Annals of Cold War II Part 1: Neo-Soviet Russia Announces International Law no Longer Applies to Former USSR

RIA Novosti reports that Russia has unilaterially decided that the United Nations charter has no applicability within the former USSR, where Russian hegemony will decide all conflicts.

MOSCOW, September 13 – Russia is against involving the UN General Assembly in the resolution of long-running conflicts in the former Soviet Union, the Foreign Ministry’s official spokesman said Wednesday.

The assembly’s general committee discussed September 12 an initiative put forward by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova to include this issue on the current 61st session’s agenda.

Mikhail Kamynin (the demonically Neo-Soviet countenance pictured above left) said that Russia had spoken against this initiative and most members of the general committee had supported its decision. Accordingly, the issue was not added to the session’s agenda.

“We have from the outset been against politicizing this issue and involving the General Assembly,” Kamynin said.

Russia has had peacekeepers stationed in the conflict zones of unrecognized republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, as well as the self-proclaimed republic of Transdnestr in Moldova, since ceasefires were brokered between the breakaway and central authorities in the early 1990s. Armenia and Azerbaijan have observed an often tense truce over Nagorno-Karabakh, a region in Azerbaijan with a largely Armenian population, since about three years of fighting came to an end in 1994.

“Russia regards attempts to eliminate the existing mechanisms of resolving the Nagorno- Karabakh, Georgian-Abkhazian, Georgian-South Ossetian and Transdnestr conflicts as counter-productive,” Kamynin said.

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Annals of Cold War II Part 2: At Ground Zero in Moldova

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has maintained an outpost in Molodva since 1993; the region is a flashpoint for skirmishing between the U.S. in Russia as Cold War II unfolds, particularly in the disputed area known as Transnistria. Reader Jeremy Putley directs us to the comments of Moldova scholar Vladimir Socor regarding the replacement of the outpost’s former director, William Hill, by Louis O’Neill (pictured). Mr. Putley tells us that “Russia wants to retain its own little enclave sandwiched between Moldova and Ukraine primarily for use as a military base. That is the long and the short of it. The feeble-minded William Hill has been a disaster as head of the OSCE mission in Moldova, and the Russian position has been greatly strengthened as a result of positions he has taken.” He relates Socor’s analysis, from the Eurasian Daily Monitor, as follows:

A new American chief has just taken over at the OSCE’s Mission in Moldova, scene of a “frozen conflict” orchestrated by Russia on what has now become the border of NATO and the EU. From 1993 to date, the OSCE has attempted in vain to resolve the Transnistria conflict. It is not just the fact of that failure, but the particular ways and means of that failure that have contributed to discrediting this organization as a security actor.

Led by U.S. diplomat William Hill for a record-breaking period of more than six years until August 2006, the OSCE’s Moldova Mission has accumulated considerable political and conceptual ballast that the new Mission Chief, Louis O’Neill, will have to clean out in order to restore the Mission’s credibility.

That problematic legacy stems in part from a few U.S. State Department diplomats of the “Russia-First” school of thought who were in charge of the Transnistria dossier in 1999-2004, and the last of whom left in 2006. It also stems in part from some of their German and French counterparts in the respective capitals and in this Mission from 1994 to date. Moldovan authorities are eager to work closely with the Mission’s new chief: indeed, Chisinau insisted, as did Washington, that the post of Mission Chief remain in American hands, notwithstanding the outgoing chief’s track record. While Washington and Brussels have demonstrated a far clearer understanding of the Transnistria conflict since 2005 than had previously been the case, and corrected their policies accordingly to a significant extent — as did their representatives at OSCE headquarters in Vienna — the OSCE’s Moldova Mission awaited its own perestroika.

The Transnistria conflict is not one between two parts of Moldova, or the two banks of the Nistru River and their respective populations, or some kind of inter-communal conflict. The OSCE will continue to fail unless it recognizes the conflict’s real nature: An inter-state conflict in which Russia has seized a part of Moldova’s territory by military force and installed its political and administrative appointees there. The ongoing “negotiating process” and diplomatic terminology long associated with it are obscuring that reality. Imposed by Yevgeny Primakov in 1997 on a then-isolated Moldova, and supported by a line-toeing OSCE Mission to date, that process and that terminology misdefine Transnistria as a “party to the conflict” (ostensibly co-equal with the rest of Moldova); and Russia as “mediator” between two parts of Moldova, ignoring Russia’s actual role as initiator of and party to the ongoing conflict. Moreover, Russia claims the role of “guarantor” of an eventual political settlement of the conflict thus defined.

Those concepts have no basis in any legally valid documents. They are only set in records of discussions within the “negotiating process” over the years, which Moscow and Tiraspol regularly cite in demanding “observance of previously reached agreements” as a condition to progress in the negotiations. Chisinau broke out of that trap in 2004-2005, avoiding any reference to Russia as a “mediator” and “guarantor.” Continuing use by the OSCE of that terminology would be seen, at best, as confirmation that the discredited “negotiating process” goes nowhere; and, at worst, as a fallback to the 2002-2004 policy of consigning Moldova to Russian dominance.

Power-sharing between Chisinau and the Tiraspol authorities, under any constitutional guise — “federalization,” “autonomy,” “distribution of competencies,” “devolution” — is a goal that condemns the negotiations and the OSCE itself to failure. The authorities in Tiraspol represent Russia, not the population of Transnistria. As part of any such deal, Moldova would in fact be sharing power with Russia on Moldova’s territory and in the presence of Russian troops. “Federalization” is only the most radical among these power-sharing proposals; and Russia’s 2003 Kozak Memorandum differs only in degree, not in kind, from the 2002-2004 “federalization” project — a mainly Russian draft championed by the OSCE Mission at the public level. Even now, the departing Hill and others want the Mission to dust off the 2004 “mediators’” document as a basis for negotiations, although Chisinau had rejected all versions of “federalization” in 2004 when it chose Europe over Russia.

A package of military Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM), worked out at the OSCE’s Vienna headquarters and by a French general seconded to the Mission, forms a military accompaniment to the political project of “federalization.” It would legalize Transnistria’s armed forces and put them on a par with Moldova’s army for an open-ended period, for the declared purpose of reducing tension and cutting force levels toward the demilitarization of Moldova’s entire territory, under a Russian-dominated inspection mechanism that could not function effectively in Transnistria. The proposal explicitly exempts Russia’s forces in Moldova from cuts or inspections. Presented officially as late as 2005, the package was publicly criticized by Western military attaches at the OSCE in Vienna as well as by leading analysts in Chisinau. Other than the first, symbolic and redundant step of voluntary exchanges of data on force levels, implementation of this CSBM package would adversely affect Moldova’s security.

The conceptual cleanout ought also to include the postulate that Transnistria possesses a special political identity that could serve as one of the bases for autonomy of the left bank. This postulate originates with the 1994 report of a German diplomat in the OSCE Mission on his first, and brief, assignment to Moldova, where he never returned afterward. In reality, the left-bank and right-bank population contains the same ethnic mix (Moldovans, Ukrainians, and Russians being the main ethnic groups, in that order) with many related families on both banks. The one specific feature in Transnistria, however, is the successful Soviet political socialization among Russian and Russified town dwellers — a feature hardly worth considering as part of a left-bank political identity, let alone justifying autonomy for the left bank.

Edward Lucas also has recent comments on the Transdniestria issue. Additional updates can be found here and here.

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Chechnya Strikes Again? Or Just total Russian Incompetence?

The BBC reports that Chechens rebels have claimed they shot down a Russian helicopter, killing eleven Russian soliders including two generals. The Russians claim the helicopter crashed into a tree. Which version is more compelling proof of Russia’s total military failure in the region? You decide.

Islamist rebels claim they shot down a Russian military helicopter which crashed on Tuesday killing 11 people, including high-ranking officers. The Mi-8 helicopter came down in Russia’s North Ossetia region in the Caucasus. A little known insurgency group said in a statement on a Chechen rebel website that the Mi-8 was taken down, using a shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile. Russian military say the most likely cause of the crash was poor visibility. The defence ministry in Moscow confirmed that two generals were among the dead but has not released the names of those killed. One of the commanders in the North Caucasus District was among the dead, officials said. The insurgency group, calling itself the Ossetia Jamaat, claims it shot down the helicopter after receiving intelligence that it was carrying high-ranking officers. The ministry has not commented on the statement. Defence ministry officials, quoted in the Russian media, say the aircraft struck a tree in thick fog during exercises near Vladikavkaz, the provincial capital of North Ossetia. However Russian media quoted investigators saying they are looking into all possible causes, including hostile action.

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Talking Turkey About Racism in Russia

The New York Times report on the Kondopoga pogroms raises several interesting points. What follows are key sentences (in black) together with La Russophobe’s comments (in red):

Ethnic animosity runs so close to the surface of Russian society that almost anything can cause it to boil over. LR: That just about says it all, doesn’t it? Well, not quite though.

Two ethnic Russians had died by the time the brawl ended, but the violence had only just begun. Their deaths — at the hands of men from Azerbaijan and Chechnya — provoked angry protests and on the night of Sept. 2, a rampage through the town, followed by sporadic acts of vandalism that have continued since. LR: Problem number one in dealing with racism in Russia is language. “Ethnic Russians” is a term that could easily confuse many. There are two words for “Russian” in the Russian language, unlike in America where there is only one word “American.” Russians have the word “Русский” (ROO-skee) and they have the word “Российский” (“ra-SEE-skee”). If you put the word “Russian” into an online dictionary, the translation you will get is “русский” — this is roughly like putting “American” into such a dictionary and getting back a Russian word which means “KKK member.” To put it a bit more kindly, it’s as if there was a single word in English that meant “native born American with white skin.” “Русский” means Slavic; it means “real Russian.” It means “Russian by blood.” If you put in “Российский,” however, you’ll get an indication that the word doesn’t exist. This is the word Russians use to refer to people from Chechnya, supposedly Russian citizens but “not really.” It means non-Slavic. It means “Russian by law.” It means you have a target on your back. The mere existence of these two words is proof positive that the first sentence above was correct. In fact, a considerable understatement. The difference is made clear at the end of the piece where the Times reports:

Oksana N. Boganova is a Russian who works at one of the stores badly damaged in the rampage, the Azeri-owned Flamingo. It reopened a week after the attack, now with a guard on duty. She lamented what happened and expressed fear of what lay ahead. “I do not know whom we are afraid of,” she said, “the non-Russians or the Russians.”

The Times got sucked into the vortex listening to Ms. Boganova and forgot to insert “ethnic” before “Russian” just like she did, because “everyone knows” that there is only one word that actually means “Russian” and that’s “Русский.” There’s a “Русский” and there’s a “non-Russian.” Away from the vortex, it should at least be “ethnic Russians and “non-ethnic Russians” or more accurately “racist Russian citizens” and “their dark-skinned, Russian citizen victims.” It should be noted that “Российский” is not like “African-American.” The term “African-American” is a term invented and applied by dark-skinned minorities themselves, not a term applied to the group by the racist majority. When used by the majority, it’s a term of respect. “Российский” when used by Slavs is a term of opprobrium, a subtext for polite company. Those who use the term couldn’t care less what the dark-skinned poeple themselves what to be called.

Mobs of young men — fueled by anger and, officials said, alcohol — burned the Seagull club, owned by a businessman originally from Azerbaijan. Then they attacked a series of precisely chosen targets: the homes and businesses of migrants from the Caucasus, mostly from Chechnya. LR: Makes it seem that they were keeping a list of all such places for just such an occasion, doesn’t it?

Dozens of the town’s residents, Chechens mostly, but also ethnic Azerbaijanis and Georgians, fled that night. A group of 49 are now staying in a tourist camp outside the regional capital, Petrozavodsk, having escaped what is being widely called a pogrom, one that many here welcomed. LR: When the USSR collapsed, many Russophile maniacs said that Russia “could never turn the clock back” to Soviet times. In fact, not only could Russians in fact do so, but they could turn the clock simultaneously back past Soviet times to the days of the pogrom. Neat trick, isn’t it? Next time you hear a Russophile maniac spouting his garbage, remember that.

“They need to leave,” said Denis Doronin, 19, who said he took part in the protests that led to the violence. “They arrive from another country and they act like kings.” LR: This is some real truth. For the “Русский” a Chechen is “from another country” — except, that is, when they want independence or when foreigners want to help them; then they are “part of Russia” and nobody can say differently.

Ethnic tensions across Russia have been fueled by the latent racism common among many Russians, who freely use the pejorative “blacks” when describing people from the Caucasus, even in casual conversation. LR: More linguistic trouble here. When you take the Russian word for “black” and make it into a noun (say “CHOR-nik”), you get the Russian equivalent of the English word “nigger.” This is how most Russians naturally refer to people with dark skin. If they wanted to be more respectful, they’d use the word “Российский” — that’s what it ’s there for.

It also reflects a growing political opposition to migrant workers not unlike those movements in Europe and the United States and the indifferent or at times hostile responses from elected officials when violence erupts. LR: God help the dark-skinned people of Russia if they ever take it into their heads to become a public political force. If the Kremlin was prepared to arrest the president of Yukos, put him through a neo-Soviet show trial and sentence him to years in Siberia because he tried to get political, can you imagine what it’s prepared to do to the dark-skinned? Or more precisely, to allow to be done by others while it turns the other way?

“The behavior of certain young men who moved here from the Caucasus and other territories in recent years — not that many of them, but they were visible — has been beyond the pale,” said Sergei L. Katanandov, governor of Karelia, the region near Finland that includes Kondopoga in an interview with Izvestia on Thursday. LR: That’s right, the governor blamed the darkies. By the way, this man is a presidential appointee, not an elected leader. “President” Putin appoints all of Russia’s governors. Now, a really crazed Russophile would have you believe that this man is just like George Wallace during the 1960s in America, and tell you that Russia simply “needs time” to learn racial tolerance just like America did. There are are couple of problems with this line of total B.S. First, if its true, it means Russia is an uncivilized country, inferior to the West. But Russia demands equal treatment in Western groups like the U.N. and G-8. Second, there have always been, even in the time of slavery, high-profile leaders of both races in the United States publicly opposing racism and race violence. America fought a war over it more than a century ago. Neither of these points are true in Russia. Try to name Russia’s Martin Luther King or imagine how he could emerge. You can’t. If he did appear, he’d be Khodorkovskized faster than you could say Jackie Robinson.

The economic success of migrants is at the source of many xenophobic statements, even ones by prominent officials. The country’s leading nationalist politician, Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky, said migrants should be barred from owning markets or shops, hotels, restaurants and bars.“Restaurants and retail outlets should be in the hands of local residents, first and foremost,” he said in a radio interview after the violence in Kondopoga. “Otherwise clashes with local residents are inevitable.” LR: Russians polled said that Zhirinovsky is the sexiest man in Russia. He called for racist pogroms (and a new cold war with the United States) more than a decade ago. Now he’s making policy.

“They completely control the prices at the market,”said [one white woman who would not give her name] of the Chechens. “They buy all the potatoes in Karelia. Potatoes are like our second bread. They buy them for 7 rubles and sell them for 15. They do not even work. They just speculate.” Meantime, she added, “Ours are unemployed.” LR: And, she forgot to add, the fact that we white Russians have elected a proud KGB spy as our president, a spy who has abolished the election of governors, destroyed TV news and hoarded the nation’s oil revenues has nothing to do with anything.

UPDATE: Here’s a classic bit of Russophile gibberish from an ignorant moron named Nikolay in the comment section. He correctly noted that we misspelled “Российский” as “Россиский” but he didn’t even put the correct spelling into the online dictionary we mentioned to see if it would change the substance of our text. It doesn’t. You can put “Российский” into the Babelfish translator and get “Russian” as a result, and there are of course plenty of dictionaries that will give you “Russian” if you type in “Российский” — but they won’t won’t tell you a thing about the difference between this word and “Русский” and many (most?) won’t give you “Российский” as a variant if you type in Russian. Note that we didn’t say the word “Российский” doesn’t exist, we simply said it’s a second class racist word in the Russian language. If you study Russian, you meet “Русский” but will have a hard time coming across “Российский.” Basically, what the fire-breathing Russophile Nikolay has done is to feverishly search through our text looking for mistakes so he can ridicule our Russian — in other words, a classic show of Russian xenophobia and paranoia. Where Russians should be encouraging foreigners in using their dying language, instead they attack them. By the way, Nikolay is just mad because he claimed, outrageously, on his blog that people accuse him of being a Russophobe and when La Russophobe challenged him to post a link proving his claim he, of course, failed to do so. Nikolay likes to poke fun at those who dare to use online translators to speak Russian, but he doensn’t make fun of Russians who speak English badly. That’s because he’s such a Russophobe, of course.

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