Another Original LR Translation: Nemtsov on Putin via Essel, Part 3

NOTE: This is the third part of a serialized translation of Boris Nemtsov’s white paper critiquing the Putin years. It includes the third and fourth chapters of the work. Part 1 (introduction and chapter one) appeared on Monday, Part 2 (chapter two) on Wednesday; look for Part 4 on Sunday. You can display all the parts in reverse sequence on a single web page by simply clicking the “nemtsov white paper” link at the bottom of this post.

Putin: the Bottom Line

by Boris Nemtsov

First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, 1997-1998

and

Vladimir Milov

Deputy Minister of Energy, 2002

Translated from the Russian by Dave Essel

Chapter 3

Oh Dear, the Roads

Bad roads are an eternal issue in Russia. Recently, however, with oil money rolling in, the country has at last had an opportunity to modernise its road system. But the opportunity has been missed.

Under Putin’s rule, the road system has degraded at a fantastic rate. During his presidency, the overall length of hard roads has fallen by about 50,000 kilometres, from 750,000 to 700,000 kilometres. This has happened in the main as a result of wear and tear to roads that were officially counted as hard-surfaced – for example graveled – but which are subject to quick wear. More than a third of Russia’s roads are of this kind; if they are not regularly maintained, the only thing left of their hard surface is the designation.

That the length of hard-surfaced roads has fallen should be a matter of shame to a country with pretensions of being a “great power”; even some African countries have better roads than ours. Russia’s backwardness in the matter of roads is quite shocking. The total length of surfaced roads in Russia is 60% of France’s, half that of Japan, and a tenth of USA’s. Only about 35,000 kms of highway meet the standard for high-quality road (width greater than 7 metres and able to accommodate speeds of over 100 kph, i.e roads of no less than 2 lanes with a normal road surface). Finland has more surfaced roads of normal width than the whole of Russia does!

Only 40% of federal highways meet the standard for surface quality, width, and other parameters. Many of the federal highways have a capacity of not more than 40-50,000 vehicles per day, while real traffic amounts to 100,000+ vehicles per day. The drive from Moscow to the country’s main port – Novorossiisk – takes almost 48 hours; it would take only about 15 hours on a normal European motorway.

The road network provides poor links between cities and regions and many highways suddenly come to an end on reaching the frontier of the RF’s regions.

This is a problem which absolutely must be solved: without an effective road network, Russia remains broken up by region and its territorial unity is thus more phrase than fact. The poorly integrated transport system makes it difficult to balance the economies of the regions and makes them more depressed than they need be.

The Russian road network is in urgent need of modernisation yet the system for financing road repairs and building has to all intents and purposes collapsed under Putin. New roads opened have fallen from 6,600 kms in 2000 to a mere 2,400 kms in 2006. The proportion of worn-out roads in the network has risen from 26% in 2000 to 46% in 2005 – this while funding of the road system has actually increased: the 2000 consolidated budget for the road system was 60 billion rubles in 2000; in 2006 it was more that 220 billion [FN1]. It is easy to work out from this that the cost of opening one kilometre of new road has risen tenfold (or fivefold if one corrects for inflation). The scale of embezzlement in the road industry can thus be see to have increased fivefold.

Government money, of which there is much more thanks to oil exports, is being swallowed up by corruption. The much advertised Investfond [FN2], which the government hyped as the future main mover in the development of the country’s infrastructure, has been spent in the strangest of ways: of the $7 billion it released for use in 2007, $4 billion were paid out as contribution to commercial projects undertaken by large financial/industrial groups in Eastern Siberia and the construction of a petrochemical plant in Tatarstan. These are surely commercial projects that have no need of state financing. Furthermore, they can in no way be said to have anything to do with infrastructure developments of national importance. As far as road projects are concerned, practically all the money directed towards such matters –$2.5 billion – will go to projects connected with St. Petersburg: the Western High-Speed Link and the Orlov tunnel as well as a motorway linking Petersburg and Moscow.

St. Petersburg does of course need to modernise its infrastructure. But so too does the rest of the country. Investfond money could have been used to build decent highways linking the main towns of Central Russia – Moscow, Samara, Nizhny Novgorod, Perm, and Voronezh. But the money went to oligarchs and Petersburg regional projects instead.

It is much more efficient to attract private capital to road financing. However, under Putin, private business involved in infrastructure works has been decimated and long-term contracts with investors have been ‘reviewed’. One recalls in this connection the story of Domodedovo airport. This was modernised by Ist Lain, making it Russia’s first up-to-date and spacious airport. Following this modernisation, Putin’s civil servants managed to have the terms of the contract with Ist Lain reviewed in the government’s favour. This case (not to mention that of Yukos and other occasions when the government has revised its obligations to, and taken back assets from, investors) has seriously affected the mood of private investors. They now worry that the government will break its long-term contracts as soon as projects are completed and start to bring in income. One should therefore not hope too seriously for private investment in the road sector. This sector is financed solely from budget monies which are then for the most part embezzled.

We need to revive and develop our road system. The Soviet road network cannot meet the needs of a modern economy. We need a modern transport system that provides passengers and freight with high mobility, integrates Russia as an genuine economic whole, and put puts an end to the conditions leading to regional inequality. To do this, we need to improvem the quality of government development planning for the country’s transport system, put a stop to corruption in the allocation of funds to finance the road system, and be more active in attracting private investment in the transportation infrastructure. This will require of the government iron-disciplined observance of the law and contractual obligations. This cannot be achieved without a genuinely independent judiciary.

Russia will have to go living with bad roads while Putin’s team remains in power.

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[FN 1] Source: Sub-programme Vehicular Roads of the Federal Expenditure Programme for the Modernisation of the Russian Transport System (2002-2010),

[FN 2] TN: Fund set up by Russian government supposedly to absorb and make good use of the oil price windfall.

Chapter 4

Russia is Dying Out

We are told that – as a result of “efforts” by the government – the birth rate is rising in Russia. In fact, Russia is continuing to die out under Putin: for example, about one and half million Russians were born in 2006 but 2,166,000 died. The Russian birth rate in 2006 was 10.4 per 1000 but the death rate was 15.2/1000! The population of Russia is falling nearly twice as fast as in the 1990s. Between 1992 and 2000, the total population fell by 2 million. Between 2000 and 2006 – by 3.5 million.

The key reason for this is a catastrophic mortality rate and Putin has not even tried to do anything about it.

The mortality rate in Russia began to rise in the 1970s and continued to do so up to the mid-1990s. Russia’s ranks 22nd in the world in mortality, ahead of Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, and Burkina Faso, and 157th in life expectancy. Average life expectancy in Russia is a smidgen over 65 years, on a level with the world’s least developed countries (average life expectancy in the developed Western countries is 78+ and 74-76 in Eastern Europe). Most striking is the average life expectancy for males: while Russian women can expect to live to the age of 72, men can expect less than 59 years of life! This is on a par with life expectancy in underdeveloped African countries.

Reasons for this high mortality include the high illness rates to be found in the population, brought about by alcohol abuse, smoking and unhealthy living. Meanwhile, under Putin people are drinking and smoking still more. In 2000, alcohol sales amounted to 8 litres of spirits equivalent per person per year. Now, at the end of his rule, the figure is nearly 10 litres. This is more than in the 1990s. According to Rospotrebnadzor [FN 1], the real figure is closer to 15 litres per year [FN1]. For the record, the World Health Organisation considers alcohol consumption of over 8 litres per person per year to be critical as mortality begins to increase sharply when that amount is exceeded. Over forty thousand people die of alcohol poisoning every year and Rospotrebnazor estimates the number of alcoholics in the country at 2.5 million.

Cigarette sales to the population have risen in both absolute terms (400 billion compared to 355 billion in 2000) and consumption terms (2700 per per person per year as against 2400 in 2000). This is considerably more than in the 1990s when average consumption was 1500 cigarettes per person per year (for a total of over 200 billion). Smoking is Russia’s most common harmful habit: according to Rospotrebnadzor 65% of men and 30% of women smoke; of these 80% and 50% correspondingly began smoking in their teens. Smoking is the cause of 27% of male deaths from cardiovascular diseases, 90% of deaths from lung cancer, 75% of deaths from respiratory diseases, and 25% of deaths from heart disease. About 25% of smokers die prematurely: smoking reduces life span by 10-15 years[FN1].

The most frequent cause of death in Russia – in nearly 60% of cases – is circulatory disease. About 1,3 million people die of circulatory disease every year – 200 thousand more per year than in the 1990s.

What has Putin done to reverse this trend or to engage in a real fight and smoking and alcoholism? Nothing. Russians continue to die from unhealthy lifestyles.

The mad attempts to combat alcoholism by prohibition under Gorbachev or in Tsarist Russia are not a method and all failed. This is because alcohol consumption is, on the one hand, a social thing, and on the other a way of life. Research has shown that there exists a U-shaped dependency between quantity of alcohol consumed and income: both the poor drink more (drowning sorrows) and the wealthy (living the high life). Moderate use of alcohol and a healthy lifestyle in general is the way of the middle class. We therefore believe that, besides spreading the word about the need for a healthy lifestyle, we should also stimulate and support the middle class. This means changing the nature of the country’s economic policies (see Chapter 10 – Deepening Inequality Chapter 11 – The Economic Bubble). Regarding smoking and combating it, there’s no need for originality: we simply need to borrow from the many years of experience of the USA and Western Europe.

Another important reason for our high mortality is the low quality of health services (already mentioned in the chapter on national projects) and the high number of people who die of illnesses. Circulatory problems are not all that Russians suffer from: under Putin mortality has not gone down for infectious diseases and cancer (330,000 deaths per year) and there has been a sharp rise in deaths from disease of the digestive tract (up from 65 thousand to 100 thousand deaths p.a.). The only drop in the death rate has been for respiratory problems – from over 100 thousand in 2000 to just over 80 thousand in 2006. This is a direct result of the move to natural gas for electric heat and power generation since this results in a reduction of harmful emissions (although the authorities, at Gazprom’s urging, are looking at reversing this positive move and force the energy generation industry to go back to ecologically dirty coal).

It is not just of diseases that people die in Russia. We hold one of the leading places worldwide for deaths by external causes. Over 300 thousand people die annually from external causes, a rate of 200 per 100 thousand of population. This is twice as high as in China or Brazil and 4-5 times higher than in Western countries. Russia is far from being a physically safe place in which to reside. We are among the world’s leaders in murders at 20 per 100 thousand population per year. This has moved us since the 1980s into the top 10 of the world for murder, joining a list that includes Columbia, Jamaica, Honduras, South Africa, and Brazil. In developed democratic countries, the murder rate is in the range of 2 to 4 per hundred thousand population per year.

Crime rates in general, which had been going down in the second half of the 1990s, are on the rise again. There are about 30 thousand murders every year, as many as in the the worst years (1994-95) of the decade. The murder rate went down in 1996-98. We have already mentioned the sharp rise in spending on security and law enforcement under Putin. This has risen from $4 billion in 2000 to a planned $39 billion in 2008. This, however, has had the opposite to the intended effect since serious crime numbers have constantly risen under Putin. The rise in crimes against the person has been especially striking: in 2006, according to Rosstat, these rose by 170% from a year 2000 base, with cases of GBH up by 50%, and robbery by 30%. Not a very pretty picture for the ‘happy 2000s’.

Many people die in road accidents: 285 thousand people were injured or killed in traffic accidents in 2006 (a 60% rise against 2000). On average, 33 thousand people were killed each year on the roads in the year 2000-2006. Recently, Putin’s “successor” Dmitri Medvedev said of the scale of the death and trauma rates on the roads that it bore comparison to military attrition. Something could have been done to combat this but the atrocious quality of the roads as a result of the embezzlement of funds for their maintenance, the flourishing corruption in road policing, poor and slow emergency services, and low standards of maintenance of vehicles are all leading only to a worsening of the situation.

The problem is not just one of high mortality but also of low replacement rates. The modest rise in the birth rate in recent years is mostly to do with the post-war demographic curve and it is evident that steps taken by the authorities will not actually influence the birth rate to any great extent: this is a problem of traditions, customs, and the effects of urbanisation. Television drives to encourage people to have more children are just a con: on average, the birth rate under Putin has remained the same as in the 1990s at about 1.4 million live births per year. The authorities boast of “measures” taken in this field although they are of doubtful use. Who is going to be encouraged to have a child because of a “maternal grant” of 250 thousand rubles? Obviously, only the very poor, “lumpenised” members of society. How far does such a sum – about $10 thousand – go? That is the price of 2.5 square metres of housing in Moscow, five in the provinces.

Russia does not need to increase the numbers of its lumpen-proletarians. It needs to stimulate births in the active sections of society, in the middle class, and it needs to do this by somewhat cleverer means – for example, by writing down mortgage debt at government expense when children are born: 15% for a 1st child, 30% for a second. 50% for a third. This would simultaneously help resolve housing problems for those wishing to have children and stimulate the birth rate mainly amongst the well-to-do, since they, unlike lumpen-proletarians, are the ones who are able to get mortgages in the first place.

People are physically undefended in Russia and this lack of protection has only got worse under President Putin. We lack protection from illness, we are seriously at risk during and after road accidents, we are victims of crime. Hand-outs from the authorities stimulate births among the lumpen-proletariat while no one is doing anything to increase the birth rate in the country as a whole. So Russia goes on dying out.

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[FN 1] TN: Federal Service for Oversight of Consumer Protection Rights and Welfare

[FN 2] Source: Rospotrebnazor official report On the Sanitary and Epidemiological Situation of the Russian Federation 2006.

[FN 3] Source: Rospotrebnazor

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

EDITORIAL: Apres Moi, Le Medvedev

EDITORIAL

Apres Moi, Le Medvedev

Things are going badly in the Caucasus. The news from just one day, last Tuesday, should be more than enough to make a hard man humble — though perhaps not a hard psychopath like Vladimir Putin.

Yulia Latynina wrote in the Moscow Times about insurrection in Ingushtia. She tells the story of Maksharip Aushev, who was arrested by the Putin’s secret police after he protested and investigated the arrest and torture of his nephew and son in the village of Narzan. She tell us:

Agents allegedly broke the young men’s ribs, and drove them into the mountains to witness what is called ‘Snickers’ in certain circles. This is where police tie explosives to a corpse and detonate it, blowing the body into little pieces, which are then eaten by wild animals so that the victim’s identity will never be established. This torture had no practical value in gaining evidence; the henchmen were just having fun. But their sadism backfired when people in Nazran took to the streets demanding the release of the pair. As a result of this public outcry, the cousins were released.

The secret police then burned down Aushev’s brother’s home and locked him up. Latynina observes: “People like Aushev are Russia’s last hope. He conducted himself like a brave warrior. He did not adopt the terrorists’ methods but fought his battle within the boundaries of the law. I don’t think Putin likes these kinds of fighters.”

Then the Associated Press told us that “Audit Chamber Chairman Sergei Stepashin on Tuesday warned that costs for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi are spiraling to double the amount planned.” This puts the costs at more than $25 billion or nearly $200 for every man, woman and child in Russia – a full week’s average wages for each. The AP states: “Sochi was one of the Soviet Union’s most popular vacation spots, but development has not kept pace with Russia’s general post-Soviet economic boom. Its lack of facilities and substandard infrastructure was seen as one of the bid’s potential weak points, but strong government support proved persuasive to International Olympic Committee members.” So, naturally, that was the spot Putin chose to host the Olympics.

These two events are horrifying enough on their own. Now, put them together. It’s easy, because Ingushetia is right next door to Sochi and Chechnya. 2 + 2 = 0. Zero hope that the powder keg Putin has created in the Caucuses will not explode right about the time the games commence, that is if they manage to commence at all, sending the true cost of these “games” into the region of the imponderable, the inconceivable.

Think the Kremlin can’t make this unimaginably bad situation even worse? Think again.

Turn back to the Moscow Times, and reporter David Nowak tells us that “an Uzbek man has been stabbed to death in southwestern Moscow, the fourth fatal attack on dark-skinned people in the city in the past five days.” Nowak states: “A total of 67 people were killed and more than 550 injured nationwide in hate crimes last year, according to Sova Center statistics.” And Russia is on pace to double that number of killings this year, with 23 in just the first six weeks of 2008. Nowak quotes Soyun Sadykov, who heads Azerross, a group representing Azeri citizens living in Russia: “We have these poor people coming to Russia in search of a better life — to work, and to provide for their families. Instead of thanking them for providing the labor force in sectors that Muscovites wouldn’t dream of occupying, we are cutting them up, stabbing them to death.”

In other words, white Slavic Orthodox Russia is not only torturing and murdering in the Caucuses, but everywhere across the country, perhaps most especially in the nation’s capital, where Vladimir Putin himself resides, building resentment among all the nation’s dark-skinned peoples, practically inviting them to strike back. Meanwhile, it throws up in their faces a grandiose Olympic scheme, as if to say: “See what we prefer to do with our money, rather than to make a better life for you.”

A famous French king, when asked why he chose to rule in such a profligate and self-destructive manner, answered: “Apres moi, le deluge.” Putin is rumored to have squirreled away billions of ill-gotten dollars and to be in the process of erecting secret vacation homes in various corners of Europe. He’s found a bird-brained sycophant to “succeed” him, which really means “take the blame, like the sap you are.”

Speaking about the Kremlin’s attack on the British Council, that successor (Dmitri Medvedev) said: “Try as I might, I cannot recall a single episode when the British government permitted Russian non- governmental organization to operate in Great Britain. I dare you try and register a Russian non-governmental organization in London.” So it seems that the reason du jour for attacking the BC is to force Britain to accept Russian cultural institutions (never mind that most people in the world lack the slightest interest in Russia culture and would ignore such institutions, especially if they were run by clueless Russians, and never mind that the Kremlin never raised a single word of protest about such an issue before launching the attack). But yesterday, the reason was that the BC was violating Russian law. The day before that, it was a nest of spies. And the day before that, it was a sacrificial symbol of Russian outrage over Britain daring to investigate the murder of Alexander Litvinenko.

Mr. Medvedev simply can’t make up his mind, such as there is. Quite literally, he wants to have his cake and eat it too, just like his Soviet predecessors. And while he’s consumed with winning the great battle against the British Council, he’s not even aware of the apocalypse his government is creating in the Caucuses.

Great Russian patriot that Mr. Medvedev is, he loves Russia just the way Stalin did.

He loves it to death.

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

Stephens Leads the Way for the U.S. in the New Cold War

It seems that columnist Bret Stephens of the Wall Street Journal is taking a leadership role in issuing the clarion call to American journalists regarding the dangers of neo-Soviet Russia. Last time it was Russia’s “torture colonies” and now a column called “Putin’s Political Prisoners.”

In its Soviet heyday, Moscow’s dreaded Lefortovo prison served as a way station to the Gulag for political prisoners such as Yevgenia Ginzburg, Vladimir Bukovsky and Natan Sharansky. Under Vladimir Putin, it performs exactly the same function.

In December, Russian scientist Igor Reshetin was sentenced to 11½ years in a “strict regime” prison colony on charges of having sold dual-use technologies to China for its space programs. In 1996, Mr. Reshetin’s company, TsNIIMASh-Export, was contracted to supply China with a series of technical reports, mostly dealing with the re-entry of spaceships into earth’s atmosphere. The deal, worth about $30 million, represented about half of Russia’s space-related exports to China at the time; business was expected to grow to about $100 million a year. In 2002, Mr. Reshetin submitted his reports to two expert government commissions, which certified that they contained no classified information.

By the next year, however, TsNIIMASh-Export was under investigation by Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), the KGB’s successor. In 2005, Mr. Reshetin, who suffers from heart disease, was remanded to Lefortovo, where he and a colleague spent two years before sentencing. During his trial, 62 publicly available monographs were produced to demonstrate that no secret information had been disclosed. “I have seen all the reports sent to China,” Alexander Kraiko, a head of department at a Russian technical institute, told the independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta. “The information they contain was published in widely accessed print [publications] in Russian and in the U.S.A.”

Given current conditions in Russia’s penal colonies, which I described in this column last week, Mr. Reshetin’s conviction amounts to a death sentence. Convicted with him are business associates Sergei Vizir (11 years), Mikhail Ivanov (five years), and Alexander Rozhkin (five years). Another business associate, Sergei Tverdokhlebov, spent two months in Lefortovo, signed a “voluntary confession,” and died of a heart attack shortly thereafter.

Why were the authorities so hell-bent on punishing Mr. Reshetin? One theory is that Mr. Rashetin simply fell afoul a local FSB agent eager to justify his pay and win advancement by taking down a “spy.” An almost identical scenario played out against another scientist, Valentin Danilov, who in 2004 was sentenced to 14 years in a penal colony on bogus charges of passing “secret” information to the Chinese — information that had been declassified years earlier.

Even more strained was the case against Igor Sutyagin, a researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ prestigious Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, who was accused of illicitly disclosing details about Russia’s nuclear posture. His “spying,” too, amounted to a paper he had written based on open-source information (including speeches by Russia’s own defense minister). Yet that didn’t prevent a court from handing down a 15-year sentence. Similar convictions for “spying” have been handed down to at least four others: Anatoly Babkin; Oskar Kaibyshev; Vladimir Shchurov and Grigory Pasko.

The second theory about Mr. Reshetin’s case is that he fell victim to the Kremlin’s habit of criminalizing its (business) competitors: in this case the state-owned arms-maker Rosvoorushenie, which Novaya Gazeta speculates may have wanted a piece of a lucrative market that Mr. Reshetin was inconveniently making his own.

If so, that makes the case similar to that of former energy giant Yukos, whose assets were looted by Gazprom and other Kremlin-connected entities in 2004. While former CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s indefinite imprisonment in a Siberian penal colony has attracted widespread media notice, less attention is paid to the 41 other Yukos defendants. One of them, lawyer Svetlana Bakhmina, was arrested in 2004 on charges of tax evasion and forbidden from speaking to her two young children for nearly six months. In 2006, her request to have her sentence suspended until her youngest child turns 14 was denied; instead, she was immediately transferred to a penal colony several hundred miles south of Moscow, where she is serving a 6½ year sentence.

Then there is the case of Vasily Aleksanyan, another Yukos lawyer, who was diagnosed with HIV shortly after his 2006 arrest. Russian authorities refused to treat him throughout most of his nearly 700-day pretrial detention; he is now being held in a medical facility, handcuffed to his bed. Drew Holiner, Mr. Aleksanyan’s lawyer, says the authorities’ motive is to force his client “to give false testimony against former colleagues in return for some form of deal.” Their gambit may not succeed, since Mr. Aleksanyan is said to be suffering from an AIDS-related lymphoma and may soon die.

Though smaller in scope and ferocity, the Yukos case shares some of the notorious characteristics of a Soviet purge, particularly the effort to manufacture a “conspiracy” by bringing charges against a wide array of individuals.

The Soviet touch is also in evidence in the case of Larisa Ivanovna Arap. A member of Garry Kasparov’s United Civic Front, Ms. Arap had campaigned on behalf of abused children in Russia’s psychiatric hospitals. Last July, she herself was involuntarily detained at a psychiatric hospital on account of a critical article she had written, “shot up with psychotropic drugs,” according to her husband, and held for over a month. Though she was released after public protest, a local district court issued the opinion that her hospitalization had been perfectly legal. As in the Soviet period, mere criticism of the performance of a state institution may now suffice as evidence of mental derangement.

In her acclaimed history of the Gulag, Anne Applebaum observes that under Stalin one could easily get arrested “for nothing,” whereas under his successors arrests usually happened “for something — if not for a genuine criminal act, then for . . . literary, religious, or political opposition to the Soviet system.” Of the many things that make present trends in Russia so worrying, surely one is that the line between “something” and “nothing” is becoming increasingly blurred.

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

Russians: Can they do ANYTHING on Their Own?

In a nice bit of reporting that’s only about six months late, the New York Times reveals that Russia relied on American ingenuity in order to make its visit to the sea floor below the polar ice cap, then — as is its wont — tried to claim the credit for itself, stabbing the American in the back.

Last August, a team of Russian scientists and legislators trekked to the North Pole and plunged through the ice pack into the abyss, descending more than two miles through inky darkness to the bottom of the ocean. There, explorers planted Russia’s flag and, upon surfacing, declared that the feat had strengthened Moscow’s claims to nearly half the Arctic seabed. The ensuing global headlines fueled debate over polar territorial claims.

But that wasn’t the whole story. The heroes of the moment did not mention that the dive had American origins. Alfred S. McLaren, 75, a retired Navy submariner, would like to set the record straight and, as he puts it, “acquaint the Kremlin with the realities” of recent history and international law. A major figure of Arctic science and exploration who spent nearly a year in operations under the ice, Dr. McLaren says he developed the polar dive plan and repeatedly shared his labors with the Russians and their partners — a claim he supports with numerous e-mail messages and documents.

The Russians, for their part, acknowledge that Dr. McLaren played a central role in the dive’s origins. But they say he took no part in substantive planning and logistics. Dr. McLaren’s plan drew on federal polar data and recommended specific sensors and methods to ensure a safe return. “I wrote the procedures for the dive,” he said in an interview. The Russians, he added, “went for the territorial claim.” Don Walsh, a pioneer of deep ocean diving who worked on the Arctic plan with the Russians, backed the account. The divers, Dr. Walsh wrote in an e-mail message, “did not develop the original idea, the operational plan and they did not pay for it” because wealthy tourists picked up the bill. “I am sure,” he added, “that this example of how to steal your way to fame will become a legend in the history of exploration.”

The Russians say they took little or nothing. “Talk is cheap,” Anatoly M. Sagalevitch, the expedition’s chief scientist, said in an interview. “But real operation, this is different.” President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has made the most of the divers’ feat, personally greeting them upon their return and announcing last month that Dr. Sagalevitch and two other team members would be named Heroes of Russian Federation, the nation’s highest honorary title.

Dr. McLaren first got to know the Russians through the lens of a periscope. As a submariner, he conducted more than 20 secret missions during the cold war, mainly in nuclear attack submarines. Three of his voyages ventured beneath the Northern ice pack, gauging its thickness, probing the dark waters below and bouncing sound waves off the bottom to map the craggy seabed. An important goal was to find safe submarine routes near the Soviet Union in case the cold war turned hot. Over all, he spent nearly a year under the polar ice. In 1972, he won the Distinguished Service Medal, the military’s highest peacetime award. He left the Navy in 1981 and earned a Ph.D. in polar studies from the University of Colorado in 1986. After the cold war, Dr. McLaren began working with his former enemies, lecturing aboard Russian icebreakers that carried tourists to the North Pole. He did so repeatedly while president of the Explorers Club, a post he held from 1996 to 2000. The idea for a polar dive arose in early 1997 when a television journalist, Jack McDonald, had dinner with Dr. McLaren and asked if anyone had ever gone to the bottom. The two decided to explore the possibility. “We spent a lot time on it,” recalled Mr. McDonald, who planned to make a documentary. The team envisioned going down in a submersible — a small craft with a super-strong personnel sphere that typically carries a pilot and two observers. Tiny portholes designed to withstand crushing pressures let the occupants peer out. A dive is typically an all-day affair, requiring hours to go down to the bottom and back up.

Later in 1997, Dr. McLaren attracted the interest of Mike McDowell, an adventure tour operator who organized the polar voyages. The next year, Dr. Sagalevitch, who runs Moscow’s twin Mir submersibles, came aboard. In 1999, the three men began diving in the Mirs to visit the deteriorating remains of the Titanic and the Bismarck. The dives were seen as practice runs for the polar plunge. All told, Dr. McLaren dived in the cramped submersibles five times. In 2001, Dr. McLaren wrote a polar dive plan for Dr. Sagalevitch in Moscow. Drawing on decades of federal polar data, it gave information like mean ice thickness (about 8 feet), water depth (about 2.6 miles) and salinity near the bottom (34 to 36 parts per thousand). “Jagged underwater projections and spurs,” the plan warned, could endanger a submersible.

The document, seven pages long, paid special attention to making sure the returning Mirs could find the hole through which they had entered the Arctic Ocean and not become trapped beneath the thick surface ice. It called for special upward-looking sensors. “Thank you for your recommendations,” Dr. Sagalevitch wrote in an e-mail message after receiving the plan. For several years the Explorers Club, based in New York City, marketed North Pole dives to adventure tourists. A cabin would be $16,000, a suite $21,000. The actual dive beneath the pole: $50,000 extra. Despite a flurry of interest, the spectacle did not materialize.

By 2005, the plan collapsed. In a bitter e-mail exchange, Dr. McLaren accused Mr. McDowell, the tour operator, of abruptly removing him from the polar dive roster and evading commitments that would have aided fund-raising. “You did not bother to answer any of my messages,” he wrote. Mr. McDowell in turn accused Dr. McLaren of failing to recruit dive sponsors and defended his removal as necessary because of rising costs and the need to attract more paying tourists. “I do all the work and take all the financial risk,” he added. Dr. Walsh, who worked with both men, laid the rupture to personality conflicts. “We were top-heavy in chiefs and needed more braves,” he said.

Another factor was the Kremlin, which was seeking new displays of geopolitical muscle. It seized control of the project. On Aug. 2, 2007, Dr. Sagalevitch and Mr. McDowell descended to the bottom, taking along two Moscow legislators. The polar dive was part publicity stunt and part symbolic move to enhance the Kremlin’s disputed claim to nearly half the Arctic seabed. It made global headlines, with much comment on Moscow’s new swagger. Time magazine’s cover article asked, “Who Owns the Arctic?” After the dive, many nations sharpened their claims. Denmark mapped icy regions. The United States mounted a polar expedition. And Canada unveiled plans for an Arctic military base. “The first principle of Arctic sovereignty,” Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada said in a much quoted statement, “is use it or lose it.”

Dr. McLaren grew livid as the dive’s impact spread. He now ridicules the Russian territorial claims as not only empty but duplicitous because of his unacknowledged contribution. He said, however, that he harbored no hard feelings against the Mir team. For his part, Mr. McDowell vigorously denied any fault and said any aid from Dr. McLaren was immaterial to the Russian feat. “What he’s saying is complete rubbish,” Mr. McDowell said from Australia, where he lives. “He’s all bent out of shape because he wanted to be first to the pole. Well, it just didn’t work out that way.” Dr. Sagalevitch confirmed that the original idea for the polar dive arose with the Westerners but said that he and his team had developed it exclusive of Dr. McLaren’s advice since 1998. “Fred was so far from any dive plan,” he said. “He doesn’t understand the technical side of the operation. He doesn’t understand the submersible.”

If there are fireworks, they may erupt March 15, when the Explorers Club will hold its annual dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria. All the dive planners and doers are to be there, with Dr. Sagalevitch getting an award for excellence in ocean science. It will be a bittersweet moment for Dr. McLaren, who helped Dr. Sagalevitch and Mr. McDowell become members when he was club president. At the dinner, the Russian dive team is to complete a triumph: returning a club flag that it carried to the polar seabed. Dr. McLaren said he planned to go to the dinner but might excuse himself from the room when the flag was returned.

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

Calling Putin’s Bluff in Abkhazia

Vladimir Socor in a Eurasia Daily Monitor e-mail:

On February 17 Kosova declared officially its independence from Serbia. On February 18 the United States and several major European countries recognized Kosova as an independent state. More than 20 (out of 27) European Union member countries are prepared to extend recognition.

Russia anticipated this outcome some weeks, if not months, ahead of its occurrence. By the end of 2007 Moscow had started backtracking on its retaliatory threats to recognize the “independence” of post-Soviet secessionist territories. It had to backtrack, lest its warnings be exposed as the bluff they were.

Moscow’s threat to use Kosova’s secession as a “precedent” or “model” for resolving post-Soviet conflicts was never a credible threat, unless the Kremlin was bent on incurring severe damage and no gain to its policies on a wide range of interests: Relations with the West, with CIS countries (far beyond those immediately affected by secessions) and with international organizations, as well as Russia’s own security situation in the North Caucasus would have been severely jeopardized.

Those anxious about Russian exploitation of a Kosova “precedent” overlooked the fact that Moscow remains more than content to exploit the existing, “frozen” situation in the unresolved conflicts. This it can continue doing effectively and at low cost to itself, as long as the West does not prioritize the resolution of the post-Soviet conflicts.

Indications are now multiplying that Moscow has blinked on its most specific threat: that to “recognize the independence” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia had singled out these two Georgian territories as prime candidates for “recognition.” This line of attack contradicted Moscow’s own claim that resolution of all secessionist conflicts in Europe and the world must follow a “common model” or “single standard.” In practice, its blatant selectivity about Abkhazia and South Ossetia reflected Moscow’s special enmity toward Georgia, the immediate territorial proximity (whereas Karabakh and Transnistria are not contiguous to Russia), and the Russian policy of allowing Armenia de facto a free hand in Karabakh, while Moscow claims de facto a free hand in the two Georgian territories.

Largely for those reasons, Moscow had conferred Russian citizenship en masse in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, so as to claim a right of intrusive protection there, including military presence. At the same time it left the issues of citizenship and security protection in Karabakh up to Armenia. And it has been negotiating with Moldova since 2006 regarding a settlement that would leave Transnistria within Moldova, in return for a certain measure of Russian political and military oversight over a Moldovan state “reunified” in that way.

These highly differentiated, expediency-based approaches nullified from the outset Russia’s argument about a “Kosovo precedent” with general applicability. Had it applied such a “precedent” unilaterally in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Kremlin would have been exposed as singularizing Georgia and targeting it for a wanton act of aggression. With Russian troops and Russian-appointed local leaders already deployed in those two enclaves, any Russian “recognition” would have been seen worldwide as open military occupation and annexation. Moscow did not need to risk such a scenario, since the existing unresolved situation suits Russian purposes too well.

As Kosova’s declaration of independence and Western recognition drew near, Moscow must have concluded that its threats against Georgia were unusable threats. Consequently, Moscow seems to be seeking a face-saving exit from a political impasse into which it has driven itself. Suddenly the Kremlin is downplaying its all-to-recent, dire warnings.

In his annual news conference (the final one of his presidency) on February 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin denounced Western intentions to recognize Kosova as “unlawful,” and the argument about Kosova’s uniqueness as (Western) “lies.” But Putin went on to declare that Russia would not let itself be provoked into similar “unlawful” actions: “What will we do if they start recognizing Kosovo’s independence unilaterally? We are not going to play the fool. If someone takes a bad decision it does not mean that we should act in the same way. I repeat, we will not play the fool by doing the same thing, acting as if this [Russian recognition of post-Soviet secessions] is a necessary consequence” (Interfax, February 14).

On February 15, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov received the Abkhaz and South Ossetian de facto leaders, Sergei Bagapsh and Eduard Kokoiti, in Moscow. The Russian communiqués referred to them as “presidents,” by the usage adopted several years ago. Lavrov, as well as accompanying statements by the Russian MFA, merely said that Russia, in light of Kosova, would “reconsider” (peresmotrit) its policy regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Further on the vague tone, Russia would “undoubtedly take [Kosova] into account in Russia’s relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia” (Interfax, February 15, 16). Thus Putin’s, Lavrov’s, and other Russian MFA statements were worded so as to stop short of repeating previous warnings about recognizing those two secessions.

On February 18, Russia’s Duma and Federation Council released a joint statement condemning the Western recognition of Kosova, but stopping short of warnings about “recognition” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian parliament had in recent years adopted a series of resolutions that contained such warnings. Sukhumi and Tskhinvali hoped for more of the same, more than ever now; but they were disappointed. Moreover, the joint statement was adopted quietly by the two chambers’ Councils (leaderships), not the plenums, and without any of the customary fanfare.

At the moment, Moscow wants the Kosova issue returned to the UN Security Council, ostensibly in order to reverse Kosova’s independence and halt its recognition (Interfax, February 15, 16). Such resort to the UNSC also signifies the beginning of a face-saving retreat from the previous show of intransigence. Referring this issue to the UNSC at this point is tantamount to burying it in that veto-bound forum, without openly acknowledging defeat. With this move, Moscow plays to Greater Serbian nationalism, but has no hope to change the situation on the ground.

The CIS summit, scheduled for February 21 in Moscow, should further restrain Russian rhetoric about Abkhazia and South Ossetia. No CIS country ever associated itself with Russian threats to recognize the secession of those two Georgian territories. Should Putin revert to such threats, he might at best find himself in the company of Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka (though even this does not seem very likely). Even Armenia would not risk its relations with Georgia by endorsing such Russian threats against Armenia’s neighbor country and lifeline to the world. Azerbaijan and Moldova, which face secessions and military occupations of their territories, would condemn any Russian “recognition” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It would also be condemned by Ukraine and Kazakhstan, both of which reckon with possible Russian exploitation of ethnic issues on their territories.

Moscow’s two-year old bluff has been called in Kosova. While Russian policy remains unpredictable (particularly during the presidential transition in the Kremlin), any Russian leverage through the threat of recognizing the post-Soviet secessions seems to have run out.

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

Russia’s Blogophere, Tilting at Windmills

The Associated Press reports:

In the final weeks of Russia’s presidential election, the three major TV networks and much of the media are filled with uncritical and often fawning coverage of the man President Vladimir Putin has blessed as his successor. Some of Russia’s bloggers, however, have been sharply critical of First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and the presidential contest he seems certain of winning.

One blogger named “lekka_reka” said an old lady asked him on the street: “Have they named Medvedev president yet or will we be able to actually go out and cast our votes?”

A blogger named “YUGva” was worried about Medvedev’s liberal image. “This Medvedev is a strange personality, a dark horse,” YUGva wroe. “Like my relatives, I think he’s just going to skip out on Russia, sell it to America and the West — and everyone is openly lauding his arrival?”

The postings by Russia’s Web commentators, professionals and amateurs alike, are sometimes barbed, frequently satirical and always unfiltered — a marked contrast to most of Russia’s major media, where many reporters, editors and producers are wary of incurring the Kremlin’s wrath. During Putin’s eight years in office, the Kremlin has extended and strengthened its control over the news media, mainly through the purchase of national broadcasters and major newspapers by state-controlled corporations or loyal billionaires. Anyone interested in probing reporting or frank commentary has few places to turn. Increasingly, relatively savvy Russians are turning to the Internet. “The propaganda on TV doesn’t work for anyone anymore,” said Oleg Panfilov, a journalist advocate who is also a regular blogger.

The Internet’s uncontrolled nature has long worried the Kremlin. Parliament’s upper house is considering legislation that would make Web sites with more than 1,000 readers daily subject to the same regulations as print media. And some Web advocates fear a newly updated law on publishing allegedly extremist literature could be used to prosecute bloggers critical of authorities. There are also allegations the Kremlin has organized teams of bloggers to attack or rebut critics of the government through Web postings. But Stanislav Belkovsky, an analyst with the Moscow think-tank National Strategy Institute, said these pro-Kremlin bloggers have little influence. “No one’s interested in people who write the same thing as you can read in the pro-Kremlin newspapers,” he said.

Communicating across Russia — which spans 11 time zones — has always been difficult, and Russian leaders have long relied on television to reach the nation’s widely scattered communities. Russian television has provided intensive — and to many boring — coverage of Medvedev’s speeches and official appearances at schools, churches, factories and other institutions for more than a year, as it has done for Putin. But on the Web, news consumers can find spicier fare. A recent search for Medvedev or Putin on a Russia’s dominant blogging and social networking site, LiveJournal, pulled up a hubbub of humorous postings, satire, opinion, links to news stories, insults and counter-insults.

One blogger from Vladivostok sought to organize a boycott of March election under the banner: “I’m not participating in this farce.” Another from St. Petersburg, who took the name “dark cloud_os,” wrote that a monarchy would suit Russia better than democracy.

Yet another, named “niagara1977,” said that reading an obituary would have been more interesting than listening to a recent Putin speech.

Putin is enormously popular, and even some journalists are angered when he is sharply questioned. Yet even before Putin had finished the last news conference of his term on Feb. 14, the Russian blogosphere was scoffing at some of his remarks. “President Putin has told us that we are satisfied with his work,” wrote one blogger by the name of “vla3986.” “If you include ripping off the country until you can’t any more as his work, then that’s been done many times over.”

Another blogger, who called himself “dmitrydmitryev,” wrote: “I wanted to watch Putin’s news conference but I happily slept throught it. For the best, probably!”

Still, Russian political blogs don’t appear to be as popular or influential as they are in the United States. Partly that’s because of the Kremlin’s near monopoly on political power in Russia. The Web’s influence is also restricted because access is limited. The phone system is antiquated, meaning connections are slow. Internet service is difficult to find in poorer provinces and personal computers are still a luxury.

Candidates in the U.S. are battling in a cliffhanger presidential contest. With the Kremlin’s political weight behind him, Medvedev is all but certain of winning the March 2 vote.

“Everyone understands that this is a fiction,” said Rustem Adagamov, who writes a wide-ranging, popular blog under the moniker “other.” “Everyone knows the outcome ahead of time.”

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

Russia’s Blogophere, Tilting at Windmills

The Associated Press reports:

In the final weeks of Russia’s presidential election, the three major TV networks and much of the media are filled with uncritical and often fawning coverage of the man President Vladimir Putin has blessed as his successor. Some of Russia’s bloggers, however, have been sharply critical of First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and the presidential contest he seems certain of winning.

One blogger named “lekka_reka” said an old lady asked him on the street: “Have they named Medvedev president yet or will we be able to actually go out and cast our votes?”

A blogger named “YUGva” was worried about Medvedev’s liberal image. “This Medvedev is a strange personality, a dark horse,” YUGva wroe. “Like my relatives, I think he’s just going to skip out on Russia, sell it to America and the West — and everyone is openly lauding his arrival?”

The postings by Russia’s Web commentators, professionals and amateurs alike, are sometimes barbed, frequently satirical and always unfiltered — a marked contrast to most of Russia’s major media, where many reporters, editors and producers are wary of incurring the Kremlin’s wrath. During Putin’s eight years in office, the Kremlin has extended and strengthened its control over the news media, mainly through the purchase of national broadcasters and major newspapers by state-controlled corporations or loyal billionaires. Anyone interested in probing reporting or frank commentary has few places to turn. Increasingly, relatively savvy Russians are turning to the Internet. “The propaganda on TV doesn’t work for anyone anymore,” said Oleg Panfilov, a journalist advocate who is also a regular blogger.

The Internet’s uncontrolled nature has long worried the Kremlin. Parliament’s upper house is considering legislation that would make Web sites with more than 1,000 readers daily subject to the same regulations as print media. And some Web advocates fear a newly updated law on publishing allegedly extremist literature could be used to prosecute bloggers critical of authorities. There are also allegations the Kremlin has organized teams of bloggers to attack or rebut critics of the government through Web postings. But Stanislav Belkovsky, an analyst with the Moscow think-tank National Strategy Institute, said these pro-Kremlin bloggers have little influence. “No one’s interested in people who write the same thing as you can read in the pro-Kremlin newspapers,” he said.

Communicating across Russia — which spans 11 time zones — has always been difficult, and Russian leaders have long relied on television to reach the nation’s widely scattered communities. Russian television has provided intensive — and to many boring — coverage of Medvedev’s speeches and official appearances at schools, churches, factories and other institutions for more than a year, as it has done for Putin. But on the Web, news consumers can find spicier fare. A recent search for Medvedev or Putin on a Russia’s dominant blogging and social networking site, LiveJournal, pulled up a hubbub of humorous postings, satire, opinion, links to news stories, insults and counter-insults.

One blogger from Vladivostok sought to organize a boycott of March election under the banner: “I’m not participating in this farce.” Another from St. Petersburg, who took the name “dark cloud_os,” wrote that a monarchy would suit Russia better than democracy.

Yet another, named “niagara1977,” said that reading an obituary would have been more interesting than listening to a recent Putin speech.

Putin is enormously popular, and even some journalists are angered when he is sharply questioned. Yet even before Putin had finished the last news conference of his term on Feb. 14, the Russian blogosphere was scoffing at some of his remarks. “President Putin has told us that we are satisfied with his work,” wrote one blogger by the name of “vla3986.” “If you include ripping off the country until you can’t any more as his work, then that’s been done many times over.”

Another blogger, who called himself “dmitrydmitryev,” wrote: “I wanted to watch Putin’s news conference but I happily slept throught it. For the best, probably!”

Still, Russian political blogs don’t appear to be as popular or influential as they are in the United States. Partly that’s because of the Kremlin’s near monopoly on political power in Russia. The Web’s influence is also restricted because access is limited. The phone system is antiquated, meaning connections are slow. Internet service is difficult to find in poorer provinces and personal computers are still a luxury.

Candidates in the U.S. are battling in a cliffhanger presidential contest. With the Kremlin’s political weight behind him, Medvedev is all but certain of winning the March 2 vote.

“Everyone understands that this is a fiction,” said Rustem Adagamov, who writes a wide-ranging, popular blog under the moniker “other.” “Everyone knows the outcome ahead of time.”

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

Russia’s Blogophere, Tilting at Windmills

The Associated Press reports:

In the final weeks of Russia’s presidential election, the three major TV networks and much of the media are filled with uncritical and often fawning coverage of the man President Vladimir Putin has blessed as his successor. Some of Russia’s bloggers, however, have been sharply critical of First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and the presidential contest he seems certain of winning.

One blogger named “lekka_reka” said an old lady asked him on the street: “Have they named Medvedev president yet or will we be able to actually go out and cast our votes?”

A blogger named “YUGva” was worried about Medvedev’s liberal image. “This Medvedev is a strange personality, a dark horse,” YUGva wroe. “Like my relatives, I think he’s just going to skip out on Russia, sell it to America and the West — and everyone is openly lauding his arrival?”

The postings by Russia’s Web commentators, professionals and amateurs alike, are sometimes barbed, frequently satirical and always unfiltered — a marked contrast to most of Russia’s major media, where many reporters, editors and producers are wary of incurring the Kremlin’s wrath. During Putin’s eight years in office, the Kremlin has extended and strengthened its control over the news media, mainly through the purchase of national broadcasters and major newspapers by state-controlled corporations or loyal billionaires. Anyone interested in probing reporting or frank commentary has few places to turn. Increasingly, relatively savvy Russians are turning to the Internet. “The propaganda on TV doesn’t work for anyone anymore,” said Oleg Panfilov, a journalist advocate who is also a regular blogger.

The Internet’s uncontrolled nature has long worried the Kremlin. Parliament’s upper house is considering legislation that would make Web sites with more than 1,000 readers daily subject to the same regulations as print media. And some Web advocates fear a newly updated law on publishing allegedly extremist literature could be used to prosecute bloggers critical of authorities. There are also allegations the Kremlin has organized teams of bloggers to attack or rebut critics of the government through Web postings. But Stanislav Belkovsky, an analyst with the Moscow think-tank National Strategy Institute, said these pro-Kremlin bloggers have little influence. “No one’s interested in people who write the same thing as you can read in the pro-Kremlin newspapers,” he said.

Communicating across Russia — which spans 11 time zones — has always been difficult, and Russian leaders have long relied on television to reach the nation’s widely scattered communities. Russian television has provided intensive — and to many boring — coverage of Medvedev’s speeches and official appearances at schools, churches, factories and other institutions for more than a year, as it has done for Putin. But on the Web, news consumers can find spicier fare. A recent search for Medvedev or Putin on a Russia’s dominant blogging and social networking site, LiveJournal, pulled up a hubbub of humorous postings, satire, opinion, links to news stories, insults and counter-insults.

One blogger from Vladivostok sought to organize a boycott of March election under the banner: “I’m not participating in this farce.” Another from St. Petersburg, who took the name “dark cloud_os,” wrote that a monarchy would suit Russia better than democracy.

Yet another, named “niagara1977,” said that reading an obituary would have been more interesting than listening to a recent Putin speech.

Putin is enormously popular, and even some journalists are angered when he is sharply questioned. Yet even before Putin had finished the last news conference of his term on Feb. 14, the Russian blogosphere was scoffing at some of his remarks. “President Putin has told us that we are satisfied with his work,” wrote one blogger by the name of “vla3986.” “If you include ripping off the country until you can’t any more as his work, then that’s been done many times over.”

Another blogger, who called himself “dmitrydmitryev,” wrote: “I wanted to watch Putin’s news conference but I happily slept throught it. For the best, probably!”

Still, Russian political blogs don’t appear to be as popular or influential as they are in the United States. Partly that’s because of the Kremlin’s near monopoly on political power in Russia. The Web’s influence is also restricted because access is limited. The phone system is antiquated, meaning connections are slow. Internet service is difficult to find in poorer provinces and personal computers are still a luxury.

Candidates in the U.S. are battling in a cliffhanger presidential contest. With the Kremlin’s political weight behind him, Medvedev is all but certain of winning the March 2 vote.

“Everyone understands that this is a fiction,” said Rustem Adagamov, who writes a wide-ranging, popular blog under the moniker “other.” “Everyone knows the outcome ahead of time.”

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

Russia’s Blogophere, Tilting at Windmills

The Associated Press reports:

In the final weeks of Russia’s presidential election, the three major TV networks and much of the media are filled with uncritical and often fawning coverage of the man President Vladimir Putin has blessed as his successor. Some of Russia’s bloggers, however, have been sharply critical of First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and the presidential contest he seems certain of winning.

One blogger named “lekka_reka” said an old lady asked him on the street: “Have they named Medvedev president yet or will we be able to actually go out and cast our votes?”

A blogger named “YUGva” was worried about Medvedev’s liberal image. “This Medvedev is a strange personality, a dark horse,” YUGva wroe. “Like my relatives, I think he’s just going to skip out on Russia, sell it to America and the West — and everyone is openly lauding his arrival?”

The postings by Russia’s Web commentators, professionals and amateurs alike, are sometimes barbed, frequently satirical and always unfiltered — a marked contrast to most of Russia’s major media, where many reporters, editors and producers are wary of incurring the Kremlin’s wrath. During Putin’s eight years in office, the Kremlin has extended and strengthened its control over the news media, mainly through the purchase of national broadcasters and major newspapers by state-controlled corporations or loyal billionaires. Anyone interested in probing reporting or frank commentary has few places to turn. Increasingly, relatively savvy Russians are turning to the Internet. “The propaganda on TV doesn’t work for anyone anymore,” said Oleg Panfilov, a journalist advocate who is also a regular blogger.

The Internet’s uncontrolled nature has long worried the Kremlin. Parliament’s upper house is considering legislation that would make Web sites with more than 1,000 readers daily subject to the same regulations as print media. And some Web advocates fear a newly updated law on publishing allegedly extremist literature could be used to prosecute bloggers critical of authorities. There are also allegations the Kremlin has organized teams of bloggers to attack or rebut critics of the government through Web postings. But Stanislav Belkovsky, an analyst with the Moscow think-tank National Strategy Institute, said these pro-Kremlin bloggers have little influence. “No one’s interested in people who write the same thing as you can read in the pro-Kremlin newspapers,” he said.

Communicating across Russia — which spans 11 time zones — has always been difficult, and Russian leaders have long relied on television to reach the nation’s widely scattered communities. Russian television has provided intensive — and to many boring — coverage of Medvedev’s speeches and official appearances at schools, churches, factories and other institutions for more than a year, as it has done for Putin. But on the Web, news consumers can find spicier fare. A recent search for Medvedev or Putin on a Russia’s dominant blogging and social networking site, LiveJournal, pulled up a hubbub of humorous postings, satire, opinion, links to news stories, insults and counter-insults.

One blogger from Vladivostok sought to organize a boycott of March election under the banner: “I’m not participating in this farce.” Another from St. Petersburg, who took the name “dark cloud_os,” wrote that a monarchy would suit Russia better than democracy.

Yet another, named “niagara1977,” said that reading an obituary would have been more interesting than listening to a recent Putin speech.

Putin is enormously popular, and even some journalists are angered when he is sharply questioned. Yet even before Putin had finished the last news conference of his term on Feb. 14, the Russian blogosphere was scoffing at some of his remarks. “President Putin has told us that we are satisfied with his work,” wrote one blogger by the name of “vla3986.” “If you include ripping off the country until you can’t any more as his work, then that’s been done many times over.”

Another blogger, who called himself “dmitrydmitryev,” wrote: “I wanted to watch Putin’s news conference but I happily slept throught it. For the best, probably!”

Still, Russian political blogs don’t appear to be as popular or influential as they are in the United States. Partly that’s because of the Kremlin’s near monopoly on political power in Russia. The Web’s influence is also restricted because access is limited. The phone system is antiquated, meaning connections are slow. Internet service is difficult to find in poorer provinces and personal computers are still a luxury.

Candidates in the U.S. are battling in a cliffhanger presidential contest. With the Kremlin’s political weight behind him, Medvedev is all but certain of winning the March 2 vote.

“Everyone understands that this is a fiction,” said Rustem Adagamov, who writes a wide-ranging, popular blog under the moniker “other.” “Everyone knows the outcome ahead of time.”

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

Russia’s Blogophere, Tilting at Windmills

The Associated Press reports:

In the final weeks of Russia’s presidential election, the three major TV networks and much of the media are filled with uncritical and often fawning coverage of the man President Vladimir Putin has blessed as his successor. Some of Russia’s bloggers, however, have been sharply critical of First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and the presidential contest he seems certain of winning.

One blogger named “lekka_reka” said an old lady asked him on the street: “Have they named Medvedev president yet or will we be able to actually go out and cast our votes?”

A blogger named “YUGva” was worried about Medvedev’s liberal image. “This Medvedev is a strange personality, a dark horse,” YUGva wroe. “Like my relatives, I think he’s just going to skip out on Russia, sell it to America and the West — and everyone is openly lauding his arrival?”

The postings by Russia’s Web commentators, professionals and amateurs alike, are sometimes barbed, frequently satirical and always unfiltered — a marked contrast to most of Russia’s major media, where many reporters, editors and producers are wary of incurring the Kremlin’s wrath. During Putin’s eight years in office, the Kremlin has extended and strengthened its control over the news media, mainly through the purchase of national broadcasters and major newspapers by state-controlled corporations or loyal billionaires. Anyone interested in probing reporting or frank commentary has few places to turn. Increasingly, relatively savvy Russians are turning to the Internet. “The propaganda on TV doesn’t work for anyone anymore,” said Oleg Panfilov, a journalist advocate who is also a regular blogger.

The Internet’s uncontrolled nature has long worried the Kremlin. Parliament’s upper house is considering legislation that would make Web sites with more than 1,000 readers daily subject to the same regulations as print media. And some Web advocates fear a newly updated law on publishing allegedly extremist literature could be used to prosecute bloggers critical of authorities. There are also allegations the Kremlin has organized teams of bloggers to attack or rebut critics of the government through Web postings. But Stanislav Belkovsky, an analyst with the Moscow think-tank National Strategy Institute, said these pro-Kremlin bloggers have little influence. “No one’s interested in people who write the same thing as you can read in the pro-Kremlin newspapers,” he said.

Communicating across Russia — which spans 11 time zones — has always been difficult, and Russian leaders have long relied on television to reach the nation’s widely scattered communities. Russian television has provided intensive — and to many boring — coverage of Medvedev’s speeches and official appearances at schools, churches, factories and other institutions for more than a year, as it has done for Putin. But on the Web, news consumers can find spicier fare. A recent search for Medvedev or Putin on a Russia’s dominant blogging and social networking site, LiveJournal, pulled up a hubbub of humorous postings, satire, opinion, links to news stories, insults and counter-insults.

One blogger from Vladivostok sought to organize a boycott of March election under the banner: “I’m not participating in this farce.” Another from St. Petersburg, who took the name “dark cloud_os,” wrote that a monarchy would suit Russia better than democracy.

Yet another, named “niagara1977,” said that reading an obituary would have been more interesting than listening to a recent Putin speech.

Putin is enormously popular, and even some journalists are angered when he is sharply questioned. Yet even before Putin had finished the last news conference of his term on Feb. 14, the Russian blogosphere was scoffing at some of his remarks. “President Putin has told us that we are satisfied with his work,” wrote one blogger by the name of “vla3986.” “If you include ripping off the country until you can’t any more as his work, then that’s been done many times over.”

Another blogger, who called himself “dmitrydmitryev,” wrote: “I wanted to watch Putin’s news conference but I happily slept throught it. For the best, probably!”

Still, Russian political blogs don’t appear to be as popular or influential as they are in the United States. Partly that’s because of the Kremlin’s near monopoly on political power in Russia. The Web’s influence is also restricted because access is limited. The phone system is antiquated, meaning connections are slow. Internet service is difficult to find in poorer provinces and personal computers are still a luxury.

Candidates in the U.S. are battling in a cliffhanger presidential contest. With the Kremlin’s political weight behind him, Medvedev is all but certain of winning the March 2 vote.

“Everyone understands that this is a fiction,” said Rustem Adagamov, who writes a wide-ranging, popular blog under the moniker “other.” “Everyone knows the outcome ahead of time.”

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

Craven Putin Draws Down the Iron Curtain

Reuters reports:

The head of a New York-based human rights group accused Russia on Wednesday of “bureaucratic harassment” of civil groups critical of the Kremlin after he was denied a visa to travel to Moscow.

The comments by Human Rights Watch head Kenneth Roth came two weeks before a presidential election opposition groups say furnishes Vladimir Putin’s chosen successor with blanket media coverage. Europe’s human rights watchdog, the OSCE, has opted not to field observers, citing lack of official cooperation. Roth had been due to present a report in Moscow that said new laws on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were being used to crack down on groups the Kremlin does not like. “This is precisely the kind of bureaucratic harassment NGOs across Russia are facing,” the HRW Executive Director told Reuters by telephone from New York when asked about his visa problems. “It’s up to the whim of the government to decide who to single out and it tends to single out groups that are somehow trying to hold it accountable,” Roth told Reuters.

When asked by Reuters to comment on Roth’s case, Russia’s foreign ministry said it could only respond to questions submitted in writing. Reuters sent questions by fax but there was no reply. Human Rights Watch said Roth was the first member of staff to have been denied a visa to travel to Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. “The story changed every day, it was always some kind of technical reason, we should have applied for this kind of visa or that kind of visa,” Roth told Reuters. “It’s also the first time that I personally have been refused a visa any place in the world since Nigeria’s Sani Abacha did so in 1997,” Roth earlier told a news conference in Moscow by telephone.

Roth’s NGO and other rights groups attack what they call a deterioration in Russia’s human rights record during the eight-year rule of President Putin. Putin is due to step down after a March 2 election almost certain to be won by his chosen successor, Dmitry Medvedev.

CHOKING EFFECT

The Human Rights Watch report said a 2006 Russian law “grants state officials excessive powers to interfere in the funding and operation of NGOs”. The NGOs facing the most scrutiny are those “dealing with Chechnya, human rights… anyone receiving funds from abroad or anyone trying to express or mobilize dissent,” Roth said. He rejected allegations by Russian officials that some NGOs are a front for foreign intelligence agencies trying to undermine the Kremlin. “The groups that have been targeted are receiving completely legitimate private funds. There has been no evidence whatsoever intelligence money is the focus of this,” Roth said. “It’s just another excuse – the point isn’t the foreign funding, the point is the public criticism.”

Russia’s parliament passed the 2006 law to tighten regulation of NGOs after a series of revolutions in neighboring ex-Soviet states unnerved the Kremlin with their well-organized civil society movements.

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

How Pathetic is This: Russia Can’t Even Make Jets Good Enough for Algeria

The Telegraph reports:

Russia’s ambitions to become the world’s pre-eminent arms exporter have suffered a setback after Algeria told the Kremlin it wanted to send back 15 fighter jets because they were sub-standard. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the president of Algeria, met Vladimir Putin in Moscow yesterday to discuss the dispute, which has taken the gloss off a $3.7 billion (£1.9 billion) deal signed in 2006. Algerian military chiefs have allegedly complained that the aircraft, the first of a consignment of 36 MiG29 jets, were second-hand rather than new and proved faulty during initial testing. Moscow denied the allegations. Russia’s state-owned defence industries have denied that the agreement was close to collapse, but there have been private concessions that more sophisticated aircraft will have to be offered as part of a face-saving deal.

Mr Putin has personally backed plans to re-energise arms sales in an effort to demonstrate Russia’s growing international influence. By expanding into markets that the West has ignored, Russia’s arms exports are growing by 25 per cent a year. After lucrative deals with Syria, Iran, Burma and Sudan, Russia is the world’s second biggest arms dealer after America. But as exports have grown, so too has criticism of its reputation as a quality arms merchant, with some saying that Moscow was overly dependent on an ageing stockpile of Soviet military “left-overs”.

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

How Pathetic is This: Russia Can’t Even Make Jets Good Enough for Algeria

The Telegraph reports:

Russia’s ambitions to become the world’s pre-eminent arms exporter have suffered a setback after Algeria told the Kremlin it wanted to send back 15 fighter jets because they were sub-standard. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the president of Algeria, met Vladimir Putin in Moscow yesterday to discuss the dispute, which has taken the gloss off a $3.7 billion (£1.9 billion) deal signed in 2006. Algerian military chiefs have allegedly complained that the aircraft, the first of a consignment of 36 MiG29 jets, were second-hand rather than new and proved faulty during initial testing. Moscow denied the allegations. Russia’s state-owned defence industries have denied that the agreement was close to collapse, but there have been private concessions that more sophisticated aircraft will have to be offered as part of a face-saving deal.

Mr Putin has personally backed plans to re-energise arms sales in an effort to demonstrate Russia’s growing international influence. By expanding into markets that the West has ignored, Russia’s arms exports are growing by 25 per cent a year. After lucrative deals with Syria, Iran, Burma and Sudan, Russia is the world’s second biggest arms dealer after America. But as exports have grown, so too has criticism of its reputation as a quality arms merchant, with some saying that Moscow was overly dependent on an ageing stockpile of Soviet military “left-overs”.

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

How Pathetic is This: Russia Can’t Even Make Jets Good Enough for Algeria

The Telegraph reports:

Russia’s ambitions to become the world’s pre-eminent arms exporter have suffered a setback after Algeria told the Kremlin it wanted to send back 15 fighter jets because they were sub-standard. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the president of Algeria, met Vladimir Putin in Moscow yesterday to discuss the dispute, which has taken the gloss off a $3.7 billion (£1.9 billion) deal signed in 2006. Algerian military chiefs have allegedly complained that the aircraft, the first of a consignment of 36 MiG29 jets, were second-hand rather than new and proved faulty during initial testing. Moscow denied the allegations. Russia’s state-owned defence industries have denied that the agreement was close to collapse, but there have been private concessions that more sophisticated aircraft will have to be offered as part of a face-saving deal.

Mr Putin has personally backed plans to re-energise arms sales in an effort to demonstrate Russia’s growing international influence. By expanding into markets that the West has ignored, Russia’s arms exports are growing by 25 per cent a year. After lucrative deals with Syria, Iran, Burma and Sudan, Russia is the world’s second biggest arms dealer after America. But as exports have grown, so too has criticism of its reputation as a quality arms merchant, with some saying that Moscow was overly dependent on an ageing stockpile of Soviet military “left-overs”.

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

How Pathetic is This: Russia Can’t Even Make Jets Good Enough for Algeria

The Telegraph reports:

Russia’s ambitions to become the world’s pre-eminent arms exporter have suffered a setback after Algeria told the Kremlin it wanted to send back 15 fighter jets because they were sub-standard. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the president of Algeria, met Vladimir Putin in Moscow yesterday to discuss the dispute, which has taken the gloss off a $3.7 billion (£1.9 billion) deal signed in 2006. Algerian military chiefs have allegedly complained that the aircraft, the first of a consignment of 36 MiG29 jets, were second-hand rather than new and proved faulty during initial testing. Moscow denied the allegations. Russia’s state-owned defence industries have denied that the agreement was close to collapse, but there have been private concessions that more sophisticated aircraft will have to be offered as part of a face-saving deal.

Mr Putin has personally backed plans to re-energise arms sales in an effort to demonstrate Russia’s growing international influence. By expanding into markets that the West has ignored, Russia’s arms exports are growing by 25 per cent a year. After lucrative deals with Syria, Iran, Burma and Sudan, Russia is the world’s second biggest arms dealer after America. But as exports have grown, so too has criticism of its reputation as a quality arms merchant, with some saying that Moscow was overly dependent on an ageing stockpile of Soviet military “left-overs”.

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !

How Pathetic is This: Russia Can’t Even Make Jets Good Enough for Algeria

The Telegraph reports:

Russia’s ambitions to become the world’s pre-eminent arms exporter have suffered a setback after Algeria told the Kremlin it wanted to send back 15 fighter jets because they were sub-standard. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the president of Algeria, met Vladimir Putin in Moscow yesterday to discuss the dispute, which has taken the gloss off a $3.7 billion (£1.9 billion) deal signed in 2006. Algerian military chiefs have allegedly complained that the aircraft, the first of a consignment of 36 MiG29 jets, were second-hand rather than new and proved faulty during initial testing. Moscow denied the allegations. Russia’s state-owned defence industries have denied that the agreement was close to collapse, but there have been private concessions that more sophisticated aircraft will have to be offered as part of a face-saving deal.

Mr Putin has personally backed plans to re-energise arms sales in an effort to demonstrate Russia’s growing international influence. By expanding into markets that the West has ignored, Russia’s arms exports are growing by 25 per cent a year. After lucrative deals with Syria, Iran, Burma and Sudan, Russia is the world’s second biggest arms dealer after America. But as exports have grown, so too has criticism of its reputation as a quality arms merchant, with some saying that Moscow was overly dependent on an ageing stockpile of Soviet military “left-overs”.

Thanks for reading La Russophobe !