKING ALL SUCH CLAIMS with a grain of salt–and turning their attention, rather, to the grains of polonium 210 that are at the center of the case. This is no garden-variety poison: polonium needs a nuclear reactor to cook it up and extremely careful handling. At first, the discovery of the element seemed to hang responsibility on the Kremlin. Russia is a big producer of polonium (although its annual output, less than a hundred grams a year, shows just how rare it is). The element is hard to procure. In the U.S., it takes a government license to buy more than minute quantities, and according to the website of United Nuclear, which sells isotopes for use in research labs, it would take about $1 million, 15,000 purchases of the largest unlicensed amount and some fancy lab work to scrape together a lethal dose. (The British Health Protection Agency says the dose that killed Litvinenko was at least 10 times as high as that needed to kill.)

Polonium 210 has some prosaic applications; it is used, for example, in antistatic devices found in photo shops and fabric mills. It would be very difficult, but for less than $1,000, just a few such gizmos could theoretically be disassembled and the contents reworked in a laboratory to produce a lethal dose. To be usable as a poison, Michael Clark, a spokesman for Britain’s Health Protection Agency, said last week, the polonium would then have to be mixed in solution, probably with a gelling agent. “If it was some sort of liquid, it could have been–as in James Bond–a little magic capsule,” Clark said. All this implies considerable sophistication and resources. A rich, ambitious criminal syndicate might have been able to pull it off; nevertheless, normally it is governments that work on this scale. And obscure poisons have long been a specialty of Russia’s secret police, going back to a “toxicological office” that reported to Lenin personally. In the past, the Russians were known to have developed a gun delivering a burst of cyanide gas causing death easy to misidentify as a heart attack, and tiny pellets smeared with the poison ricin, which has no antidote.

In retrospect, it would have been a lot less trouble for someone to push Litvinenko under a bus than to feed him polonium. But it’s likely his poisoners did not anticipate the brouhaha his death would cause. “I believe this was a botched operation,” says Litvinenko’s friend Alexander Goldfarb, who helped him escape from Russia and runs the Berezovsky-funded International Foundation for Civil Liberties in New York City. Without the intervention of Britain’s nuclear-bomb lab, the cause of death would have remained shrouded. Boris Zhuykov, chief of the radioisotope laboratory at the Nuclear Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, says the discovery that polonium was the cause was “an act of scientific heroism. The murderers obviously did not expect that the polonium would be found. They failed because of the excellence of the English gamma spectrometer and the persistence of the research.” (Zhuykov says that when he was making these points to Moscow’s pro-government NTV network last week, the interview was terminated.)

Who had the opportunity?

SCOTLAND YARD HAS HAD ONE BIG BREAK IN the case: polonium, once released, is like a persistent, invisible dye that marks whatever it touches. Someone who ingests even small amounts will leave an unmistakable trail through sweat and even fingerprints. London’s gumshoes have spent the past two weeks following such spores all over town–and beyond.

Litvinenko got sick the evening of Nov. 1, when alpha particles were destroying the lining of his gut. As he began to suspect poison, he focused on two meetings he had earlier that day. One was at a sushi bar in central London with Mario Scaramella, 36, an Italian lawyer and, like Litvinenko, a man drawn to the world of secret information and conspiracy theories. The second meeting was in the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel, near the U.S. embassy, with a group of Russian businessmen with whom Litvinenko was apparently hatching business ventures in Britain. “Alexander said both [meetings] were suspicious, and one was probably innocent,” says Goldfarb.

For a time, attention focused on Scaramella, but by the end of last week his level of poisoning and other evidence exculpated him of any suspicion. Instead, the trail of polonium was entangling the group of Russians at the Pine Bar. All seven bartenders on duty that day tested positive for the substance, at levels approaching those found in members of Litvinenko’s family, implying they had inhaled it soon after its release–possibly from the vapor given off by a drink into which it had been slipped. The Russians who met Litvinenko in the bar included Andrei Lugovoy, a former KGB bodyguard who had met Litvinenko in the 1990s when serving as Berezovsky’s security chief at ORT; Dmitry Kovtun, a former Soviet army officer who has lived in Germany for many years and has known Lugovoy since they were 12; and Vyacheslav Sokolenko, a graduate of the same military school as Lugovoy and Kovtun. Sokolenko says he had never met Litvinenko before their brief encounter in London, and that his only interest that day was to attend a soccer match and do some sightseeing. Both Lugovoy and Kovtun have polonium in their bodies, and so far the main focus is on them; both men (and Sokolenko) deny any wrongdoing.

When Lugovoy learned that British authorities were investigating Litvinenko’s poisoning, he volunteered for an interview at the British embassy in Moscow. Polonium was later found in the embassy room, and in lots of other places Lugovoy had visited: on planes he had flown between Moscow and London in October; in five rooms at the Sheraton Park Lane hotel, where he had stayed; and in a fourth-floor room at the Millennium Hotel he is said to have used on the day Litvinenko was poisoned. Finding polonium in a hotel Lugovoy had used on a previous trip to London prompted British authorities to wonder if there might have been an earlier, failed murder attempt. A senior British security official thought the sprawl of radioactive markers throughout London and beyond implied an amateur operation, not up to the FSB’s usual standard. But another official disagreed. “This is such an extraordinary material to be using as a weapon,” he said, “I’m not sure if any standard operating procedures would exist for handling it.” Lugovoy’s explanation for the traces that seem to track his progress around London was straightforward. “Someone is trying to set me up,” he said to the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper. “But I can’t understand who. Or why.”

Nine Scotland Yard detectives were in Moscow last week, trying to talk to Lugovoy. But the interview kept getting postponed for “technical reasons.” Cooperation between the Londoners and the Russian authorities has been frosty. Russian prosecutors insisted that they conduct all the interviews, with the British merely suggesting questions. Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika said no Russian citizens would ever be extradited to Britain in connection with the case, while his office suggested that Russia would open its own criminal investigation in London. Lugovoy and Kovtun were said to be in the hospital with radiation poisoning, but there was no independent confirmation of that. After his interview with the British detectives, Kovtun was reported by the usually reliable Interfax news agency to have lapsed into a coma, but his lawyer quickly denied it. Hamburg police found alpha radiation in the apartment of Kovtun’s ex-wife and in the home of his ex-mother-in-law, but were not able to say whether the source was polonium 210. For their part, British officials were hoping further tests might let them pinpoint the origins of the polonium, since reactors usually leave signatures in their output. The forensic trail so far points decisively to Russia. But Scotland Yard knows that pursuing Litvinenko’s murder back to those who set it in motion, whether official, private or some combination of the two, may never be possible unless someone confesses.

Meanwhile, there is the light–uncomfortably glaring–that the case sheds on modern Russia. Vladimir Ryzhkov, one of the few independent liberals left in the Duma, says, “The point is not whether Putin is responsible for these concrete murders. The point is that he is responsible for having created a system that is ruled by fear and violence.” Ryzhkov claims that the armed forces, Interior Ministry, FSB and those who have retired from them to join private security services “are running this country, own its economy and use violence and murder as habitual management techniques.” A U.S. businessman in Moscow seconds the argument. “While you in the press are obsessed by Politkovskaya and Litvinenko, you’ve missed that half a dozen major oil executives and another half-dozen major bankers have been murdered in the last few months.” Unlike Litvinenko’s sickness, Russia’s may not be fatal. But like his, it starts from inside. From his lead-lined coffin, a shadowy figure has illuminated that much.

Would you like to live in the Soviet Union?

The Russian newspaper “Nash Vremya” (“Our Times”) is running a reader poll on its front page asking the question: “Would you like to live in the USSR?” (Хотели бы вы жить в СССР?). So far nearly 1,000 votes have been cast and the results are:


57% YES (I would like to live in the USSR)

43% NO (I wouldn’t like to live in the USSR)

It’s what you might call a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it shows the utter failure of the Putin regime; on the other, it shows the utter failure of Russia’s system of education.