(1) The Sunday Photos: Loo Edition
(2) The Sunday YouTube: Images from an Old Believer Village
(3) Perspective on the New Year: Russia not Stable or Prosperous
(4) The Sunday Survey: Our New Sidebar Poll
(5) The Sunday Horror: Dr. Frankenputin Losing Control of Racism Monster
Posted in contents
Posted in russia, sunday photos
Isn’t it ironic? Vladimir Putin claims to have made Russia stable and prosperous, yet he’s obsessed with Western intervention upsetting his apple cart as if Russia were weak and vulnerable. Kind of a contradiction, isn’t it? Just as in Soviet Times, Russia pretends to strength but acts in weakness. Paul Goble summarizes Yulia Latynina (pictured) from the pages of Yezhednevniy Zhurnal
Vladimir Putin has managed to convince a great number of people in his own country and abroad that he has restored order and greatness to the Russian Federation albeit at the cost of destroying many of the freedoms residents of that country had enjoyed under his predecessor. But the tragic reality, according to one of Moscow’s most thoughtful and courageous political commentators, is that the Russian leader has succeeded in undermining basic freedoms without managing to restore order throughout the country or make Russia genuinely great again.
Instead, Yulia Latynina argues in Yezhednevniy zhurnal on [December 28th], Putin has focused on reestablishing order only on the oil and gas industries whose exports generate wealth for him and his associates and on others whose independence might threaten this cash flow. Within the Russian Federation itself, these potentially threatening institutions are the electronic media and especially television whose exposes in the past have limited the freedom of action of the regime and the parliament whose public debates and investigations, as limited as they have sometimes been, also represented a threat.
Putin’s success in reining in both these institutions is one of the major reasons why so many Russians believe that the country is now more orderly and great, Latynina says. They simply do not have the information they need to understand precisely what the Russian president is doing and, equally important, is not doing. And that domestic effort has been supplemented by a propaganda campaign directed abroad, an undertaking that, as Time’s decision to name Putin its “person of the year” shows, has been amazingly successful, Latynina writes, in large measure because it has been conducted by well-paid Western public relations and media specialists. “From afar,” she continues, what Putin is trying to project looks “remarkably convincing. If you live in Wisconsin, it is easy to believe that this terrible Russia has again become something like Germany under Hitler. There may be no freedom, but there is Ordnung.”
If one examines the situation in Russia more closely, however, the image Putin has sought to project and that so many in both Russia and the West have been ready, even eager, to accept, falls apart, revealing a reality that is far more frightening and disturbing than most Russians or many in the West currently recognize. In support of her argument, the Moscow commentator points to three situations in Russia, none of which corresponds to the image Putin tries to project and many others have put their faith in.
First, she points out as have many others that “the territory of Ingushetia is not controlled by Russia at all.” Is it really possible, Latynina asks rhetorically, that the “strong Russian state” Putin says he heads, one capable of “controlling the situation” throughout the country, would not control this North Caucasus republic? Noting that Putin’s hand-picked leader of the region probably does not control anything more than his own office, she argues that Putin does not control Ingushetia “because he is not interested in it.” What is he interested in? Oil and gas exports and the money he and his confederates can get from them.
Second, she points out that “the Russian militia has almost ceased to solve crimes.” Bandits kill bank officers or children in Moscow, and the police do nothing or make up stories to explain away whatever has occurred. Such things do not normally happen in a democracy, Latynina says, where officials know they are expected to enforce the law. But they also do not happen in effective dictatorships. “Such things are unthinkable in the USSR in Stalin’s time or Italy under Mussolini — indeed, in any country where the dictator takes upon himself responsibility for what takes place … and where criminals, who commit grave crimes, become the personal enemies of the regime.” Related to this situation is the strange case of the son of the country’s defense minister. The son killed his own wife but is now suing her relatives for inflicting “physical and moral trauma” on him, according to his highly-placed father. If this is “the new order” in Russia, Latynina says, Putin should decree who can commit murder with impunity.
And third, the Moscow commentator notes, criminal elements simply ignore orders from above. Recently, criminals inside the law enforcement agencies stole millions of dollars of equipment being sent to Russia by Motorola for the Euroset Company. U.S. President George Bush asked Putin to intervene. Putin promised to do so. But nothing happened. Either Putin did not want to punish this criminal whose actions had attracted the attention of Washington, or the millions of dollars the criminals were able to obtain from this theft were more important to them than the orders of the supposedly all-powerful Russian president. Neither of these conclusions conform with the image of Putin and his regime that the Kremlin and its PR aides have projected, she notes. And consequently, anyone who wants to understand where Russia under Putin now is needs to carefully distinguish between those issues that concern the Kremlin leader and those that do not.
“President Putin is interested in questions connected with obtaining control over multi-billion dollar financial flows” which solves crimes, and he is interested in establishing control over only those other institutions — the parliament, the domestic electronic media, and the PR image of Russia internationally — that might threaten that control. He is not concerned, she continues, about “questions concerning the illegal shooting of people, with the complete loss of control over the situation in the regions, with the total disappearance of law enforcement as a system which solves crimes” rather than its degeneration into a group of armed people “who commit them.” That is not a description of a country whose leader has reestablished order or greatness even at the cost of freedom. Instead, it is a portrait of a country whose leadership is engaged in looting the wealth of the Russian Federation rather than involved in building a state, even an authoritarian one.
And as another author suggested this week, it is not a recipe for stability but rather for something worse. Sergei Gupalo, who heads the Committee Against Political Repression in the Republic of Tatarstan, argues that this approach threatens the survival of the Russian state as an integral whole. First of all, he said, Putin’s arrangements are creating a situation in which it is far from clear “where the bureaucracy begins and where the mafia ends” because so many bureaucrats now act like criminals interested only in seeing how much money they can steal and put into their own pockets. Second, Gupalo argued, the degeneration of state institutions as a result already means that “the bureaucratic dragon” of Moscow is giving birth to many “little dragons” in the regions, mafia officialdoms whose behavior is modeled on but quite often worse and more ill-intentioned than that of the parent. And third, the Kazan-based activist said, the developments threaten Russia with what he calls “the Somalia variant where formally there is some central government but where in fact [control of] the country is divided among various criminal gangs engaged in fighting one another.”
That picture, like the one offered by Latynina, may overstate the case, but it is clear that neither Putin nor his admirers at home or abroad are willing or able to explain how the problems these two writers highlight are in any way consistent with the notion that at the cost of freedom, Putin has made Russia orderly and great.
Posted in neo-soviet failure, russia, translations
We’ve retired our first sidebar poll, which asked readers: “Who is most responsible for the rise of dictatorship in Russia?” With nearly 2,000 votes recorded, the answer “the people of Russia” was the runaway winner, with 30% of the total (nearly 600 votes). And today we begin a new poll, asking whether, in light of this answer, the people of Russia are worthing fighting for. Is there hope that, if they throw of the shackles of Vladimir Putin, they will finally begin to behave in a responsible manner? Or, if they are lucky enough to get free of his malignant clutches, as they escaped the Tsar and the Bolsheviks, will they simply embrace a horrific new form of reprehensible, abusive regime? We’ve said many times on this blog that the people of Russia have repeatedly destroyed those who fought to save them, and repeatedly made heroes out of those who sought to destroy them. Is this behavior inevitable? We’d genuinely like to know what you think. By “your life” we don’t necessarily mean your personal life, but the life of a Russian patriot who wants to bring democracy and benign government to her (or his) country. Say, if you were Anna Politkovskaya. Or Oleg Kozlovsky. Or Garry Kasparov.
Paul Goble reports:
President Vladimir Putin is rapidly losing control over the rising tide of Russian xenophobia and ethno-nationalism that almost a decade ago helped him become president and that in the years since he has helped to legitimize, according to one of Moscow’s leading experts on these phenomena. In a new book, a chapter of which is available online, Aleksandr Verkhovskiy argues that Putin and his regime no longer can hope to reverse this trend by their own actions and consequently are simply trying to redirect Russian anger away from domestic targets toward foreign ones. But while the Russian leader can certainly help whip up Russian anger toward the West with his use of what some have called “civilizational nationalism,” the SOVA Analytic center expert says, there seems little chance that this will reduce the threat xenophobic ethno-nationalism represents for the future of the Russian Federation.
On the one hand, the SOVA Analytic Center specialist says, xenophobic attitudes increasingly infects Russian ethno-nationalism because Putin and other senior leaders have appeared to sanction growing hostility among many ethnic Russians toward many minorities, especially in the wake of the Kondopoga riots of a year ago. And on the other, Russian ethno-nationalism itself now affects groups and parties across virtually the entire political spectrum, again including United Russia and others close to Putin, rather than being confined as they were for most of the 1990 to marginal individuals and groups with little or no chance of coming to power. Consequently, and to a certain extent in ways that parallel his exploitation of xenophobic attitudes against Chechens, Putin is again serving as the midwife of a phenomenon which may mean future Russian leaders will have to defer to this trend even more than he has.
In the course of his 12,000-word article, Verkhovskiy covers the ideological evolution of Russian ethno-nationalism over the last 16 years. While he notes that his treatment of this topic is in many ways superficial, he touches on more topics than can be mentioned here.
Nonetheless, given the importance of this issue, Verkhovskiy’s specific arguments deserve careful consideration, whether they have been made before and are largely common ground or they are something new and certain — because they concern Putin and his policies — to be controversial. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, he writes, the ethno-nationalisms of minority groups within the Russian Federation played a far greater role in Russian political life than did the nationalism of ethnic Russian majority. But by 1995, the relative importance of the two had changed. By that time, ethno-nationalism among minority groups had run its course, and members of most of these groups, with the obvious exception of the Chechens and a few others, shifted from efforts at national self-determination toward a concern with the defense of their rights as ethnic minorities. And precisely because the Yeltsin regime was so hostile to Russian nationalism, many Russians came to feel that they were the truly “insulted and injured,” a sense that helped power ethno-nationalism at the mass level and the articulation of various ethno-national agendas by a series of typically small marginal groups.
Verkhovskiy surveys the programs of six of these groups – the Red Patriots, the Black Hundreds revivalists, the neo-Eurasians, the neo-Nazis, the White Power skinheads, and the Russian separatists – in order to show that each was more concerned about ideological niceties than about winning support from the regime or the population. But then, he continues, the rise of Putin changed the relationship among Russian nationalists, the Russian population more generally, and the Russian president. If the Russian nationalists of the 1990s almost invariably viewed President Boris Yeltsin as the enemy, the Russian nationalists of the 2000s often view Putin not only as someone they can support but – and this is even more important to many — as a leader who intentionally or not has paved the way for them to come to power. That in turn led some nationalists to soft-pedal their rhetoric in the hopes of gaining influence with both the people and the political parties that might contribute to their further rise. And that in turn has meant that as a group, they began to articulate a new national populism, one drawing on social as well as ethnic themes.
That shift made their programs less offensive to many both in Russia and outside – after all, they now talking about addressing real social problems rather than attacking ethnic minorities there were increasingly interested in stressing Russia’s differences with the West. But it did not mean that everyone involved in this movement had become less xenophobic or even racist, Verkhovskiy insists, but it did mean that their new stance offered Putin and some of those around him with the hope that they could redirect and thus assume some measure of control over this set of attitudes by playing to this theme. Three factors helped promote this process, Verkhovskiy says. First, “the increasing legitimization of nationalist ideals and xenophobic emotions characteristic for the political scene and the mass media in the new decade allowed [these groups] to broaden the circle of likeminded people” less concerned about ideology as such.
Second, because ethno-nationalism had infected virtually all political parties and groups, it became more an influence group or set of attitudes within most of them rather than a single party that could be isolated and controlled. Indeed, Kremlin efforts to set up such a party have repeatedly failed. If there is today no single Russian nationalist party, however, there is a community of nationalists, many of whom passed through the marginal groups in the 1990s and now work to influence the parties, media outlets and government offices where they now sit, a network that the Kremlin has not been willing or perhaps able to destroy. And third, the regime itself, from Putin down, has been infected by these ideas. After all, as Verkhovskiy notes, the president has appeared to legitimate many of them both in his often inflammatory statements about the Chechens and in his actions or non-actions concerning many other minorities.
But as other statements by the Russian president show, Putin appears to be concerned that for many Russian xenophobic nationalists, he has not been willing to go as far as they would like either to strike out at immigrants or promote the idea of a “Russia for the Russians.”
Indeed, at least some of the more extreme xenophobic elements and ethno-nationalists among the Russians certainly view what Verkhovskiy describes as Putin’s latest effort to refocus their anger away from the domestic minorities to foreign states as evidence of this. This effort involves the promotion of a still amorphous set of ideas that another Moscow specialist on Russian xenophobia, Emil Pain, has labeled “civilizational nationalism,” the view that Russia is a unique civilization very different from and necessarily at odds with the West. Among the key elements of this concept are the following: Russia is not an ethnic whole or an empire but rather a civilization defined by its ideas. Its cultural and political traditions mean that it should not follow the West. And its ideological core is provided by Russian Orthodoxy.
Aleksandr Panarin, a neo-Eurasian in the past, is one of the chief articulators of this trend. In his writings, he openly opposes globalization, the West and “especially the United States” and seeks to promote a centralized and extremely authoritarian Russian state as a necessary step toward the formation of a new Orthodox Russian Empire. As ideal types, Verkhovskiy says, imperial and ethnic nationalism contradict one another, but in practice, at least in the Russian case, they in fact interact and reinforce rather than undermine each other. But as he notes in conclusion, that observation begs another question: Can ethnic and “civilizational” nationalism co-exist? Putin is clearly betting that they can, at least in his time. But his failure to anticipate the role that the monster of xenophobic Russian nationalism on which he rode to power would ultimately play suggests, Verkhovskiy concludes, that the current Russian president may be mistaken again.
The Telegraph reports:
A former aide to Vladimir Putin has accused the Russian president’s circle of lining their pockets from state funds. Andrey Illarionov, a market reformer and Putin’s economic advisor until his resignation two years ago, alleged that the Russian government’s £75 billion Stabilisation Fund, created in 2004 to cushion the budget from a fall in oil prices, was being exploited by members of the ruling elite for their personal benefit. He gave no details of how this allegedly occurred.
“The Stabilisation Fund, in the form in which it was created in which monies were accumulated, has ceased to exist. It has died. This is now a fund for increasing the personal wealth of specific individuals,” he claimed in a radio interview. “In the current conditions, the creation of organisations or funds like this simply increases the personal wealth of persons who have chanced to find themselves at the top of the Russian power structure.”
Illarionov, president of the Moscow-based Institute of Economic Analysis and a fellow of the Washington-based Cato Institute, claimed that the circle around Putin and his chosen successor Dmitry Medvedev, were increasingly adopting “the aggression of the street rabble” to stay in power. He cited flawed elections and alleged “velvet re-privatisation” – or forcing down the value of ex-state assets before putting them into the hands of loyalists – as examples of this “aggression” linked to a “moral decline” among the ruling elite. The state’s institutions have become the tools of Putin’s circle, he claimed. “At the moment for many of the people who are in power, there is almost no other means left to them but to escalate violence and aggression in order to remain in power. “They are not stupid people and they understand that the peak of their popularity has passed and that they will have to resort to the kind of violence seen in the past few weeks.
“The country has entered one of the most dangerous phases in its history, when almost all the institutions of a modern state have been destroyed and there is nothing that can be used as a support in a crisis.”
He insisted, though, that Russia’s present direction was a “deviation”.
“This option is a dead end – and will come to an end. It will end much more quickly that many people think,” he said.
The allegations come weeks after a controversial political scientist separately claimed Mr Putin had acquired control of £20 billion in energy assets during his eight years in power – enough to make him Europe’s richest man. Stanislav Belkovsky claimed that Mr Putin had made a multi-billion pound fortune by controlling stakes in three Russian energy companies through a network of front-men. “Russia under Putin is not a version of modern democracy,” said Mr Belkovsky. Mr Belkovsky claimed his information had come from credible sources in the Kremlin but admitted he had no documentary evidence. Mr Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, denounced the claims as “nothing but trash”.
“Certainly it has nothing to do with seriousness; it has nothing to do with professionalism. It’s just trash.” According to Mr Belkovsky, Mr Putin controls a 37 per cent stake in Surgutneftegaz, an oil exploration company, 4.5 per cent of Gazprom, the state energy giant, and at least 50 per cent of Gunvor, a Swiss-based oil trading company that has won a series of state contracts. The chief executive of Gunvor released a statement saying that Mr Putin owned no part of the company and was not “a beneficiary of its activities”. Observers were sceptical about Mr Belkovsky’s claims. “It would be strange if Putin was not rich,” said Leonid Radzikhovsky, a political analyst. “But the information about this treasure island seems a little exaggerated.” Mr Radzikhovsky added: “It is difficult to understand Belkovsky. He is known as a source of confusing information and it is hard to treat it seriously. He is an adventurer.” Mr Radzikhovsky said Mr Belkovsky “really knows a lot of people in high places but who is he to know the secrets” of Mr Putin.
“It would be strange if Putin was not rich.” That’s Russia in a nutshell, isn’t it. It would not only be surprising but “strange” to find out that Vladimir Putin had not looted the Russian treasury. And if he stole only one or two billion, that’s OK — as long as he didn’t steal $20 billion.
What a country! How barbaric and uncivilized can you get? THIS country is a G-8 member? Why not invite Robert Mugabe to join? How about Qadafi?
Yikes.
Posted in corruption, halls of power, russia
The Telegraph reports:
A former aide to Vladimir Putin has accused the Russian president’s circle of lining their pockets from state funds. Andrey Illarionov, a market reformer and Putin’s economic advisor until his resignation two years ago, alleged that the Russian government’s £75 billion Stabilisation Fund, created in 2004 to cushion the budget from a fall in oil prices, was being exploited by members of the ruling elite for their personal benefit. He gave no details of how this allegedly occurred.
“The Stabilisation Fund, in the form in which it was created in which monies were accumulated, has ceased to exist. It has died. This is now a fund for increasing the personal wealth of specific individuals,” he claimed in a radio interview. “In the current conditions, the creation of organisations or funds like this simply increases the personal wealth of persons who have chanced to find themselves at the top of the Russian power structure.”
Illarionov, president of the Moscow-based Institute of Economic Analysis and a fellow of the Washington-based Cato Institute, claimed that the circle around Putin and his chosen successor Dmitry Medvedev, were increasingly adopting “the aggression of the street rabble” to stay in power. He cited flawed elections and alleged “velvet re-privatisation” – or forcing down the value of ex-state assets before putting them into the hands of loyalists – as examples of this “aggression” linked to a “moral decline” among the ruling elite. The state’s institutions have become the tools of Putin’s circle, he claimed. “At the moment for many of the people who are in power, there is almost no other means left to them but to escalate violence and aggression in order to remain in power. “They are not stupid people and they understand that the peak of their popularity has passed and that they will have to resort to the kind of violence seen in the past few weeks.
“The country has entered one of the most dangerous phases in its history, when almost all the institutions of a modern state have been destroyed and there is nothing that can be used as a support in a crisis.”
He insisted, though, that Russia’s present direction was a “deviation”.
“This option is a dead end – and will come to an end. It will end much more quickly that many people think,” he said.
The allegations come weeks after a controversial political scientist separately claimed Mr Putin had acquired control of £20 billion in energy assets during his eight years in power – enough to make him Europe’s richest man. Stanislav Belkovsky claimed that Mr Putin had made a multi-billion pound fortune by controlling stakes in three Russian energy companies through a network of front-men. “Russia under Putin is not a version of modern democracy,” said Mr Belkovsky. Mr Belkovsky claimed his information had come from credible sources in the Kremlin but admitted he had no documentary evidence. Mr Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, denounced the claims as “nothing but trash”.
“Certainly it has nothing to do with seriousness; it has nothing to do with professionalism. It’s just trash.” According to Mr Belkovsky, Mr Putin controls a 37 per cent stake in Surgutneftegaz, an oil exploration company, 4.5 per cent of Gazprom, the state energy giant, and at least 50 per cent of Gunvor, a Swiss-based oil trading company that has won a series of state contracts. The chief executive of Gunvor released a statement saying that Mr Putin owned no part of the company and was not “a beneficiary of its activities”. Observers were sceptical about Mr Belkovsky’s claims. “It would be strange if Putin was not rich,” said Leonid Radzikhovsky, a political analyst. “But the information about this treasure island seems a little exaggerated.” Mr Radzikhovsky added: “It is difficult to understand Belkovsky. He is known as a source of confusing information and it is hard to treat it seriously. He is an adventurer.” Mr Radzikhovsky said Mr Belkovsky “really knows a lot of people in high places but who is he to know the secrets” of Mr Putin.
“It would be strange if Putin was not rich.” That’s Russia in a nutshell, isn’t it. It would not only be surprising but “strange” to find out that Vladimir Putin had not looted the Russian treasury. And if he stole only one or two billion, that’s OK — as long as he didn’t steal $20 billion.
What a country! How barbaric and uncivilized can you get? THIS country is a G-8 member? Why not invite Robert Mugabe to join? How about Qadafi?
Yikes.
Posted in corruption, halls of power, russia
The Telegraph reports:
A former aide to Vladimir Putin has accused the Russian president’s circle of lining their pockets from state funds. Andrey Illarionov, a market reformer and Putin’s economic advisor until his resignation two years ago, alleged that the Russian government’s £75 billion Stabilisation Fund, created in 2004 to cushion the budget from a fall in oil prices, was being exploited by members of the ruling elite for their personal benefit. He gave no details of how this allegedly occurred.
“The Stabilisation Fund, in the form in which it was created in which monies were accumulated, has ceased to exist. It has died. This is now a fund for increasing the personal wealth of specific individuals,” he claimed in a radio interview. “In the current conditions, the creation of organisations or funds like this simply increases the personal wealth of persons who have chanced to find themselves at the top of the Russian power structure.”
Illarionov, president of the Moscow-based Institute of Economic Analysis and a fellow of the Washington-based Cato Institute, claimed that the circle around Putin and his chosen successor Dmitry Medvedev, were increasingly adopting “the aggression of the street rabble” to stay in power. He cited flawed elections and alleged “velvet re-privatisation” – or forcing down the value of ex-state assets before putting them into the hands of loyalists – as examples of this “aggression” linked to a “moral decline” among the ruling elite. The state’s institutions have become the tools of Putin’s circle, he claimed. “At the moment for many of the people who are in power, there is almost no other means left to them but to escalate violence and aggression in order to remain in power. “They are not stupid people and they understand that the peak of their popularity has passed and that they will have to resort to the kind of violence seen in the past few weeks.
“The country has entered one of the most dangerous phases in its history, when almost all the institutions of a modern state have been destroyed and there is nothing that can be used as a support in a crisis.”
He insisted, though, that Russia’s present direction was a “deviation”.
“This option is a dead end – and will come to an end. It will end much more quickly that many people think,” he said.
The allegations come weeks after a controversial political scientist separately claimed Mr Putin had acquired control of £20 billion in energy assets during his eight years in power – enough to make him Europe’s richest man. Stanislav Belkovsky claimed that Mr Putin had made a multi-billion pound fortune by controlling stakes in three Russian energy companies through a network of front-men. “Russia under Putin is not a version of modern democracy,” said Mr Belkovsky. Mr Belkovsky claimed his information had come from credible sources in the Kremlin but admitted he had no documentary evidence. Mr Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, denounced the claims as “nothing but trash”.
“Certainly it has nothing to do with seriousness; it has nothing to do with professionalism. It’s just trash.” According to Mr Belkovsky, Mr Putin controls a 37 per cent stake in Surgutneftegaz, an oil exploration company, 4.5 per cent of Gazprom, the state energy giant, and at least 50 per cent of Gunvor, a Swiss-based oil trading company that has won a series of state contracts. The chief executive of Gunvor released a statement saying that Mr Putin owned no part of the company and was not “a beneficiary of its activities”. Observers were sceptical about Mr Belkovsky’s claims. “It would be strange if Putin was not rich,” said Leonid Radzikhovsky, a political analyst. “But the information about this treasure island seems a little exaggerated.” Mr Radzikhovsky added: “It is difficult to understand Belkovsky. He is known as a source of confusing information and it is hard to treat it seriously. He is an adventurer.” Mr Radzikhovsky said Mr Belkovsky “really knows a lot of people in high places but who is he to know the secrets” of Mr Putin.
“It would be strange if Putin was not rich.” That’s Russia in a nutshell, isn’t it. It would not only be surprising but “strange” to find out that Vladimir Putin had not looted the Russian treasury. And if he stole only one or two billion, that’s OK — as long as he didn’t steal $20 billion.
What a country! How barbaric and uncivilized can you get? THIS country is a G-8 member? Why not invite Robert Mugabe to join? How about Qadafi?
Yikes.
Posted in corruption, halls of power, russia
The Telegraph reports:
A former aide to Vladimir Putin has accused the Russian president’s circle of lining their pockets from state funds. Andrey Illarionov, a market reformer and Putin’s economic advisor until his resignation two years ago, alleged that the Russian government’s £75 billion Stabilisation Fund, created in 2004 to cushion the budget from a fall in oil prices, was being exploited by members of the ruling elite for their personal benefit. He gave no details of how this allegedly occurred.
“The Stabilisation Fund, in the form in which it was created in which monies were accumulated, has ceased to exist. It has died. This is now a fund for increasing the personal wealth of specific individuals,” he claimed in a radio interview. “In the current conditions, the creation of organisations or funds like this simply increases the personal wealth of persons who have chanced to find themselves at the top of the Russian power structure.”
Illarionov, president of the Moscow-based Institute of Economic Analysis and a fellow of the Washington-based Cato Institute, claimed that the circle around Putin and his chosen successor Dmitry Medvedev, were increasingly adopting “the aggression of the street rabble” to stay in power. He cited flawed elections and alleged “velvet re-privatisation” – or forcing down the value of ex-state assets before putting them into the hands of loyalists – as examples of this “aggression” linked to a “moral decline” among the ruling elite. The state’s institutions have become the tools of Putin’s circle, he claimed. “At the moment for many of the people who are in power, there is almost no other means left to them but to escalate violence and aggression in order to remain in power. “They are not stupid people and they understand that the peak of their popularity has passed and that they will have to resort to the kind of violence seen in the past few weeks.
“The country has entered one of the most dangerous phases in its history, when almost all the institutions of a modern state have been destroyed and there is nothing that can be used as a support in a crisis.”
He insisted, though, that Russia’s present direction was a “deviation”.
“This option is a dead end – and will come to an end. It will end much more quickly that many people think,” he said.
The allegations come weeks after a controversial political scientist separately claimed Mr Putin had acquired control of £20 billion in energy assets during his eight years in power – enough to make him Europe’s richest man. Stanislav Belkovsky claimed that Mr Putin had made a multi-billion pound fortune by controlling stakes in three Russian energy companies through a network of front-men. “Russia under Putin is not a version of modern democracy,” said Mr Belkovsky. Mr Belkovsky claimed his information had come from credible sources in the Kremlin but admitted he had no documentary evidence. Mr Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, denounced the claims as “nothing but trash”.
“Certainly it has nothing to do with seriousness; it has nothing to do with professionalism. It’s just trash.” According to Mr Belkovsky, Mr Putin controls a 37 per cent stake in Surgutneftegaz, an oil exploration company, 4.5 per cent of Gazprom, the state energy giant, and at least 50 per cent of Gunvor, a Swiss-based oil trading company that has won a series of state contracts. The chief executive of Gunvor released a statement saying that Mr Putin owned no part of the company and was not “a beneficiary of its activities”. Observers were sceptical about Mr Belkovsky’s claims. “It would be strange if Putin was not rich,” said Leonid Radzikhovsky, a political analyst. “But the information about this treasure island seems a little exaggerated.” Mr Radzikhovsky added: “It is difficult to understand Belkovsky. He is known as a source of confusing information and it is hard to treat it seriously. He is an adventurer.” Mr Radzikhovsky said Mr Belkovsky “really knows a lot of people in high places but who is he to know the secrets” of Mr Putin.
“It would be strange if Putin was not rich.” That’s Russia in a nutshell, isn’t it. It would not only be surprising but “strange” to find out that Vladimir Putin had not looted the Russian treasury. And if he stole only one or two billion, that’s OK — as long as he didn’t steal $20 billion.
What a country! How barbaric and uncivilized can you get? THIS country is a G-8 member? Why not invite Robert Mugabe to join? How about Qadafi?
Yikes.
Posted in corruption, halls of power, russia
The Telegraph reports:
A former aide to Vladimir Putin has accused the Russian president’s circle of lining their pockets from state funds. Andrey Illarionov, a market reformer and Putin’s economic advisor until his resignation two years ago, alleged that the Russian government’s £75 billion Stabilisation Fund, created in 2004 to cushion the budget from a fall in oil prices, was being exploited by members of the ruling elite for their personal benefit. He gave no details of how this allegedly occurred.
“The Stabilisation Fund, in the form in which it was created in which monies were accumulated, has ceased to exist. It has died. This is now a fund for increasing the personal wealth of specific individuals,” he claimed in a radio interview. “In the current conditions, the creation of organisations or funds like this simply increases the personal wealth of persons who have chanced to find themselves at the top of the Russian power structure.”
Illarionov, president of the Moscow-based Institute of Economic Analysis and a fellow of the Washington-based Cato Institute, claimed that the circle around Putin and his chosen successor Dmitry Medvedev, were increasingly adopting “the aggression of the street rabble” to stay in power. He cited flawed elections and alleged “velvet re-privatisation” – or forcing down the value of ex-state assets before putting them into the hands of loyalists – as examples of this “aggression” linked to a “moral decline” among the ruling elite. The state’s institutions have become the tools of Putin’s circle, he claimed. “At the moment for many of the people who are in power, there is almost no other means left to them but to escalate violence and aggression in order to remain in power. “They are not stupid people and they understand that the peak of their popularity has passed and that they will have to resort to the kind of violence seen in the past few weeks.
“The country has entered one of the most dangerous phases in its history, when almost all the institutions of a modern state have been destroyed and there is nothing that can be used as a support in a crisis.”
He insisted, though, that Russia’s present direction was a “deviation”.
“This option is a dead end – and will come to an end. It will end much more quickly that many people think,” he said.
The allegations come weeks after a controversial political scientist separately claimed Mr Putin had acquired control of £20 billion in energy assets during his eight years in power – enough to make him Europe’s richest man. Stanislav Belkovsky claimed that Mr Putin had made a multi-billion pound fortune by controlling stakes in three Russian energy companies through a network of front-men. “Russia under Putin is not a version of modern democracy,” said Mr Belkovsky. Mr Belkovsky claimed his information had come from credible sources in the Kremlin but admitted he had no documentary evidence. Mr Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, denounced the claims as “nothing but trash”.
“Certainly it has nothing to do with seriousness; it has nothing to do with professionalism. It’s just trash.” According to Mr Belkovsky, Mr Putin controls a 37 per cent stake in Surgutneftegaz, an oil exploration company, 4.5 per cent of Gazprom, the state energy giant, and at least 50 per cent of Gunvor, a Swiss-based oil trading company that has won a series of state contracts. The chief executive of Gunvor released a statement saying that Mr Putin owned no part of the company and was not “a beneficiary of its activities”. Observers were sceptical about Mr Belkovsky’s claims. “It would be strange if Putin was not rich,” said Leonid Radzikhovsky, a political analyst. “But the information about this treasure island seems a little exaggerated.” Mr Radzikhovsky added: “It is difficult to understand Belkovsky. He is known as a source of confusing information and it is hard to treat it seriously. He is an adventurer.” Mr Radzikhovsky said Mr Belkovsky “really knows a lot of people in high places but who is he to know the secrets” of Mr Putin.
“It would be strange if Putin was not rich.” That’s Russia in a nutshell, isn’t it. It would not only be surprising but “strange” to find out that Vladimir Putin had not looted the Russian treasury. And if he stole only one or two billion, that’s OK — as long as he didn’t steal $20 billion.
What a country! How barbaric and uncivilized can you get? THIS country is a G-8 member? Why not invite Robert Mugabe to join? How about Qadafi?
Yikes.
Posted in corruption, halls of power, russia
Posted in russia, sunday funnies
Very few English-language Russia blogs in the world have a higher Google page rank than La Russophobe.
