La Russophobe

The Sunday Photos: Nemtsov at Oborona

February 17, 2008 · 1 Comment






Oborona continues to draw the attention and support of the movers and shakers in Russian opposition politics. Now, it reports on a recent meeting with Boris Nemtsov (LR staff translation, not by our professional translators, corrections welcome; look for a new original LR professional translation by Dave Essel of the first chapter of Nemtsov’s new white paper on the Putin years, linked to below, this Monday):

On February 8th at the Moscow headquarters of Oborona hosted the former vice-premier of Russia, one of the foundering leaders of the SPS political party, Boris Yefimovich Nemtsov.

Nemtsov immediately asked about the status of Oborona coordinator Oleg Kozlovsky, who was illegally drafted a month and a half ago into the army, and received briefing. He then went on to discuss key issues in current Russian politics such as corruption in the bureaucratic system, the collapse of military effectiveness of the army, the pension fund deficit, the demographic crisis, the commodity-dependent distortions in the economy, and many others. It was stressed that despite extremely favorable market prices of oil and gas, the Putin regime has been unable to make significant progress in resolving any of the key issues. The country is still beset by serious social diseases, which will make their presence severely felt in the even of any downturn on the commodity markets regardless of how large the “stabilization fund” might grow. The only hope for Russia is full-scale political and legal reform leading to the creation of a modern democratic state. Nemtsov agreed that it is virtually impossible now to rely on printed media to advance the cause of reform due to censorship, meaning that only electronic publication is available, and he has published an analysis of the Putin years in power on his website.

Nemtsov discussed with Oborona various possible strategies that might be pursued in order to help Russia down the road to democratization, and we discussed his decision to boycott the presidential elections on March 2nd. Nemtsov called for a boycott and advocating signing a petition online, followed by taking active steps to protest the election itself, such as voting with a spoiled ballot, as well as to focus on seeking to win elections for office at the municipal level, where Putin’s influence is less. He also stressed the need to unify the opposition forces under a single umbrella organization with streamlined decisionmaking, and called for a democratic summit conference in St. Petersburg on March 22nd to discuss the matter further.

Categories: russia · sunday photos

The Sunday YouTube Part I: Annals of Friendly, Responsible Russia

February 17, 2008 · Leave a Comment

Last week a Russian bomber buzzed a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean. The AP reported: “The bombers were among four Russian Tupolev 95s launched from Ukrainka in the middle of the night, including one that Japanese officials say violated their country’s airspace over an uninhabited island south of Tokyo. Such Russian bomber flights were common during the Cold War, but have been rare since. This is the first time Russian Tupolevs have flown over or interacted with a U.S. carrier since 2004.”

Since Russia doesn’t have any aircraft carriers, or indeed a credible navy of any kind, it goes without saying that the action is totally unprovoked. U.S. planes haven’t buzzed any Russian ships on the high seas at any time, nor have they been accused of violating Russian civil airspace.

But even if they had, is it really in the best interests of the Russian people to provoke a new cold war, and a news arms race, with the world’s only superpower? Does this behavior really indicate that Russia is a serious, responsible nation that deserves respect and attention?

Categories: YouTube · militarism · russia

The Sunday YouTube Part II: Russia, Perishing

February 17, 2008 · 4 Comments

March 2006. Fifteen years after the fall of Communism, Marcel Theroux goes on a personal journey through Putin’s Russia for British TV. He discovers a country that’s literally dying.

A reader writes: “I can imagine Russians saying that they could find a whole lot of bad things in America if they wanted to and make an anti-American film. The question is could they find a sadistic alcoholic facist police chief (who got promoted) in a chance encounter, when he stopped them from filming a community of outcast non-white American citizens awaiting deportation because they where and embarrassment?”

And indeed, is it really a comfort to Russians to believe that although they are destroying their nation, America also will be destroyed? Does hatred of America supecede love of Russia among Russians?

Categories: YouTube · russia

The Sunday Apocalypse

February 17, 2008 · Leave a Comment


Wow, talk about losing the PR battle. This is a new low for the failure of Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy. The Financial Times reports:

Why Putin’s Rule Threatens both Russia and the West

At least he made the trains run on time. That was said of Benito Mussolini, Italy’s fascist dictator from 1922 to 1943. Much the same is now said of Vladimir Putin, Russia’s authoritarian president. He may have crushed the fragile shoots of democracy, but he has at least restored the economy, the state and his country’s place in the world.

This view is shared by Mr Putin himself. He stated only last week that: “We have worked to restore the country after the chaos, economic ruin and breakdown of the old system that we saw in the 1990s.” But it suffers from a drawback: it is false, as Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss of Stanford University argue in a powerful article*.

True, between 1999, the year before Mr Putin became president, and 2007, the Russian economy expanded by 69 per cent. But the economies of 11 of the 15 former republics of the Soviet Union expanded by more than Russia’s. Indeed, only Kyrgyzstan did markedly worse. A number of the former Soviet republics did, it is true, benefit from an oil and gas bonanza. But so, too, did Russia: its oil and gas exports jumped from $76bn in 1999 to $350bn last year. Even so, the Russian economy expanded by less than Ukraine’s.

Like all post-communist countries, Russia’s economy suffered a steep initial decline, which reached its trough in 1998. Countries that reformed more decisively, such as Poland, bottomed out more quickly and are now far ahead. Again, Russia’s recovery is in no way exceptional: tiny Estonia has done far better. Maybe this is why the Kremlin hates the Baltic state so much.

It is simply wrong to assign credit for the upswing to Mr Putin. Not only did it begin with the devaluation of 1998, but nearly all the reforms that underlay the improvement were initiated, if not brought to fruition, under Boris Yeltsin’s despised rule. Under Mr Putin little progress has been made on structural reforms. That is one of the central points made by Anders Aslund, a distinguished scholar, in a superb new book**.

In important respects economic reform has gone backwards, particularly with the ever-growing role of the state in vital segments of the economy. This reversal is directly related to the second false claim about Mr Putin, that he has restored the state. This is true only if one accepts his definition of a strong state: a behemoth subject neither to law nor to political competition.

Mr Putin has eliminated all independence in television and most of it in the press; he has destroyed the autonomy of regional government; he has emasculated parliament; and he has eliminated competition for power. The political divergence between Ukraine, increasingly free, and Russia, increasingly despotic, is as clear as it is disturbing.

The result is not an effective state, but an overweening one. Corruption is rife. Mr Putin himself tells us so: “The state system is weighed down by bureaucracy and corruption and does not have the motivation for positive change, much less dynamic development.” But this is inevitable when so much unaccountable power is concentrated in one person’s hands. By destroying independent institutions, the state has mutilated itself: it is a blind and crippled giant.

In 2006, Russia ranked a mediocre 96th out of 175 in the World Bank’s “ease of doing business” index, its worst ever position. In the World Bank’s governance indicators for 2006, the effectiveness of Russia’s government was ranked in the 38th percentile from the bottom. Its rule of law ranking was in the 19th percentile, well behind Ukraine’s 27th and Poland’s 59th. If one judges a state by its ability to serve the people and protect them from the powerful, including itself, Russia’s is ineffective. That vast numbers of Russians like such a state makes this no less true, merely more depressing.

Russia’s neighbours – at least those in which the people may express their opinions – are more hostile. The KGB-state is unable to understand that fear and respect are antitheses, not synonyms. Mr Putin has made no secret of his regrets about the collapse of the Soviet empire and his resentment at the subsequent expansion of the European Union and, even more, of Nato. What seems absent from his discourse is why these countries, so familiar with beneficent Russian rule, should have handed over their futures to bodies whose central powers are Germany and the US, respectively. Why, too, as Edward Lucas of The Economist notes, are Russia’s friends a “rogue’s gallery” of tinpot despotisms?***.

In place of erstwhile hopes for the emergence of a pro-western Russian democracy, we have proto-fascism: aggrieved nationalism; bullying of smaller nations; a cult of the strong leader; suspicion of enemies within; and resentment of foreigners.

Yet Russia is also a nuclear-armed state with vast energy resources. That makes this development worrying, as well as depressing. Russia has chosen the statecraft of fear over the promise of freedom. No doubt, mistakes by the west helped bring this about. I agree with Mr Aslund that the biggest error was the decision to focus on the ridiculously insignificant issue of post-Soviet debt, in late 1991 and early 1992, instead of the challenge of assisting the political and economic transition. But this is now history. It was, in any case, the decision of Mr Putin and associates to turn Russia from the aspiration for a law-governed democracy towards autocracy.

Mr Putin then is a failure, not a success. But he is a dangerous failure. The regime he has created is unpredictable: nobody can know how the post-election duumvirate will work. But it is unlikely to provide sustained improvements in prosperity.

The west must again form a concerted policy: it must resist efforts to divide westerners against themselves; it must insure itself against over-dependence on Russian energy; and it must make the price of revanchism high for Russia itself. But it must also repeat a powerful truth: the west is no enemy of the Russian people. On the contrary, nothing would be more desirable than for a vibrant and self-confident Russian democracy to take its place in the world of western values. And, yes, that must include membership of Nato.

Let us rid ourselves of illusions. This is no new cold war, not least because Russia offers no enticing new ideology. But it is a cold peace. That is a tragedy. It is also a reality. It is one the west must live with, probably for a long time to come.

*The Myth of the Authoritarian Model, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008; **Russia’s Capitalist Revolution (Peterson Institute for International Economics), 2007; ***The New Cold War (Bloomsbury), 2008

Categories: cold war II · rhetoric · russia

The Sunday Poet

February 17, 2008 · Leave a Comment

Writing in the New York Sun Pajamas Media editor Michael Weiss interviews Russian poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko as neo-Soviet Russia

On December 12, the Russian poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko was honored with “White Snows Are Falling,” a state-funded rock opera tribute staged at Moscow’s Olympic Stadium. At 74, Mr. Yevtushenko is well acquainted with the concert arena venue, having become famous in the late ‘50 for declaiming his verses before youthful crowds hungry for genuine art in the post-Stalin — and anti-Stalinist — period. Back then, he published collections that sold in the 100,000-range. His good looks, charisma, and cultivated “public” persona only legitimize the inevitable comparisons with Western pop stars: Mr. Yevtushenko was always something of a Mick Jagger of the taiga.

It was with this slightly kitsch portrait in mind that I phoned him up a few weeks ago at his dacha at Peredelkino, just outside the Russian capital. Mr. Yevtushenko divides his time between Russia and the University of Tulsa, where he has taught poetry and film for nearly 20 years. The rock opera, coincident with his 75th birthday, was based on a 1980 record, “Confession,” composed by Gleb Mai, who set Mr. Yevtushenko’s decades-old poems to music, accompanied by the Bolshoi Theater orchestra. The poet himself was onstage to deliver more traditional live readings.

“The first part was written 25 years ago exactly,” Mr. Yevtushenko, whose English is admirable, tells me of “White Snows Are Falling.” “It’s about an intimate relationship between a young man and a young woman, about the fear of separation of the body and soul. When the soul lives separately from the body or vice versa, there is no harmony … there is no plot. This is an inner fight for the soul of man.”

The metaphysical was always a part of Mr. Yevtushenko’s “individualist” style; he still professes to think of himself as foremost a love poet. I couldn’t help but think, however, that his talk of the mind-body distinction — and he could go on like this for quite a while — was only a prologue to the rock opera’s historical significance. “The twentieth century has left so many ruins of marketism, Stalinism … not ruins of democracy. Young people are incredibly scared about themselves because they feel some apathy. They long for ideals, not ideology.” He seemed to believe his performance answered this longing. “They were singing, applauding — they didn’t want to leave! This rock opera united so many people of different ages, from 60-year-olds to 17- year-olds.”

The satirist Mikhail Zadornov, Mr. Yevtushenko told me, recently nicknamed him “The Lighter” for his ability to set a stadium full of Russian spirits aflame, though he did not emphasize the necessity of such an enterprise in the consensus-choked, opposition-starved Age of Putin. Mr. Yevtushenko has spoken only euphemistically about the KGB tsar’s abrogation of democracy, claiming, “Putin, like Russia, is struggling to find his way in a time when ideals have been shattered and expedience reigns.” This rather paltry analysis of current affairs may seem a great distance from the man who warned, in “The Dead Hand of the Past” (1962), that “Someone still glares in the Stalin manner, / looking at young men askance.” In truth, Mr. Yevtushenko’s politics have always been a complicated mixture of bravery, populism, and vulgar accommodation with dictatorship. “The writers who had briefly flourished [under Khrushchev's thaw] … went two different ways,” the great Sovietologist and literary critic Robert Conquest put it in a 1974 profile. “Solzhenitsyn and his like into silenced opposition; Yevtushenko and his like, sometimes reluctantly, sometimes in the hope of still influencing matters a little, into well-rewarded collaboration.”

And yet, a hagiography of Mr. Yevtushenko as the Byronic rebel has flourished in the West — he is an honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Letters — and this surely owes to “Babi Yar,” his most famous poem, written in 1961 as a moving threnody to the Ukrainian Jews massacred by the Nazis: “In my blood there is no Jewish blood. / In their callous rage, all anti-Semites / must hate me now as a Jew. / For that reason / I am a true Russian!” It made its 28-year-old author an international icon of Russian liberalism a year before Solzhenitsyn’s “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich” came out; it also made him a martyr to his own attempts to address the taboo subject of Judeocide. (Shostakovich later rendered the poem, along with three others by the same author, as an orchestral piece for his 13th Symphony.)

Mr. Yevtushenko once defiantly recited the closing staves of “Babi Yar” to Khrushchev, who replied that the poem had no place in the Soviet Union because “official” anti-Semitism didn’t exist there. But because the poem was an indictment of an unofficial Russian pathology, as opposed to an ideologically sanctioned bigotry, it was not suppressed, only watered down. After the leftist French weekly L’Express put out his “A Precocious Autobiography” (1963) — a volume that also addressed anti-Semitism and carried the observation that in “Russia all tyrants believe poets to be their worst enemies” — Mr. Yevtushenko was formally brought to heel. He was one of the few writers to confess to having committed “an irreparable mistake,” which he vowed to rectify.

Not that his reputation abroad suffered: As Mr. Conquest put it, he “was not just the shining liberal knight who sold out and became a mere cynical agent of the oppressor. His original liberalism was of a limited nature, and it was not he, but his Western fans, who made higher claims.” Such fans included Arthur Miller and William Styron, who called Mr. Yevtushenko a “voice of conscience among his colleagues,” a judgment that could not have been more wrong — it was precisely his colleagues who hated him most.

The poet himself once wrote that the “Russian Parnassus is rife with squabbles,” but the antagonism which met Mr. Yevtushenko at home was not merely the result of Leavisite feuds. Critics such as Vasily Aksyonov and Grigory Pozhenyan accused him of using his perch as secretary of the Soviet Union of Writers to “settle personal scores” and engage in “hypocritical demagogy.” Also troubling was that this avowed admirer of Pasternak — whom he called “Pushkin’s double”— would say that “Dr. Zhivago” was “not worth publishing” in the Soviet Union. Overseas, Mr. Yevtushenko took to defaming the deceased novelist’s lover and heir, Olga Ivinskaya, who had been jailed for eight years on false charges of unlawfully administering Pasternak’s Western royalties. When asked about her plight, Mr. Yevtushenko replied that he wouldn’t have anything to do with currency criminals.

Indeed, the greatest feat of Kremlin public relations may have been to convince the world of the existence of an uncompromised dissident with a passport. Mr. Yevtushenko was at his most amenable to Moscow when far away from it. He took no position, despite numerous entreaties, on the notorious Ginzburg-Galanskov trial, because he was preparing for a trip to Chile at the time. He got to travel regularly to Italy, Portugal, Spain, Australia, Senegal, and Cuba, where he directed an idolizing film about that country’s revolution (Fidel Castro is still a personal friend).

During his 1972 trip to America, he produced such vulgar propaganda verses that even Eugene McCarthy — no fan of American foreign policy then — had heard enough. Allen Tate called him a “ham actor, not a poet,” and others not unsympathetic to criticisms of Washington found his frequent condemnations of American “imperialism,” and comparatively footling criticisms of the Russian police state, thoroughly repulsive.

Much has been made of Mr. Yevtushenko’s protest of the trial of Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, an event now credited with inaugurating the modern dissident movement and readying the national pulse for perestroika. Both writers had toiled under pseudonyms and stood accused, in 1966, of “anti-Soviet activity” for the views espoused by their fictional characters. But Mr. Yevtushenko’s actual position was that the writers were guilty, only punished too severely.

There is something uneasy and defensive about his response some 40 years on to any questions concerning his dubious role as a cultural statesman. “When I wrote ‘Babi Yar,’” he told me, “one high official said to me, ‘Why [did] you write this? We could make you our first national poet if you wrote something about Vietnam.’ I said to him, ‘If I couldn’t write poems like “Babi Yar” against something I didn’t like, like anti-Semitism, I will never have the moral right to write poetry about Vietnam.’ I dislike both, this is my position. You know the proverb ‘You couldn’t sit between two chairs’? I once wrote a poem that used this proverb. I said if both chairs are dirty, to sit between them is the best place for a poet.”

That Mr. Yevtushenko managed to both captivate and unsettle is best evidenced in his twin run-ins with Kingsley Amis, a man not known for his generosity toward foreigners, much less foreign literary types. The cold warrior Falstaff first met the blue-eyed Siberian at Cambridge in 1962 during one of the latter’s media-frenzied tours of Europe. They bonded in discussion of ugly bourgeois architecture, the existence of God, and the rewards of literature (“Kipling good”), so much so that Amis wrote that Mr. Yevtushenko was not a “charlatan” — high praise coming from the author of “Lucky Jim” — and that he had just found “the first completely good reason … for liking the U.S.S.R.”

Yet just six years later, the scales fell from the eyes. When Mr. Yevtushenko was nominated for the poetry chair at Oxford in 1968, Amis, Bernard Levin, and the Russian-Hungarian historian Tibor Szamuely led the campaign against him, arguing correctly that he had made life difficult for his fellow Soviet writers. In the event, he did not get the post, and when asked about it today, Mr. Yevtushenko responds that Amis was “misinformed.” In his defense, he cites an unfair rumor going around at the time that he had not signed a telegram protesting the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia when he had in fact done so; he’d also written a poem, “Russian Tanks in Prague.”

Nevertheless, it is absurd to credit his insistence that he was ultimately denied the cap and gown due to KGB disinformation feeding the small but potent band of naysayers. For one thing, the Soviet Embassy in London supported his candidacy, as did even the conservative element on Fleet Street. The whole affair was recently recounted in the British magazine Prospect by Bernard Wasserstein, the student who first proposed Mr. Yevtushenko for the position, as he admits, purely for “political” reasons. As with most of the New Left, the poetry was a secondary consideration.

And yet if evaluated “primarily as a politician,” Mr. Conquest wrote, “we might yet accept that in Soviet circumstances his record, with all its shifts and compromises, may merit, on balance, a positive assessment.” Auden’s clement judgment that time “Worships language and forgives / Everyone by whom it lives” might also apply here. Though for the orphans and prodigal children of 20th-century totalitarianism, Mr. Yevtushenko’s one-line autobiography says it best: “I am a citizen of human grief.”

Categories: arts/letters · russia

The Sunday Shell Game

February 17, 2008 · Leave a Comment

Hero journalist Yulia Latynina, writing in the Moscow Times:

In mid-January, India refused to accept its Sindhuvijay submarine after it was refitted with Russian Klub cruise missiles at a shipyard near St. Petersburg. The reason for the refusal is that the Klub missiles failed to hit their target in six consecutive test firings.

The Kremlin, which did not want to be outdone by the snooty Indians, quickly retaliated with the single remaining strategic weapon in its arsenal — the Agriculture Ministry’s Federal Service for Veterinarian and Vegetation Sanitary Supervision. The agency immediately announced that it had discovered Khapra beetles in some sesame seeds that were shipped in from India; this served as Moscow’s justification for banning Indian tea imports. The only problem was that these insects do not infest tea — or sesame seeds for that matter.

Unlike when Moscow banned imports of Georgian wine on the grounds that it did not meet health standards, this time Russia faced the real threat of a multibillion-dollar recriminatory lawsuit from New Delhi for its strong-arm interference in international trade.

As soon as the Kremlin learned of the litigation threat, the Khapra beetles vanished from Indian sesame and nothing more was heard about it — not from Federal Consumer Protection Service head Gennady Onishchenko, from state environmental inspector Oleg Mitvol or from any other agency that typically uses scare tactics in the name of protecting Russia’s sovereign democracy.

In Moscow’s response to India, it behaved like a salesclerk in a supermarket who, when told the fish is rotten, punches out the shopper rather than bringing fresh fish to replace it. Attacking the customer, of course, doesn’t help convince anybody that the fish is fresh.

Russia must have been a little confused when it decided to fire these diplomatic shots from the big guns of the unsinkable dreadnought Onishchenko. The Kremlin apparently doesn’t understand that India has long ago ceased being the type of Third World country that eagerly accepts Moscow’s obsolescent technologies. Now the opposite is true: The booming Indian and Chinese economies are locomotives of global economic development.

Besides the Sindhuvijay fiasco, Russia was four years behind schedule in its contract with India to retrofit the Admiral Gorshkov warship. To add insult to injury, Moscow asked New Delhi last year for another $1.2 billion to finish the job.

Why do I mention this?

There have been a few major foreign policy events this past month. Russia has been excluded from the international negotiations over Kosovo. Moreover, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly quietly sidelined Senator Mikhail Margelov. He had been slated to become the next president of the Strasbourg-based assembly, but the parliament’s members had strong reservations about Russia’s human rights record.

But what foreign policy events have the Russian media been covering lately? Most reports have focused on whether or not international election observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s democracy watchdog, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, will monitor the presidential election on March 2. The question of whether Russian elections are democratic is certainly relevant, but the Kremlin is preoccupied with the less relevant question of whether the OSCE will insult Russia by criticizing the election.

This issue has nothing to do with whether the OSCE has the right to pass judgment on Russian internal affairs, but whether the elections stand on their own as objectively free and fair.

Categories: neo-soviet failure · russia

The Sunday Sacrilege: Russia is an Amoral Nation

February 17, 2008 · 1 Comment

Russian radio commentator Georgy Bovt, writing in the Moscow Times:

Addressing the annual security conference in Munich on Saturday, First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, who was once a leading candidate to succeed President Vladimir Putin, said, “We respect those values that the United States and Europe have cultivated for centuries. They cannot, however, serve as the standard by which other nations should measure their own political systems, national cultures and mentalities.”

This was just the latest Kremlin declaration of what it means to be a “sovereign democracy.”

Ivanov’s discussion of Russian versus Western values reminded me of two incidents that I witnessed recently on Moscow’s public transportation.

The first happened on a trolleybus. It was one of those days when the snow and slush turn Moscow streets into a filthy obstacle course for pedestrians. A woman in her 70s was about to step down from the trolleybus at a stop, but she was afraid of landing on the snow and ice on the street. She turned to a well-dressed young man and asked him to help her down. “[Expletive] off” he replied, quite matter-of-factly and without any particular emotion. “What was that for?” the woman asked as tears started to swell up in her eyes.

This concerns the question of values: What is the reason for this unprovoked, groundless animosity toward anyone and everyone that we are seeing in Moscow?

The next scene took place on a different trolleybus on a different day. A young woman tried to buy a ticket from the driver. He shrugged and said, “Don’t worry about it.” She insisted on paying for her fare. He waved her away and opened the central doors so she could get on without having to go through the turnstile. She then made her way through half the bus and the throng of passengers back to the front of the bus. She knocked on the driver’s window and demanded to buy a ticket. He again waved her away. “Just ride for free, ” he said. The girl gave in and finally took a seat.

At the next stop an inspector stepped on and began checking the passengers for tickets. When this young woman was found without a ticket, he demanded that she pay a fine. She explained how she had tried to buy a ticket but that the driver refused. She appealed to the driver and some of the passengers joined in, but the driver claimed that he had never seen the woman before. In the end, she paid the fine and started to cry.

To be sure, reports of how hundreds of passersby show complete indifference to someone lying sick on the sidewalk are nothing new. But the two incidents that I saw on the trolleybus underscore how Russian values, ethics and morals have truly deteriorated over the last several years. I have noticed an increase in rage and hostility people exhibit toward those around them and the absence of a basic willingness to help each other.

Moreover, society as a whole seems to have become totally apathetic to politics and the condition of the country. It is indeed a rare occasion when an event stirs people into taking some kind of stance or action.

There is a basic more code and set of laws that help regulate society in most Western countries. The moment they are applied to Russia, however, the ever-resourceful and wily Russian mind will find some way to get around the rules and make a nice buck while doing it. Russians are indeed quite ingenious; they can create illegal schemes that no one could every dream up in other countries.

Society is lacking a basic moral foundation — an understanding of what is good and bad. Our politicians can attack Western values for as long as they want, but this criticism is nothing more than blowing a lot of hot air — and this will remain the case until Russia develops some moral values of its own.


Categories: russia · russian people

The Sunday Funnies/Mystery

February 17, 2008 · Leave a Comment

Early last week the following cartoon appeared on the Ellustrator website:


By the end of the week, it was gone.

In the cartoon’s first panel, Putin says to Medvedev: “Oh, Mr. Successor! Here’s the atomic suitcase with the red button. Be very careful with this.”

In the second panel, Medvedev answers: “I’ll find good hiding place for it.” Putin replies: “Good idea.”

In the third panel, Medvedev returns to Putin an hour later and says: “Volody, buddy, I don’t know what’s going on. You slipped me some defective hardware! I pressed it and pressed it, but it wouldn’t even go down once!”

Perhaps Ellustrator got a phone call from the Kremlin?

Categories: russia · sunday funnies